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ABSTRACT

Murray Ro thbard's

anarcho-capitalism represents

an largely

unexplored portion of American political thought. Despite an overwhelming
array of publications on politics, economics, history, methodology, and other
realms of social theory, his writings have received very little attention from
the community of social theorists.
A significant reason for the lack of analysis concerns the unique and
radical nature of Rothbard's thought. Although this research concludes that
his form of anarchism is surely an American phenomenon, he combines the
influences upon his writings in ways which ultimately separate him from
even his libertarian colleagues. Still, he is an extremely influential figure in
the largely successful revival of contemporary American libertarianism or
classical liberalism, despite his overly radical anarchist tendencies.
This project integrates Rothbard's social theory and critiques it from
within the confines of a libertarian negative rights framework which defines
ethical parameters around the notion of individualism and non-interference.
It focuses upon five components of Rothbard's work: 1.) Methodological and
epistemological foundations; 2.) Economic theory; 3.) Political ethics; 4.)
Anarcho-capitalist society; and 5.) Strategies in the achievement of the
libertarian system.
After a thorough analysis of each of these areas, the research concludes
that Rothbard's system of libertarian ethics and his society of anarchy and
property rights are quite feasible theoretically and potentially provide practical
advantages over current State-imposed alternatives in many arenas .
However, some major concerns remain. Concerning the private provision of
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defense, Rothbard underestimates the propensities for free riding which may
only be overcome (as in other arenas entailing spillover effects) with time,
which makes the removal of the State apparatus highly problematic without
complete international consensus. In the case of external opposition,
transitional costs make his theoretical framework untenable. Moreover, the
entire libertarian model faces serious tactical problems--in which Rothbard's
absolutist and monistic style and theory do not relieve. He is never clearly
able to guarantee that his brand of anarchism necessarily protects or cultivates
the ethics of libertarianism. A rigid ethical dichotomy of the market and
political processes tends to cloak this fundamentally crucial issue in his
theory.
Nevertheless, Rothbard Is a significant figure both in the historical
understanding of the modern libertarian revival in America and in the
theoretical advancement of these ideas.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE WRITINGS
OF MURRAY ROTHBARD

Why Study Rothbard?

Murray Rothbard has written approximately twenty books, dozens of
scholarly articles, and hundred of articles in libertarian and popular
periodicals. In combination, these writings represent a highly coherent system
of social thought that has influenced a small but apparently expanding core of
modern thinkers. Yet, outside this libertarian circle, Rothbard's works have
received scant attention.
The scholarly community's overwhelming ignorance of this prolific
writer's thought is an unfortunate circumstance. There has been very little
critique of Rothbard's writings, despite the fact that his work, as a substantial
and comprehensive "theory of liberty," spans across the bulk of social theory.l
The intellectual world has been clearly witnessing a rejuvenation of
classical liberalism in recent years. And Rothbard is a critical player in this
unfolding drama. First, he may be viewed, as much as anyone, as the founder
of this "libertarian" revival. His writings in the 1960's and early 1970's were
some of the first works that began to define the new movement. Second, his
radical anarcho-capitalist ideas are in many ways the foundation for the

1 . There are a few exceptions, although the discussions tend to be
limited. See Newman (1 984, pp. 76-91); Green (1 987, pp. 34-54); Sampson (1984,
pp. 223-232); and Barry (1 986).
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milder forms of minimalism and laissez-faire which today are enjoying such
intellectual success. While part of the libertarian revival is surely due to the
attraction of writers like Rothbard and dedicated political activism, there are
other factors which opened the door to these ideas. Historical and theoretical
shortcomings in the choices provided by the American ideological spectrum
in the 1960's and 1970's produced a window of opportunity for libertarianism.
Whereas Rothbard's perspective has remained steadily consistent since he
began writing in the 1950's, the mainstream remained far from his point of
view until the social, political, and economic problems that surrounded the
turbulence of Vietnam, economic stagflation, Watergate, and other similar
events. Consequently, because of these potentially unexplainable events, the
existing mainstream of American political economy suffered numerous
chinks in its paradigmatic armor. A Watergate could not occur in America's
democracy. Neither could a Vietnam. And Keynesianism had promised an
age of prosperity. But in each case, the myths were uncovered, creating
unexplainable gaps for the ideological status quo and an opportunity for new
and different ideas. One of the most popular perspectives seeking to fill the
void left by the demise of the New Deal, Keynesian, and Vietnam mentalities
was a modernized notion of classical liberalism. The shift in the direction of
libertarian thought has brought attention to its more radical counterpart,
anarcho-capitalism, best found in the writings of Rothbard.
In important ways libertarianism represents a substantially different
alternative to the political status quo. The "hard core" of Western thought for
the majority of the twentieth century has entailed a more "collectivist"
foundation than the preceding century, whether found in its conservative,
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liberal, or more radical forms. As could be expected, it was within the more
individualistic American political culture that criticism of this collectivist
mentality first reemerged. Libertarianism, at first more critique than
substance, has subseq uently matured to provide a developed and
comprehensive system of ideas. One of the key contributors to this
renaissance is Rothbard: An analysis of his substantial writings would be a
timely endeavor which, as of yet, has not been undertaken.

The Nature of Rothbard's Writings

In examining Rothbard's scholarship, three characteristics in his
writing stand out in particular. First is the breadth of interdisciplinary
knowledge evident in his work. Heavily influenced by an intellectual
tradition that views social science as an intertwined and inseparable
discipline, his writings span philosophy, economics, politics, history, and
practice. Yet, all of these fields of study are combined in a singleness of
purpose: to develop a comprehensive and convincing theory of liberty.
Therefore, even within the expanse of his writings, there is always a common
and unifying theme and purpose. And this purpose is, of course, an extremely
radical one, namely, the removal of the State as an economically unviable
and ethically dastardly entity. In this sense Rothbard is the quintessential
libertarian.
Thus, his mission guarantees that, secondly, Rothbard will never fail to
be

provo cative.

His

t hought

demonstrat es

both

innovat ion

and

insightfulness, as he refuses to fit into common categories of theory. For
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instance, while he is quite clearly an anarchist, he retains few philosophical
similarities with the more familiar collectivist and syndicalist brands of
anarchism. His brand of anarchism more resembles the native American
individualistic kind, with still enough subst antial differences in both
economic and political theory to clearly distinguish his writings from these
nineteenth century writers. Yet, he ironically never seems comfortable with
even his philosophical neighbors in the minimalist and other classical liberal
camps. In fact, Rothbard has quite often been a vocal critic of these writers.
However, this intellectual "loneliness" in no way implies a lack of
logical consistency or a haphazard research program. In fact, this uniqueness
is more likely the consequence of the exact opposite circumstance, an
absolutist and rigorously derived system of social theory--all based upon
similar foundations. Therefore, Rothbard's third characteristic and perhaps
strongest attribute is his logical rigor. His staunchly deductive and axiomatic
approach to both economics and political ethics leads him to a consistent and
comprehensive--and radical--system of thought.
While this rigor is usually a positive attribute, it may be occasionally
damaging to a system of thought. First, the absolutism leaves the opportunity
for scholarly dialogue severely limited. If one rejects Rothbard's foundations,
there is little reason beyond the sheer appreciation of the logic and
comprehensive nature of the axiomatic system for a scholarly conversation to
continue. Secondly, Rothbard's is a demanding system and even at times,
perhaps, a dogmatic one. This method clarifies the dichotomy of reality and
theory. While this recognition may direct action toward the ideal, it may also
ignore the realities of the world and make the argument entirely untenable.
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Thus, the same attributes which make Rothbard a powerful theorist serve to
diminish the appreciation he might otherwise garner.

Rothbard's Major Contributions to Social Theory

We may rather neatly divide Rothbard's contributions to social theory
into six general areas: 1.) economic theory; 2.) political theory and politics; 3.)
public policy; 4.) epistemology /methodology; 5.) strategies of activism; and 6.)
history. This research examines the substantial portions of the first five of
these areas. Considering the interconnectedness of the research program, this
division may appear rather arbitrary in certain ways. Yet, as careful reading of
Chapters II through VI will demonstrate, there is an observable chain of logic
that directs Rothbard's system of thought from the metaphysical principles of
epistemology to the concrete concerns of intellectual and political strategy.
Rothbard's writings in economics spans across his entire career.
Influenced heavily by Ludwig von Mises, Rothbard has maintained a strict
adherence to the traditional tenets of the Austrian School of Economics that
originated in the writings of Mises' mentor Carl Menger in the late
nineteenth century. Rothbard's most important contribution to the Austrian
school is probably his magnum opus Man, Economy, and State (1 962c),
arguably the last of the traditional comprehensive treatises on economics.
This work was followed in 1970 by Power and Market (1977a), a companion to
his 1962 publication which developed his views on government intervention
in the market. One of the Austrian School's most important contributions to
economics is Rothbard's "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare
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Economics" ( 1956), a critical appraisal of welfare economics' failure to
maintain a strict subjective value theory. In 1983, Rothbard specifically
provided his views on monetary theory in The Mystery of Banking (1983b) in
which he further developed his arguments for the return of the gold
standard. Other contributions in monetary theory includes What H a s
Government Done to Our Money? (1985b; 1 964 originally), E c o n o m i c
Depressions: Causes and Cures (1983a), "Austrian Definitions of the Supply of
Money" ( 1978a), "The Austrian Theory of Money" ( 1976a), and "The Case for
the 1 00 Percent Gold Dollar" (1962a). Finally, he has written substantially on
economic history, applying Austrian insights to the recession of 1819, in The
Panic of 1819 (1962d) and the Great Depression, in America's Great Depression
(1 963a) . Other contributions to economic history include "The Federal
Reserve as a Cartelization Device: The Early Years, 1913-1930" (1984) and "The
New Deal and the International Monetary System" (1976e).
Rothbard's major contributions to political theory are found generally
in two of his works. For a New Liberty, originally published in 1973 and
expanded in 1 978, represents a "manifesto" of the libertarian movement
(1978b). The work encompasses a combination of both political theory and the
framework for anarcho-capitalism. However, Rothbard's most philosophical
writings are found in The Ethics of Liberty (1982a). Further development of
these themes may be explored in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature
(1973a), Left and Right (reprinted 1979d), "Capitalism versus Statism" (1 972a),
"Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor" (1971 a),
"Justice and Property Rights" (1974c), "The Logic and Semantics of
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Government" (1963b), "Society Without a State" (1978d), and "Law, Property
Rights, and Air Pollution" (1982b) .
Rothbard's discussions of public policy may be found in literally
hundreds of sources. In general, the best source is still For a New Liberty. One
may also examine "The Myth of Neutral Taxation" (1981c) and "The Great
Society: A Libertarian Critique" (1 973b). He has also written a good deal on
education specifically, including Education, Free and Compulsory (1972) and
"Total Reform: Nothing Less" (1 976i).
The best general source of Rothbard's views on methodology are found
in Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1979c), which
includes several articles which appeared in other forms earlier. One may also
find

discussions of praxeology in Man, Economy, and State (Chapter 1),

"Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics" (1 976g), "Praxeology,
Value Judgments, and Public Policy" (1 976h), "In Defense of Extreme
Apriorism" (1957), "Value Implications of Economic Theory" (1 973c), and
"Epistemological Problems of Economics" (1962b) .
The majority of Rothbard's contributions to the literature on
libertarian strategy may be encountered in the numerous libertarian journals,
magazines, and other assorted forms of print that arose from the late 1960's to
the present.2 However, these arguments are generally systematized in the
concluding chapters of The Ethics of Liberty and For a New Liberty.
Finally, Rothbard has written extensively in American revisionist

2. For a generally complete list of all of Rothbard's work (through 1986)
see Block and Watner (1 986, pp. 34-37, 45-72).
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history. While we will not be investigating these contributions in the present
analysis, they still are a substantial addition to the literature of liberty. The
most important of his works is the ongoing series on early American history,
Conceived in Liberty, a four volume work (a fifth has yet to be published) that
traces the American experience up through the Revolution. Rothbard has
also written widely in recent history, particularly relating to American foreign
policy, including "Harry Elmer Barnes As Revisionist of the Cold War"
( 1 968), "The Hoover Myth" (1 970), "War Collectivism in World War I"
(1972c), and "The Foreign Policy of the Old Right" (1978c).

The Research Program

Our research follows this division of Rothbard's contributions to social
theory in Chapters II through VI. While there are threads which weave all
these categories into a comprehensive whole, it is not difficult to find the
means to make these categorizations. In a sense, the chapters appear in a kind
of descending order, beginning with Rothbard's and other Austrians'
discussions of the ultimate foundations of epistemology and methodology,
and concluding with the "real-world" concerns of the strategies to be used in
actual practice to achieve the libertarian society.
We need to provide the reader two warnings . First, whereas the
interconnectedness of these categories will remain obvious, it will be our task
to try to separate each "realm" and analyze it on its own merits. Therefore,
each chapter will limit its focus to the subject at hand; we leave it to the
reader to recognize the subtle relations between these categories. While these
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divisions may not provide perfect justice to Rothbard's arguments, it is a
necessity of analysis.
Second, we examine Rothbard in "his environment". In investigating
and critiquing his contributions to social theory we will remain within the
confines of those traditions that have influenced Rothbard. There will not be
thorough expositions of the kind of criticisms that a Marxist value theorist or
a Keynesian economist might heap upon Rothbard's economics, for example.
We limit our discussion to the "paradigm" in which Rothbard writes,
namely, Austrianism, libertarianism, anarchism, etc.
Chapter II explores the epistemological and methodological
foundations of Rothbard's thought. This requires an inves tigation of
praxeology, an apriori notion of science which is deductively built upon
fundamentally true axioms. Since the bulk of Rothbard's understanding of
praxeology originates in the writings of Mises and other earlier Austrian
writers, Chapter II focuses upon the role of Rothbard's mentor in the
development of these materials. Rothbard's contributions to this body of
thought are quite clearly resting upon the shoulders of earlier Austrian
theory. However, although Rohbard's unique contributions in this area are
limited, these discussions are required to establish the foundations and
illuminate the reader to this thinker's more original work in other realms of
social theory. We conclude by examining a contemporary issue of the
Austrian School that helps to elucidate the foundations of Rothbard's
methodology while also uncovering a potentially widening gulf within this
rather unique methodological tradition.
Chapter Ill investigates Rothbard's contributions to economic theory.
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The chapter is divided into three parts. First, we briefly examine the general
themes of the Austrian School of economics. Secondly, we explore Rothbard's
most important contributions to Austrianism. Our focus concerning
Rothbard's contributions is on particularly two areas of economic theory,
namely, monetary and monopoly theory. Thirdly, expanding this discussion,
we investigate Rothbard's most unique contribution to economics, the
praxeological consequences of what he terms "hegemonic" intervention, the
admittance of government into the free market.
Although one may discuss the consequences of particular policies
scientifically, Rothbard argues that in order to promote a specific set of
prescriptions from these conclusions we require an objective set of ethics. In
other words, even though Austrian economics may generally appear to
promote certain policy conclusions, it may legitimately only explain the
consequences. Chapter IV examines Rothbard's efforts to create the ethics
which allow for a theory of liberty. In this discussion, we explore his
grounding of ethics in natural law, based upon the rights of self-ownership.
He develops in a method similar to his economics the body of libertarian
ethics founded on the principles of property rights and the axiom of non
aggression. Finally, we examine his discussion of the State in political
philosophy or, more correctly, the realization that the State represents for
him the epitomy of criminality and ought not to exist.
Chapter V continues the themes that are created by the anarchist
conclusions of the preceding discussion. In this chapter we transcend the
mere critique of the State by Rothbard in order to look at the kinds of
institutions which, he argues, may replace the functions now provided by
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governments. The result is the anarcho-capitalist society in which all goods
and services, including those traditionally viewed as public goods, are
provided through the market process. To achieve this system Rothbard seeks
to consolidate ethical imperatives and real demands. The chapter explores
and critiques these policy solutions in a substantial number of specific areas,
concluding in almost all cases that his efforts at linkage are, in fact, successful.
Chapter VI examines Rothbard's major contributions on libertarian
strategy by exploring a problem common to radical systems of thought,
namely, the pitfalls of political acceptance and practical implementation.
Without adequate successes in this tactical arena, an entire system of thought
faces intellectual extinction. Thus, the chapter examines several problems
facing libertarian activism--many that are peculiar only to libertarianism.
Chapter VII concludes our study by reweaving Rothbard's work into a
whole fabric. In our final discussions we seek to place both Rothbard and the
larger libertarian movement in historical and theoretical context. Specifically,
we look at the libertarian heritage and its relationship to other contemporary
American ideologies. Moreover, we search for Rothbard's place within these
American contexts. And, finally, we conclude by briefly speculating on what
the future may hold for the ideas of Rothbard and libertarianism.
The current problems facing the more collectivist and politically
interventionist arenas in the world have created an intellectual "stage" which
humanity has not witnessed in many generations. These concerns require
one to return and reexamine first principles of political theory in
fundamental ways. In contemporary society, libertarian thought is a key
component in this reexamination. The fundamental task of this research is to
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analyze perhaps the most influential and provocative contributor to this body
of ideas, Murray Rothbard.
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CHAPTER II
ROTHBARD AND THE METHODOLOGY
OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL

I ntroduction to the Austrian School's Methodology

Before one may adequately critique Rothbard 's more original
contributions in political economy, he must investigate the uncommon
methodological tenets of the Austrian School of Economics. The bulk of his
thought has a distinctly Austrian component, a tradition that explicitly
originated during the subjectivist/marginalist revolution of the 1870's in the
writings of Carl Menger and that were later elucidated in the thought of his
student Ludwig von Mises (Menger, 1 981; 1963). While Rothbard has
provided significant contributions to the body of this methodology, to
completely understand these ideas one is required to explore other Austrian
predecessors . Therefore, Chapter II will be a more comprehensive
investigation of these foundations, which focus not only on Rothbard's
writings but also on the more general tradition of Mengerian /Misesian
Austrian methodology.
Menger, along with fellow Austrians Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen
von Bohm-Bawerk, developed a methodology plainly in contrast to the
popular German Historical School of the late nineteenth century) As a result,

1 . For overviews of the history of Austrianism, see White (1 984);
Reekie (1984, Chapter 1); Taylor (1980, Chapter 1); and Rothbard (1979c, pp. 4561).
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this Methodenstreit, or "battle over methods," pitted the Historical School,
which in its more naive forms sought science founded on pure
"inductivism" without any unifying formal theory, against the Austrians. 2
The Austrians, Rothbard argues, were a synthesis of two sources: the
individualistic deductive tradition of the classical political economists (J.B.
Say and Nassau Senior in particular) and the "Southwest German School"
(Rothbard, 1980a, p. 30) .3
In

the

twentieth

century,

the

older

d i s t i n ction

of

historicism/institutionalism and Austrianism has been superseded by the
domi nance of modern positivism or empiricism. Epistemologically,
empiricist truth-claims require verification by sensory experience. Reason
alone is inadequate; mathematics and logic are retained but as purely analytic
statements, true by definition, which are utilized to organize meaningful
statements. Phenomena outside this realm (such as metaphysics, as
positivists define it) are either impossible to verify (or falsify) or are
completely non-sensical. Theorists in the mainstream of neo-classical
economics, mimicked by other "less rigorous" social sciences, have adopted
these overtly natural science methods and have applied them to the study of
human action. Relying heavily on mathematical formalism and statistics,
many modern empiricists have viewed the goal of science to produce

2. The label "Austrian", in fact, was first used by members of the
German Historical School as a derogatory brand. It stuck, however. Most
Austrian economists today are not Austrian by nationality.
3. For discussions of pre-Mengerian influences see Rothbard (1979c, pp.
45-51; 1976, pp. 69-71) and Kirzner (1976a, pp. 152-159).
14

theories that are predictive and rest ultimately on empirical sensory data
(Friedman, 1953, pp. 3-43).
However, most Austrians ground their methodology on a very
different form of "empiricism", or even on apparently non-empirical
grounds. As a result they have often been woefully misunderstood by
mainstream critics. 4 Arguably, some parts of the Austrian's own criticisms of
modern empiricism have been superseded by advancements in the study of
epistemology (Butler, 1988, pp. 319-321 ) . Yet, their fundamental critique
remains and, likewise, "praxeology"--the method for understanding human
action--remains a viable alternative to present frameworks of knowledge
discovery. Therefore, it is necessary to outline the methodological and
epistemological underpinnings of Austrian praxeology, focusing on its main
architect (and Rothbard's mentor), von Mises. Ignoring a small (though
fund amental)

epistemological

difference,

there

are

only

minor

methodological differences between Mises and Rothbard. However, as we
shall see, there is a more clear dichotomy between Rothbard and a number of
younger current Austrians concerning more fundamental epistemological
issues, a debate which we investigate in the subsequent section.

4. See, for example, Blaug (1 980, pp. 91 -93). Caldwell (1982, pp. 105-106,
1 1 8-1 19, and 134) takes Blaug to task on these misconceptions. He further
argues in support of an attractive form of "methodological pluralism,"
contending that the application of falsificationist frameworks to the Austrian
program is improper critique, since it is founded on explicitly different
grounds.
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Methodology, Praxeology, and the Study of Human Action

Praxeology is most thoroughly detailed in the writings of Mises (Mises,
1963, Chapters 1-7; 1976; 1985) . In developing its foundations Mises clearly
seeks an epistemological "middle ground" between scientific extremes.
Rejecting normatively laden holism, he adopts the notion of "value free"
science in the Wertfreiheit tradition of Weber. However, he also denies both
the subtle relativism of historicism and the scientism of modern empiricism,
developing a foundation resting upon what he terms "methodological
apriorism."
Fully developed praxeology, Mises contends, transcends the commonly
conceived confines of economics. By escaping these parameters and avoiding
the pitfalls of both nihilism and scientism, he grounds social science on a
thorough theory of subjectivism in human choice and exchange rather than
on narrow profit maximization.
For a long time men failed to realize that the
transition from the classical theory of value to the
subjective theory of value was much more than the
substitution of a more satisfactory theory of market
exchange for a less satisfactory one. The general
theory of choice and preference goes far beyond the
horizon which encompassed the scope of economic
problems as circumscribed by the economists from
Cantillon, Hume, and Adam Smith down to John
Stuart Mill. It is much more than merely a theory of
the "economic side" of human endeavors and of
man ' s striving for commodities and an
improvement of his material well-being. It is the
science of every kind of human action. Choosing
determines all human decisions. In making his
choice man chooses not only between various
material things and services. All human values are
16

offered for option. All ends and all means, both
material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base,
the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single
row and subjected to a decision which picks out one
thing and sets aside another. Nothing that men aim
at or want to avoid remains outside this
arrangement into a unique scale of gradation and
preference. The modern theory of value widens the
scientific horizon and enlarges the field of
economic studies. Out of the political economy of
the classical school emerges the general theory of
human action, praxeology (Mises, 1963, p. 3).
Praxeology studies conscious actions, as contrasted with involuntary
behavior, which, Mises argues, is not a part of human social science.
However, neither is praxeology an endeavor into psychology, nor is it aimed
at the speculative understanding of why individuals act certain ways in
specific situations. Instead, it focuses upon explaining what occurs in human
activity--not by providing concrete or specific details, but by providing the
observer a framework to order and understand reality.
A universally true science is achievable, Mises concludes. While the
motivation of action may not be universally understood, the nature of action
can be discerned. That much--as of now, at least--is all one can know, for man
faces an "insurmountable" separation of subject and object Mises calls
"methodological dualism. "
. . . . In the present state of our knowledge the
fundamental statements of positivism, monism,
and panphysicalism are metaphysical postulates
devoid of any scientific foundation and both
meaningless and useless for scientific research.
Reason and experience show us two separate
realms: the external world of physicat chemical,
and physiological phenomena and the internal
world of tho ught, feeling, v alu ation, and
purposeful action. No bridge connects--as far as we
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can see today--these two spheres .... In the face of this
state of affairs we cannot help withholding
judgment on the essential statements of monism
and materialism .... (We) are bound to acquiesce in a
methodological dualism.
Human action is one of the agencies bringing
about change. It is an element of cosmic activity
and becoming. Therefore it is a legitimate object of
scientific investigation. As--at least under present
conditions--it cannot be traced back to its causes, it
must be considered as an ultimate given and must
be studied as such (Mises, 1963, p. 18).
Praxeology, therefore, studies the category of human action, not
particular concrete acts. But in studying action categorically, one develops an
understanding for the "real thing." According to Mises, there is, in fact, no
alternative to accepting the truth-claim of the primordial category of action.
Grasping methodological apriorism leads to the realization that one cannot
imagine categories of knowledge in variance or conceive of logical
contradictions with these positions.
The fundamental logical relations are not subject to
proof or disproof. Every attempt to prove them
must presuppose their validity. It is impossible to
explain them to a being who would not possess
them on his own account. Efforts to define them
according to the rules of definition must fail. They
are primary propositions antecedent to any
nominal or real definition. They are ultimate
unanalyzable categories. The human mind is
utterly incapable of imagining categories in
variance with them .... They are the indispensable
prerequisite of perception, apperception, and
experience (Mises, 1963, p. 34).
These propositions are true, prior to experience, and represent a series of
"necessary and ineluctable intellectual conditions of thinking, anterior to any
actual instance of conception and experience" (Mises, 1963, p. 33). They are
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laws of thought or a pre-equipped "set of tools for grasping reality" (Mises,
1963, p. 35). Since the category of action is mind-founded, it cannot be nor
need be falsified. To challenge its truth-claim is to verify its truthfulness. To
"test" self-evident truths, Mises concludes, would be ridiculous; it is "idle to
ask whether things-in-themselves are different from what they appear to us"
(Mises, 1 963, p. 36).
On these epistemological points, there has been a substantial amount
of disagreement within the Austrian tradition. In fact, Mises is largely alone
with his Kantian foundations. For instance, his mentor Menger rests his own
methodology on Aristotelian metaphysics, seeking the "laws" of economics
in the essences of human action, i.e., the nature and inter-connections of
social phenomena (Menger, 1963, p. 37). Mises, while maintaining the core of
the Mengerian program, redirects it in two distinct ways. First, he discards the
psychological overtones of early Austrian motivation studies, replacing it
with the study of the implication and not the motives of action.
Psychological studies, in other words, are replaced by a pure theory of choice
founded on the self-evidently true idea of cognitive action. Secondly, he
denies Menger's broadly empirical epistemology and substitutes Kantian
rationalism.
Rothbard, on the other hand, returns to the Mengerian perspective,
arguing that the "axioms" of action are so broadly based in experience "that
once enunciated they become self-evident and hence do not meet the
fashionable criterion of 'falsifiability"' (Rothbard, 1976g, p. 25) .
. . . . Without delving too deeply into the murky
waters of epistemology, I would deny, as an
Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any such alleged
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'laws of logical structure' that the human mind
necessarily imposes on the chaotic structure of
reality. Instead, I would call all such laws 'laws of
reality,' which the mind comprehends from
investigating and collating the facts of the real
world. My view is that the fundamental axiom and
subsidiary axioms are derived from the experience
of reality and are therefore in the broadest sense
empirical. I would agree with the Aristotelian
realist view that its doctrine is radically empirical,
far more so than the post-Humean empiricism
which is dominant in modern philosophy
(Rothbard, 1976g, p. 24).
However, for the purpose of understanding Austrian method, the
differences between Mises and Rothbard are minor, particularly when they
are contrasted with mainstream positivism. Whereas Rothbard may argue
that praxeological axioms are empirical, they are still just as certainly true as
are Mises' rationally founded ones (Rothbard, 1976g, p. 27) . And this view is
unquestionably contrary to modern empiricism's constantly open-ended
conception of truth-claims.
Since Mengerian empiricism, unlike the post-Humean variety, seeks
fundamental truths, or essences, it is likely to be dismissed by modern
empiricists as definitional propositions and, therefore, mere tautologies. A
deeper understanding of these propositions, however, would lead one to
recognize that these qualitative relationships and phenomena bundled in
these axioms are themselves fundamentally true and critical in explaining
reality.
It is unlikely any Austrian would deny a role for modern empiricism
in science. Menger, for example, argues there are two kinds of empirical laws:
exact (non-falsifiable) and empirical (concrete and contingent on specific
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human volition) . In fact, T.W. Hutchison contends that Menger's vigorous
attack on the Historical School was aimed at the distinctive notion of certain
historicists that they had exclusive ownership of truth (Hutchison, 1973, p.
37). This perspective, Austrians argue, is overly restrictive; science must
further grasp the understanding of the essences of phenomena, a type of
knowledge that "transcends" particular events but is all the while just as true.
This broadly empirical notion focuses on an additional part of reality, one
discovered by introspection, or by the understanding of universal inner
experience. Experience includes the "reflective" as well as the "physical"
(Rothbard, 1976g, p. 25) . Modern empiricists would obviously frown upon
such a view, since introspection fails to be "operationally meaningful" and,
thus, is untestable.
For Mises, the "test" for correct praxeology does not come from
comparing it with external experience, since these propositions precede
history. It is impossible to discern meaning without these axioms. The
proposition is "tested" and true if it is grounded in correct epistemological
foundations and properly arrived at through a deductive chain of logic.
Rothbard, on the other hand, views introspective experiences as antecedent
to extrospective ones, and argues that praxeological axioms are "a posteriori
to the universal observations of the logical structures of the human mind
and human action" (Rothbard, 1951, p. 181). Yet, they are both empirical and
non-falsifiable; once stated these propositions are obviously true, even if they
are not subject to extrospective verification to justify their truthfulness.
Therefore, these claims are not mere tautologies; by beginning with a broader
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notion of experience, methodological apriorism avoids the tentativeness of
positivistic verification and the trap of circular definitional argumentation.
Moreover, Austrian methodology escapes positivism's division of the
a priori (and "unreal") and the empirical (and uncertain) . By expanding into
the introspective realm of purposes, praxeology, as Austrian Israel Kirzner
notes, avoids the limitations imposed by modern social science .

....It is the task of science to describe and explain
reality. If reality consists of more than the external
world, then a science that is confined to the facts of
the external world is simply incomplete. It does not
account for everything that is there. The Austrian
approach insists that there is something besides the
facts of the external world and the relationships
that may be postulated between these bare facts.
What is that something else? It is the realm of
reality that Knight pointed to, the realm of
purposes. And even if one were able to explain the
facts of the external world in terms of similar facts,
without regard to the human purposes underlying
these facts, one would not have explained
everything there is to be explained, not have set
forth everything there is to set forth. One would
have failed to make the world intelligible in terms
of human action, that is, in terms of human
purposes . . . . There is a realm of reality called
purposes. It is there, and if we fail to point it out,
then we fail in the task of making the world
intelligible in terms of human action (Kirzner,
1976c, pp. 44-45).
The study of human action depends on the idea that there is an essence
to human conduct, accompanied by the "consciousness of volition" (Kirzner,
1976a, p . 151) . Hence, it is the introspective factor that makes "human"
science, i.e., the ability to make choices. Praxeology does not propose to have
knowledge of the content of specific determinations of anyone's particular
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will, but only that all individuals share this ability to act willfully. While
praxeology may provide some predictive ability qualitatively, its main
purpose is to explain the chaotic social world, assisted by the understanding of
the essence of volition. This understanding results not from generalizing
about certain series of particular past events but from an essentialist
understanding of humans "from within. "
Since the knowledge of internal experience or mind-founded
categories is required in the study of human action, it is quite illogical to
utilize exclusively methodologies aimed only at external sensory data.
Austrians, therefore, are highly critical of the use of natural science methods
in the social· sciences. Fundamental differences in the phenomena studied
may lead to woefully incomplete or even misguided research. Whereas the
natural world may be objectively verifiable, observable, and suitable to
commonly applied deterministic methodologies, human action is the
product of an individual's elective and creative faculties (which themselves
give the social world its meaning) and require an alternative approach.
Thus, the appropriate methodology in the social s ciences i s
fundamentally reversed from that o f the natural sciences (assuming a
deterministic method is appropriate for the natural sciences) . The latter
ideally begins with or is at least verified by observation, as one tests
hypotheses against collected data. On the other hand, praxeology begins with
true axioms and carries this knowledge into the realm of human action. In a
sense, as Rothbard argues, these axioms are more firmly empirical than any
natural science observation, for "since the ultimate causes are known as true,
their consequents are also true" (Rothbard, 1979c, p. 21).
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These axioms are derived from the "subjective" imprint on all social
events. Praxeology studies person and meaning, not things, which necessarily
introduces the notions of perception and subject-valuation. Nevertheless,
while the focus is subject-oriented, the science--at least for traditional
Austrians such as Rothbard--is still objective and untainted by personal
values.
Objective praxeological theory in the social sciences may be compared
to a second branch of social reality, history, or the "concrete content of human
action" (Mises, 1963, p. 30). Epistemologically, theory alone is a reliable source
for universal truth-claims, for history may provide neither universal
understanding nor predictive capabilities of future actions. Instead, theory is
used to envelope specific events, providing a "roadmap" to allow
understanding.
This distinction of theory and history corresponds to the position that
the social and natural sciences are fundamentally (or at least extremely)
different. Since the concrete social world is indeterminate and its meaning is
subject-given, historical events cannot be used to ultimately prove or
disprove specific hypotheses.

Likewise, the historian will never be truly

objective, for he deals with unique events and necessarily invokes his own
subjective meanings.
For the Austrian, these overtly uncertain themes are critical to the
formation of a social science. Each historical act is unique--no more fixed for
repetition than any other conceivable act. The social world is both incredibly
complex and indeterminate. Even if science could somehow solve the former
concern of a practically infinite number of causal variables, no degree of
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understanding causality may solve the inherently unpredictable nature of
human motivations and actions. Thus, praxeology is severely limited in the
sense it is "accurate and irrefutable but it is not precise" (Reekie, 1984, p. 32) .
The understanding of particular historical events relies on the theories one
applies to these actions, or what Mises terms the "non-historical" means .
. . . . Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a
historical, science. Its scope is human action as
such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental,
and individual circumstances of the concrete acts.
Its cognition is purely formal and general without
reference to the material content and the particular
features of the actual case. It aims at knowledge
valid for all instances in which the conditions
actual correspond to those implied in its
assumptions and inferences. Its statements and
propositions are not derived from experience . . . .
They are not subject to verification or falsification
on the grounds of experience and facts. They are
both logically and temporally antecedent to any
comprehension of historical facts. They are a
necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of
historical events. Without them we should not be
able to see in the course of events anything else
than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle
(Mises, 1963, p. 32).
One "brings" praxeology to the study of history. It is a process more of
lo cating the proper theory than testing it. That an axiom fails to "fit" a
particular set of events makes it only inapplicable, not falsified. Still, theory is
not completely severed from the concrete world; its usefulness is dependent
on its application to historical events. Hence, there is a sort of intertwining of
the two realms but with always a clear distinction. For example, in
developing praxeological axioms, the economist must delve into history to
demonstrate the meaning of his propositions or to explain specific world
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events. Contrarily, the historian explains unique circumstances using all
available insights (including praxeology). The mental tool of the former is the
conception of universals or essences; the mental tool of the latter is the
understanding of the uniqueness of events as developed through the "eyes"
of the historian. Viewed from an Aristotelean perspective, the "form" of
human action precedes the "matter" of action. Or, facts illustrate rather than
prove propositions (Rothbard, 1 95 1 , p. 944) . As Rothbard notes, this
understanding allows the Austrian program a far richer view of human
history.
. . . .The praxeologist contrasts, on the one hand, the
body of qualitative, nomothetic laws developed by
economic theory, and on the other, a myriad of
unique, complex historical facts of both the past and
the future. It is ironic that while the praxeologist is
generally denounced by the positivist as an
'extreme apriorist,' he actually has a far more
empirical attitude toward the facts of history. For
the positivist is always attempting to compress
complex historical facts into artificial molds,
regarding them as homogeneous and therefore
manipulable and predictab le by mechanical,
statistical, and quantitative operations in the
attempt to find leads, lags, correlations,
econometric relations, and the 'laws of history.'
This procrustean distortion is undertaken in the
belief that the events of human history can be
treated in the same mechanistic way as the
movements of atoms and
molecules--simple,
unmotiv ated, homogeneous elements . The
positivist thereby ignores the fact that while atoms
and stones have no history, man, by virtue of his
acts of conscious choice, creates a history. The
praxeologist, in contrast, holds that each historical
event is the highly complex result of a large
number of causal forces, and, further, that it is
unique and cannot be considered homogeneous to
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any other event. Obviously, there are similarities
between events, but there is no perfect
homogeneity and therefore no room for historical
'laws' similar to the exact laws of physical science
(Rothbard, 1979c, pp. 41-42).
The Austrian avoids the criticism of arbitrariness by grounding his
deduced axioms in firm, epistemological foundations which, in turn, serve as
an ordering framework that is applied to external experience yet is itself also
true. The modern empiricist, on the other hand, attempts to formulate a body
of science in a specialized and fragmented manner, failing to recognize any
explicit systematic framework. From an Austrian perspective such an effort
resembles an attempt to escape a maze in blind darkness.
Once the praxeologist establishes the a priori existence of human
purposeful action, deduced true implications necessarily follow. In turn,
these thereoms may then be applied to specific areas of human activity. S The
statement "individuals act" establishes two necessary foundations of
praxeological research. First, all action is reducible to single actors; social
"wholes" derive any meaning they possess from the actions /meanings of
specific individuals. In no way does this deny that individuals are influenced
by their external worlds or by other individuals .
. . . . Individualism has always been charged by its
critics--and always incorrectly--with the assumption
that each individual is a hermetically sealed 'atom',
cut off from, and uninfluenced by, other
persons . . . . Economic theory is not based on the
absurd assumption that each individual arrives at

5. Austrians have largely focused upon economics within praxeological
theory. Nevertheless, apparently nothing prevents applications into other
realms of social theory. See Rothbard (1951 , pp. 945-946).
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his values and choices in a vacuum, sealed off from
h uman influence . Obviously, indiv iduals are
continually learning from and influencing each
other (Rothbard, 1976g, pp. 30-31).
There is no denying persons may act differently when under the influence of
"groups," for example. But the difference lies in the meaning attached to the
event by the actor, not the fact that something other than the individual
acted. As Mises quips, it is the hangman, not the "State," that executes the
criminal (Mises, 1 963, p. 42). The fundamental Austrian criticism is that
unless one proceeds back to the foundation of human science--the human
actor--he faces the dangers of falling prey to any number of the unscientific
forms of holism (common in modern macro-economics). Collective units
simply do not "act" apart from or not reducible to individuals as the core unit
of analysis. Beginning comprehension elsewhere, as Menger notes, may lead
the researcher far afield.
Whoever wants to understand theoretically the
phenomena of a 'national economy' and those
complicated human phenomena which we are
accustomed to designate with this expression, must
for this reason attempt to go back to their t r ue
elements, to the individual economies in t he
nation, and to investigate the laws by w hich the
former are built up from the latter. But whoever
takes the opposite road fails to recognize the nature
of ' national economy. ' He starts off on the
foundation of a fiction, but at the same time he fails
to recognize the most important problem of the
exact orientation of theoretical research, the
problem of reducing complicated phenomena to
their elements (Menger, 1963, p. 93).
From these arguments follows the intense Austrian critique of
"scientism". Rothbard, for instance, argues that this type of foundation may
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ultimately result in either misguided mechanicalistic or organismic
analogies. The first produces a false faith in measurement, mathematical
formalism, model-building, and a propensity for misused metaphors, such as
"equilibrium." The second leads to "grossly unscientific" concepts such as the
"public good" and an inclination to bring abstract labels (such as "market") to
life (Rothbard, 1979c, p. 15; Chapters 3-4).
Nothing within the Austrian program denies the worthiness of
studying institutional arrangements--so long as they are properly rooted. In
fact, a major emphasis of Austrianism has always been the study of
unintended institutional consequences of individual action. But institutions
are consequences, not formulators, of reality. Reality is an unceasing sequence
of solitary actions which may occur in non-isolation but that all the while
happen because an indiv idual thinks and acts. Within the constraints of
methodological individualism, it is only the individual that generates the
real-stuff of the social world.
Hence, the second component of the initial axiom relates to individual
action. Mises argues that action both results from and demonstrates an
uneasiness about one's state of affairs. To act implies, first, the image of a
better state and, second, the expectation that action can alleviate the
uneasiness. To fail to act (which is self-evidently impossible) would signify
either a perceived perfect state of affairs or no perceived aptitude to achieve
success. Thus, action implies that individuals believe some level of order
exists in the world and that they may benefit from acting upon this
knowledge.
In seeking to relieve uneasiness, Mises contends that individuals aim
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to achieve a broadly defined concept of happiness. However, happiness is
purely subjective; the scientist may make absolutely no judgment on
individual valuation. 6 Therefore, human volition requires only a meager
notion of rationality in this subjectivist framework. The nature of rationality
is perhaps the most misunderstood of all Austrian tenets. As with other true
structuring propositions, rationality is both a non-falsifiable and fruitful idea.
As Kirzner explains, it demonstrates that individuals' actions are "not
haphazard but are expressions of a necessity for bringing means into
harmony with ends," allowing a "range of explanations of social
phenomena" (Kirzner, 1976a, p. 172).
The misunderstanding of Austrian rationality (beyond the positivist
criticism that it is a tautology) results from the different meaning praxeology
and subjectivism attach to rational acts . The notion that it is used as a
substantive concept, ie., an act is rational if the manipulated means are
consistent with chosen preferences aimed at a hiearchy of ends, makes no
sense in the Austrian program. Instead, rationality is "in the transference ... of
those features in behavior that accompany the direct pursuit of ends"
(Kirzner, 1976a, p. 1 66). In this sense, rational and action are the same thing.
All action involves choice, and the act reveals or demonstrates true
valuations. To speak of concrete thoughts about preferences in particular
circumstances exits the realm of praxeology. Rationality obviously cannot

6. Almost all Austrians have been staunch proponents of free markets.
But to maintain such a perspective requires one to "leap" into the realm of
ethics. On the impossibility of grounding the market in non-ethical ways, see
Rothbard (1973c, pp. 35-39).
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speak of what should be acted upon. But nor can it judge qualitatively the
consequences of actions, since both the notions of human error and
uncertainty, as well as the unlocked mysteries of subjective thought patterns,
are always present. And these notions do not affect the Austrian notion of
rationality. All this definition requires is that individuals do not act purely
reflexively. Thus, the contrast is not between rationality and irrationality but
rather between voluntary (human volition responding to specific
circumstances) versus involuntary actions. There is human volition and
there are physiological reactive responses. The former must always
encompass the Austrian idea of rationality; the latter is not part of a human
science (Mises, 1963, pp. 20-21) .
To alleviate uneasiness, persons seek ends (either intermediate or
ultimate). To achieve ends, means are utilized. The social world is given
meaning by the actions of persons; or, in shaping their worlds, individuals
transform things into means . This understanding of action is much more
than the common economic notion of allocation of resources, as Kirzner
recognizes:
.... But a really unique criterion for the definition of
economics is not to be found in the idea of
allocating scarce resources, nor can this concept
serve as an adequate foundation on which that
science can be constructed. The key point is not that
acting man ponders the comparative efficacy in
different uses of certain given 'means,' but that he
behaves under the constraint that he himself has
imposed, i.e., the necessity of acting in order to
achieve what he wants to achieve, so that his
behavior tends to conform to the pattern implied by
his scale of ends. 'Means' exist as such for acting
man only after he has turned them to his purpose;
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acting is not apportioning, but doing --doing what
seems likely to further one's purposes (Kirzner,
1976a, p. 162).
The means-ends framework, as Mises argues, is therefore "not about
things .. .it is about men, their meanings and actions" (Mises, 1963, p. 92) .
To act implies a teleological, means to ends, framework. Means must
always be scarce; otherwise, no uneasiness would be felt. Moreover, action
implies the perceived ability to discover causal relationships. Without this
category of causality, persons would not aim to act, since all things would be
purely random. So, to intervene with the world requires at least the
perception of some degree of regularity and the ability to manipulate causal
relations.
To act within these constraints implies the notion of choice and
preference-making. The reality of scarcity requires that choices must be made,
which implies valuation. Value equates to the importance an actor attaches
to an end as demonstrated by actual conduct. Means are valued according to
the perception/ expectation one has in their ability to attain such ends. Value,
therefore, is not intrinsic in the thing valued, but is subject to the reactions
each human has toward it, within their own "world" (Mises, 1963, p. 96). For
example, to define a nation or individuals as "wealthy" because they possess
large quantities of oil would be inappropriate from an Austrian perspective-
for the same reasons tallying all the country's rocks or mud would be
unfruitful. There are no ways to impose "value" on these things outside the
subjective valuation of individuals and the specific time of the valuation.
The focus of economic science, then, is not the measurement and/ or the
efficient allocation of predetermined "means", but the process of actors in an

32

economy conceiving of and implementing plans to define or convert things
into means to respond to changing realities.
Mises calls this process of reconstituting one's state of affairs exchange.
The abandoned state is called costs; profit is the difference between the two
states. These generally viewed economic terms are thus much more
expansive. Value is a "psychic" phenomeneon, purely determined within
each acting subject and intersubjectively unmeasurable.
The notion of a change to alleviate existing uneasiness

m

states of

affairs also implies a temporal sequence. Action occurs through time and is
always aimed at the future. It becomes evident to the actor through his efforts
at change. The concepts of time and change clarify Austrian notions of
rationality. One can speak only of demonstrated preference. In combination,
Austrian temporality and rationality require:

If A>B, and B>C, atT:l , then A>C, at T:l
However, at T:2, one faces a new set of constraints. The acts at T:l cannot
serve as a universal guide. If, for instance, C>A at T:2, praxeological axioms
remain as true as before. Concretely, an observer simply knows for whatever
reasons preferences have changed. Rational action is, in other words, always
consistent but not always constant.
Finally, the notion of action implies uncertainty. Mises, in fact,
considers them "two different modes of establishing one thing" (Mises, 1963,
p. 105) . The volatility that results from acting in an uncertain social world
serves as the foundation for the Austrian criticism of probability studies and,
more generally, quantitative methodology in the social sciences. Since no
constant relations of any kind exist across time, any effort to track
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quantitative relationships must continually be reevaluated. Prediction for
obvious reasons is, accordingly, severely downplayed. Perhaps certain
qualitative "mental experiments" might be useful. But these exercises, by
necessarily holding numerous "variables" constant, are extremely limited
because of the indeterminate and complex nature of reality. Or, no variables
in the real world ever stay constant!
Because of these problems, Austrians focus on process rather than
social statics. In a world that gives the notion of time real meaning, the value
of mathematics becomes exceedingly limited, for there is no thing resembling
what one might call the "frozen present." In explaining human action in a
complex and uncertain model, the English language is much richer than a
mathematical or symbolic one. Creative and unpredictable actors require a
constant recapitulation of any empiricist model. As Duncan Reekie points
out, quantification is an unfruitful exercise.
More important. . .is the Austrian emphasis on the
study of the competitive process through time . The
nature of changes in time, their degree and
intensity, and even their direction cannot be
deduced from initial axioms . If they could then
mathematical economics would be of value as a
concise reasoning tool. But human action is not
'preprogrammed. ' Learning occurs, tastes and
technologies change, exogenous variables are
continuously imparting new shocks to the system.
Only if these variables could be perfectly foreseen
would mathematics be of value for conciseness .
Since they are not, even if they are tractable by
mathematics, the symbols and their relationships
would have to be continually respecified . . . .It is the
presence of time and uncertainty that makes
mathematics of little value to Austrians rather than
its inability to handle their economic data. And
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time and uncertainty, learning and expectation
revisions are elements which are inherent in
human action but which cannot be treated by
abstract mathematical symbolism before, and
during the ever changing events (Reekie, 1984, p.
33)
More fundamentally, while drawing quantifiable correlations may
mysteriously link sets of variables, the explanatory concern--the nature of the
linkage--is left unknown. Austrians, by focusing on a verbal method, are able
to transcend the limitations of static studies, i.e., equilibrium models. Such
models are restricted in usefulness by the social world's overwhelming
complexity, the lack of anything remotely resembling pure "laboratories," the
indeterminate nature of subjective volition, and the subsequent lack of
human constancy. Rather than assuming these pitfalls away, Austrians focus
upon these "variables. " However, it is more than merely a debate over focus;
by viewing human action as an ongoing process of human discovery, error,
or creativity and not as series of static end-states, Austrianism redirects the
nature of human sciences. ?
This notion of (radical) uncertainty reveals a potentially serious
problem in the Austrian program, however. In a certain sense, its divergence
from neo-classical economics, for example, rests upon the question of how
much uncertainty actually exists in the social realm. Kirzner, in fact, argues
there are two distinctive strands that define Austrianism. First, human action
is purposeful, a notion derived introspectively. The second strand concludes
there is an unpredictability inherent in human choices and expectations

7. For a strong defense of the usuage of words rather than symbols, see
Egger (1 978, pp. 27-31 ).
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(Kirzner, 1976c, p. 42). The degree that the second tenet is true is a narrowly
empirical question, however. While praxeological deduction may imply
some level of uncertainty, it cannot imply how much.
This issue creates a particularly important dilemma for economics. In
the balance hangs the nature of order in a complex market arena. Following
Hayek's concerns, Kirzner asserts:
. . . [ W ] hen postul ating a tendency toward
equilibrium, we do have to resort to a particular
empirical proposition. Moreover, the empirical
proposition in question would seem to contradict
the other i dea that there are an inherent
unpredictability and an indeterminancy abo ut
human preferences and human knowledge. If we
are to be able to say anything about the process of
equilibration, especially if we are to say something
about the course by which human decisions lead to
unintended consequences, we shall have to rely
upon the particular empirical proposition that men
learn from market experience in a systematic
manner. This is inconsistent with the second tenet
underlying Austrian economics that there is an
inherent indeterminancy in the way by which
human knowledge changes (Kirzner, 1976c, pp. 4849).
Accepting a broad and inherent notion of uncertainty means that the
nature of a market order and any systematic understanding of unintended
consequences becomes problematic. If the world is inherently unpredictable,
science seems left with nothing but the implications of individual purposeful
action. Yet, would even these implications remain? A notion of
purposefulness would seem to require some level of predictability. In other
words, to act at all would require actors to be correct at least part of the time.
On the other hand, if the world is truly unpredictable, can science even
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postulate universal truth-claims? This dilemma, as will be evidenced in the
next section, threatens to generate a deep divergency in the Austrian School.

Modern

Debates

in

Austrianism:

Growing

Emphasis

on

Inh erent

Unpredictability?

An increasing amount of Austrian research in recent years has focused
on these themes of uncertainty. In fact, the entire idea of value-free science
has been subject to internal criticism, a challenge that may ultimately reform
the traditional understanding of praxeology as being universally true.
The tensions of a scientific methodology founded heavily on radical
subjectivism has produced an epistemological dichoto my in the recent
Austrian revival. Misesian-Rothbardian praxeology, which may be defined as
a formal and universally true logic of choice, has found opposition from a
growing number of younger Austrians. Perhaps the two most outspoken
critics of "classical formalism" are Don Lavoie (1 985a; 1986, pp. 192-210) and
Richard Eberling (1985; 1986, pp. 39-55), who argue for a "hermeneutical"
study of human action. By briefly examining these ideas we can ascertain a
more clear understanding of Rothbard's own perspective.
These

hermeneutical Austrians rely heavily o n the "growth of

knowledge" literature to repudiate modern positivism for failing to include
the "subjectivist" (Eberling) or the "interpretative" (Lavoie) elements of
knowledge. Lavoie defines this element as the "historical (both history proper
and history of ideas), linguistic, narrative, dialogical, perspectivistic, tacit, and
sociological aspects of economic explanation" (Lavoie, 1985a, p . 3). He
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contends that through a bias toward the predictive and quantitative aspects of
science over the interpretive and qualitative ones, economics, rather than
immunizing itself, opens the discipline to the criticisms of the " anti
microeconomic hoards" (Marxists, Supply-Siders, Institutionalists,etc.). 8
Building on the arguments of Richard Berstein (1 983), Lavoie
interprets the growth of knowledge not as a skeptical weakening of science
but as a "liberation" from both objectivism (positivism) and relativism. The
idea of truth is broadened, found not in "explicit rules known by any single
mind, but in the partly tacit judgments of, and the processes of interaction
among, the members of the scientific community" (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 14).
This epistemological perspective has a definitive common thread with
the Austrian program. Science is seen as a competitive discovery process akin
to a market, from which a complex order emerges. Acceptance of one
" theory" over another is never discernible in advance but emerges or is
unmasked by the continual rivalry and interaction of scientists trained in a
specific discipline. Thus, science is less rationalistic rule-following and more
tacit judgment, intuitive sense, and personal choices by persons trained
within the dialogue of a particular context. Or, science is not the "efficient
allocation" of pre-determined contexts and criteria, but the process of
discovering these factors.

8. See particularly Lakatos and Musgrave (1 970); Lakatos (1978); Kuhn
(1970);Feyerabend (1975); and, for an excellent summary of the growth of
knowledge literature, Caldwell (1982).
For an intriguing application of Lakatosian science to Austrian methodology,
investigate Rizzo (1982, pp. 53-74) .
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Yet, Lavoie argues, rejecting objectivism does not necessarily create a
relativistic abyss.
But to say the scientist's trained intuition is what
ultimately guides his or her search for truth, is not
to say 'Anything Goes.' Rejecting objectivism does
not entail embracing relativism. While alternative
paradigms cannot be objectivistically translated into
a neutral language and measured against a common
set of standards, this does not mean that rivals
should give up their vain search for one truth and
all go their own relativistic ways. On the contrary
our only path to truth is in their engaging in the
process of contention. It is out of the confrontation
between two incommensurable theories, their
mutual attempts to re-interpret and criticize one
a n o th e r , that we hope to construct effective
comparisons between them. Where we cannot
disprove our opponent's theory by finding clearcut
cases of falsification of its predictions, we can still try
to per suade him that our interpretation is more
compelling than his (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 15).
The criteria for choosing one theory over another becomes the plausibility of
the specific interpretive framework. Scientific explanation rests on two
dimensions: a predictive dimension that is falsifiable but as of yet unfalsified
by "facts," and an interpretive dimension. But all facts are necessarily theory
laden, as all interpretive undertakings by an observer begin in a hermeneutic
"circle." In other words, there is no external source outside the subjective
interpretation of the person doing the observing that could arbitrate in a
detached manner. Always, some prior perspective must "make sense" of facts,
for the circle is closed, i.e., one is a part of the observation being made
(Eberling, 1985, pp. 6-8). Hence, the criterion for what is scientifically valuable
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is whatever interpretations scientists find convincing in this open-ended and
ideally free-spirited "conversation."
Therefore, the context for evaluation is not "a theory vs. the facts, but
two (or more) theories explaining the selected-as-relevant 'facts'" (Eberling,
1 985, p. 1 2) . Facts represent "disguised theories," so that any notion of
"evidence" is problematic; to ask for facts presupposes a framework that
defines which stuff is and is not relevant.
And so fails objectivism and its acceptance of "foundationalism," the
view that one must ground all knowledge in a specific philosophical route
which makes it immune fro m criticism. In economics, Lavoie notes, one
finds this viewpoint as either Euclideanism (as rigorously deductive models)
or as Falsificationism (as rigorously inductive frameworks) . Either one of
these perspectives, alone, leaves out too much of reality and thus evades the
problem of theory choice by simplistically ignoring circumstances where
alternative interpretive frameworks exist. By being overly narrow in focus,
these techniques beg the issue.
Starting with the subjectivist notion of introspection, Lavoie and
Eberling turn to hermeneutics and reject both Kantian and Aristotelian
metaphysics, replacing them with a thoroughly subjectivist epistemology.
Still, knowledge is not exclusively private; these introspective propositions
refer to, as Alfred Schutz explains, the "one and unitary life-world common
to us all" (In Lavoie, 1985a, pp. 28-29). And this knowledge produces a richer
science, an "unarticulated" sociological process by which scientists and their
interpretations interact. The interpretive act requires the scientist to explore
the "other," but not as a detached observer but as one who is mutually
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connected to the observation and dependent on other scientists in this neverending dialogue.
Yet, if detachment is

unachievable, one might argue

that

hermeneutical science cannot be subjected to any means of criticism or
"testing. " Lavoie responds:
What we find ourselves doing in the social sciences
is not so much the testing of ex ante predictions but
is more of the nature of an ex post explanation of
principles. The only 'test' any theory can receive is
in the form of a qualitative judgment of the
plausibility of the sequence of the events that have
been strung together by narrative. Theoretical
sciences like economics can supply the principles of
explanation but only the historical narrative can
put these principle to work and establish their
applicability and significance in some specific
circumstances under investigation. But elevating
the role of history and tradition in science does not
imply a denigration of reason. On the contrary,
these writers charge their critics with having caused
an improverishment (sic) of reason by divorcing it
from practical reasoning and equating it instead
with a 'strictly formal scientific methodology' .... [I]f
we seek to trace the sources of our prejudices, both
those that distort our vision of reality and those
that enable it, 'then we must turn to the past, to
tradition, and to the proper authority (based on
knowledge) which 'implants ' these prejudices
(Lavoie, 1985a, p. 38).
The source of knowledge is thus shared understanding, or the domain of
intersubjective agreement resting upon, in Eberling's words, "explanatory
plausibility" of historical circumstances (Eberling, 1985, p. 12). Based on
traditional interpretations of praxeology, these critics have redirected the
debate over Austrian epistemological foundations . Science becomes "more
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dialogical than logical, more a matter of a back and forth interplay of partly
implicit perspectives than a linear accumulation of explicit facts, more a
dynamic process among scientists in which meaning unfolds spontaneously
than a static body of data deliberately acquired" (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 41).
However, Lavoie further argues that this perspective does not
represent a radical departure from the Misesian tradition, contending there
has always been a strong hermeneutical component in Austrianism. Hayek's
work, for example, may be rather easily fit into the growth of knowledge and
hermeneutical literatures. His emphasis on subjects transforming inarticulate
and tacit bits of information unintentionally into the unambiguous price
structure of a complex market order seems quite similar to the more
fundamental epistemological subjectivism of Lavoie and Eberling.
Moreover, Hayek drifted away from the strict Misesian praxeology after
coming under the influence of Karl Popper's falsificationism. His mentor
Mises, though, has generally always been interpreted as an "extreme
apriorist", fully cloaked in an "apodictically certain" foundationalism.
Construed in this manner, praxeology is not open-ended; it is universally
true. To subject these propositions to any manner of skepticism would be
ridiculous. Yet, the insights of the growth of knowledge literature require
open-endness and a rivalry of competing research programs. Dogmatism
would apparently have no place in such a scientific order.
Lavoie, however, reinterprets Mises' writings by replacing the apodictic
notion of universally true theory with a view that sees theory as a "scheme of
interpretation" that both illuminates and is shaped by historical factors
(Lavoie, 1985a, p. 45) . Eberling calls the thereoms "transparent overlays" to be
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"lowered on to the historical terrain," allowing understanding (Eberling, 1985,
p. 40) . In an important sense, this interpretation still strongly resembles
traditional praxeology: It is knowledge that is "within" humans--an argument
Mises made using a great deal of Kantian language.
However--and this interpretation is crucial to the new critique--Mises,
according to Lavoie, never meant apriorism to be metaphysical but merely
methodological. In other words, the "apriori" is a pragmatic kind,
tantamount to the intersubjective life-world one takes for granted. Through
theory, one captures this sameness; praxeology provides the schemes that
give human action meaning.
The practical ramifications of Misesian praxeology are retained while
the commonly construed (dogmatic) foundations are dismissed. The "apriori"
is not a "list of explicit, self-evident intrasubjective axioms" from which we
deduce true science, but a "level of pregiven intersubjectivity, of common
understanding which precedes and sustains science. " (Lavoie, 1986, p. 204) .
And, so, praxeology becomes open to dialogue and challenge.
Likewise, the common notion of Mises' separation of theory and
history requires reinterpretation. Lavoie contends that Mises viewed the two
realms as only different and not disconnected--merely "two complimentary
aspects of cognition" (Lavoie, 1986, p. 53) . That history is dependent on
presuppositions that base historical "facts" seems uncontroversial in the
Misesian program. That theory is somehow dependent on history is a quite
bit more debatable proposition from a reading of Mises. It is apparent that the
development of a specific theory is likely reliant upon the problems posed by
an a priori understanding of history. But Lavoie also argues that the
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acceptance of a specific theory depends on its usefulness in interpreting
history.
On the second point Mises is less clear,but he can be
read as endorsing the position that the reason that
we accept an interpretive framework is that we
believe we 'see' history better through it than
through alternative frameworks. Mises held the
whole purpose of theory is to 'render useful
services for the comprehension of reality' . . . . For
Mises then, the value of theory is a derived
demand. What a theory is worth depends on how
well it 'works,' that is, how good a grasp on the
events of reality it enables its user to attain. In the
weighing of the usefulness of a theory for
interpreting history that theory is 'tested' in the
only way a theory ever is (Lavoie, 1986, p. 55). 9
And, apparently, the justification must be a pragmatic one. Thus, it
appears that Hayek's prediction about the (Austrian's) twentieth century
advance toward subjectivism includes even the realm of epistemology.
Science itself becomes ultimately subjectively intrinsic (although somehow
defined in epistemologically collectivist terminology) . There is, as Eberling
concludes, "no textbook of rules to tell us whether [an interpretation] really is
the correct or best one" (Eberling, 1985, p. 41). Yet, the link to the Misesian
tradition remains arguably intact; Mises' contentions are
similar to those of hermeneutics: "[T]hat all social theorists in practice and
each of usin our everyday lives view social phenomena as already
interpreted, or from within" (Lavoie, 1985a, p. 56).

9. Eberling is even more clear on this relationship, stating that history
provides the selection among and modification o f specific theoretical
constructs. See Eberling (1985, p. 40).
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Setting aside what Mises really meant (which is, in many ways, a moot
point), this new epistemologic al approach is more consistent with the
Austrian research program in certain ways. Eberling, for example, explicitly
notes the similarity of traditional Austrian economics and hermeneutical
science, comparing the "entrepeneurial interpretations" of the businessman
and the scholar, who are both in an open-ended process of discovery,
speculation of meaning, and interpretation (Eberling, 1985, pp. 28-29).
Despite these similarities, a number of Austrians remain quite
unconvinced. Rothbard is a particularly harsh critic of hermeneutics,
branding it a "fuzzy-minded Continentia! horror," "a fetid bog, a miasma of
jargon-ridden incoherence," and an "incomprehensible thicket" (Rothbard,
1 986, p. 12). Namecalling aside, there are concerns among a number of
Austrians over the apparent "slippery slope" to historicism faced by
hermeneuticians (Gordon, 1986). Rothbard also argues that the removal of
universal truth-claims in economics and ethics leaves one devoid of any
ammunition against statism--or, for that matter, any position--a consequence
which he clearly will not accept. It may be more than coincidence, for
instance, that most hermeneuticians are political collectivists as well as
epistemological ones. It is unclear how or if this perspective somehow
threatens individualism within the Austrian framework. Furthermore, to
borrow an example from economic theory: Would individuals act to achieve
ends if there were no predictability, i.e., stable conditions? If science in a
similar regard is no more than open dialogue without "stable" foundations,
what incentive is there for the scientist to act, i.e., to research and participate
in the community's conversation. Rothbard is concerned with the dangers of
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endless dialogue, or perhaps no dialogue, since truth-claims appear to
originate purely subjectively.
Yet, the traditionalist arguments leave one with a sort of
uncomfortable "dualism"--an "objective" science of subjectivism. While
there is nothing necessarily inconsistent in such a perspective, it is very easy
to see the logic of the direction hermeneutics seeks to move the Austrian
program. Moreover, the debate ultimately boils down to whether scientific
claims are eternally true or rather only fundamentally stable. The
hermeneutical position places a great deal of responsibility and faith in the
scientist who acts outside the assurances that absolute truth may be
forthcoming, perhaps ironically in a manner quite similar to the faith
Austrians in general have in entrepeneurs in generating an efficient market
order through the discovery and exploitation of profit possibilities.

Conclusion

Where the hermeneutical-traditionalist debate will lead is highly
unclear at present. In responding to neo-classical economics, many younger
Austrians are apparently focusing on the features that most separate them
from mainstream economics, namely, the consequences of uncertainty in the
social world and the nature of a thoroughly applied subjectivism. It is quite
possible that the attraction to hermeneutics is at least in part due to the
dogmatic nature of modern positivism, i.e., its dogmatism toward Austrian
dogmatism! As a result, certain Austrians have intuitively moved towards
epistemologies and methodologies which focus upon openness and dialogue,

46

weary of merely "talking to themselves." Adopting the growth of knowledge
literature's notion of theory choosing may then be viewed as much a practical
response as a philosophical one.
Because of this pragmatism, it is unlikely one will witness a drastic
overhaul of the Austrian program, despite the traditionalist cries of
relativism. The epistemological debate will surely continue between the more
and less relativistic camps--drawing attention away from more substantive
concerns. And, ironically, these debates may themselves fuel the flames of
hermeneutical sentiments. In at least one regard, this "attitude" for open
dialogue is a blessing. Setting aside the question of whether praxeology
represents universal truth-claims or merely schemes of interpretation, the
way in which science is carried out is a critical issue. In other words, that a
scientist believes certain positions are universally true does not enjoin him to
retain a dogmatic approach to the art of scientific dialogue. (Although it does,
of course, make dialogue either more difficult or more foundational, i.e., to
debate, one is forced back to original principles.) While such a perspective
may not be "pure," it may be the only avenue to providing a fuller idea of
science in the social theory. Only by moving towards a methodologically
pluralistic position--by Austrians and positivists alike--and breaking from the
notion of "one true method" will fruitful conversation and subsequently
scientific advancement occur. How much that requires Austrians to slip
down the "slippery slope" remains uncertain. If praxeological propositions
are, however, self-evident and eternally true, they would seem to be able to
pass any plausibility test. Accepting this point, the entire debate loses some of
its controversy.
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But the purpose of this chapter is not to delve deeply and critically into
the finer points of epistemology but only to provide an understanding of
Rothbard ' s

methodological

foundations

and

furnish

a

means

to

comprehending his substantive social theory. Apriorism is the base for both
Rothbard's economics and ethics. But debate over methodology is a very
small portion of either Austrianism or Rothbard's own program; moreover,
these differences are generally minute in comparison to other systems
(Caldwell, 1982, p. 133). Within these confines, Rothbard is clearly a leading
proponent of traditional interpretations of Misesian praxeology, maintaining
a thorough notion of subjectivism that is, nevertheless, within the
parameters of a universally true deductive science of purposeful human
action. With this discussion of foundations completed, we may move to the
more substantive issues of Rothbard's economic and political writings .
Chapter III examines the first of these two areas.
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CHAPTER III
ROTHBARD AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY

Introduction

Austrian application of the praxeological method has been aimed
overwhelmingly at the science of economics. Moreover, the largest portion of
Rothbard's own writings are in this field. However, the majority of these
writings are firmly built on the works of the earlier Austrians. To attempt to
examine these contributions thoroughly would require a treatise itself.
Therefore, in Chapter

III,

we explore this part of Rothbard's work by dividing

our discussion into two parts: 1 .) the general themes of the Austrian School,
and 2.) Rothbard's unique contributions to the tradition. We conclude our
dis cussion by examining Rothbard's rather original application of
praxeological reasoning to the area of non-voluntary exchange which, in his
view, is predominately the policy of government involvement in the
economy.

Austrian Themes in the Study of Economic Phenomena

Duncan Reekie argues that one may divide modern Austrianism into
three distinctive historical collections of theorists (Reekie, 1984, pp. 1-5). The
first set includes the founder of the Austrian School Menger and his
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followers Bohm-Bawerk and Wieser. The second set were students of the
first, and included namely Mises and later Hayek.
Unfortunately, the school fell into almost complete anonymity
following the Great Depression. First, Hayek's scholarly interests shifted
elsewhere. Second, and more importantly, the advent of the depression along
with the publication of J.M. Keynes' The General Theory and the subsequent
"Keynesian" emphasis on macro-economics with its study and application of
aggregates in the economy redirected the focus of modern economics (Reekie,
1984, p. 4). Thus, from the depression until the 1970's there was little work in
the Austrian tradition, with the only substantial exceptions being the writings
of Israel Kirzner and Rothbard.
However, the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Hayek in 1974 coupled
with the serious practical and theoretical problems in the Keynesian
mainstream has spurred a revival of interest in the Austrian School and,
hence, a third collection of economists. From mainly the writings of
Rothbard, Kirzner, and Ludwig Lachmann the Austrian School has expanded
greatly in the contemporary setting, assisted now by a number of graduate
programs with special emphases in Austrian economics. I
A substantial portion of what makes Austrianism distinctive is, as
noted in Chapter II, methodologically derived. A central tenet of the Austrian
program is its thoroughly consistent application of a subjective theory of
value (Taylor, 1983, pp. 32-40). In fact, White argues that subjectivism is the

1 . For a partial and somewhat dated list of contemporary Austrian
economists, see White (1 984, p. 31). For a useful bibliography of Austrian
writings (although also dated) see Eberling (1979, pp. 227-230).
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"distinctive method of the Austrian School" (White, 1984, p. 4). One of the
crucial components of the marginalist revolution concerned the view that
value is a relationship of the evaluator and the thing evaluated rather than
something which is inherent in the evaluated item. This realization solved
the dilemmas that haunted the different cost of production and objective
value theories of the clsssical economists. This orientation, for a number of
reasons, leads Austrians to be highly critical of the entire "welfare economics"
tradition. First, statements of social welfare may have meaning only if they
can "be unambiguously translated into statements concerning the
individuals in society. " Secondly, Austrians will not accept statements which
"measure" social welfare in terms that are not related to the actions and
perceptions of particular individuals. Thirdly, any evaluation of welfare must
include not only levels of economic well-being but also an evaluation of the
economic institutions in the market process which provides for its continual
success (Kirzner, 1988, p. 78).
In very important ways, only the Austrians have carried through the
ramifications of subjectivism--exemplified by these criticisms of welfare
economics. Through these applications, the Austrian School has taken a path
especially divergent from the neoclassical model. In fact, Hayek goes so far as
to argue that every important advancement in economics in the past century
has been no more than an additional application of thorough-going
subjectivism (Hayek, 1979, pp. 41-60). According to Littlechild, subjectivism
for the Austrian means "the idea that actions depend upon perceptions and
also the idea that different people will generally have different perceptions"
(Littlechild, 1978, p. 81). Humans, then, create their economic worlds through
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their perceptions, expectations, and valuations . Moreover, both their costs
and their benefits are subjective. They cannot be transferred to others nor
measured by others, as they exist only in the mind of the evaluator. These
subjective factors are always forward-looking and anticipatory (Littlechild,
1 978, pp. 82-83) . The only means by which costs and benefits may be
demonstrated is through the actions of the individuals and only in a limited
and ordinal fashion (and, then, only if the decision is voluntary, i.e., on a free
market). 2 The entire idea that social costs, e.g., public goods, can be ascertained
rests upon an implicit objective value theory which requires at least the
intersubjective measurement of individual utility (Rothbard, 1956, pp. 224262) . Welfare economics never explains how the inherent conflicts among
persons' plans, expectations, preferences, etc. may be aggregated to form
anything resembling a valid social welfare function (Littlechild, 1979a, p. 14).
A second important difference in Austrian economics which arises
from its methodology relates to the role of mathematics in economics. 3 The
distrust o f the tools arises not from any technical reason but from the
Austrians' distinctive

understanding of the nature of economics. Rather

than focus upon the formal and static dictates of the equilibrium mentality,
Austrians see the economy as a process. In other words, whereas often

2. The grounding of all social science in the actions of individuals is
very evident in Rothbard's economic treatise (1962c), in which he begins with
"Robinson Crusoe" alone in nature and proceeds to intro duce, first, direct
one-on-one exchange and, finally, indirect exchanges in a market economy.
3. In fact, Littlechild (1982, pp. 85-102) argues that a number of Austrian
insights are being recognized by proponents of mathematical models.
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equilibrium models assume perfect knowledge, for instance, the Austrian
views the d i s covery of information as the central issue in the study of
economics. For the Austrian the market is, as Lachmann says, a "continuous
process without beginning or end, and should be studied as such," rather
than a set of beginnings and endings of market activity, such as is
representative of a Walrasian "auctioneer" (Lachmann, 1 977a, p. 39) . As
Kirzner points out, by ignoring the fact that all activity in the economy occurs
in disequilibrium--where participants do not have information concerning
what the market-clearing price is--equilibrium theory "takes too much for
granted" (Kirzner, 1976b, p. 117).
And this distinction is quite fundamental. Equilibrium theory cannot
relieve these differences by merely adding a stunted notion of time devoid of
the uncertainty of the Austrian model (O'Driscoll and Rizzo, 1 985) . As
Lachmann argues, "macroequilibrium in motion" cannot replace the insights
of the market process approach (Lachmann, 1976c, p. 156). 4 The former still
fails to grasp the existence of the inevitable divergence in the plans and
expectations of persons which will always leave the economy outside
equilibrium. One might conclude that whereas neoclassical economics
imposes a reality on economic activity (and one that is usually highly

4. This concern has led some Austrians to question all forms of
equilibrium models--even its use as a mental tool. At a point, consistently
applied subjectivism approaches nihilism--a criticism often leveled in regard
to Lachmann's writings, which is even more applicable to G.L. S. Shackle
(who shares a number of Austrian traits) . For this debate see Littlechild (1 986,
pp. 1-15) and Shackle (1986, pp. 19-31).
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unrealistic) the Austrian School seeks to understand the process of reality
being-generated and to explain the order that subsequently arises.
This focus on coordination through time emerges in part because of a
less constrained notion of economic man. The ability to predict individual
action is severely limited. And, accordingly, the order that permeates the neo
classical model is replaced by inherent uncertainty and its consequences
(ignorance and error, for instance) in the Austrian process. The problem of
economics is not, then, to borrow Lord Robbins' famous definition, how to
technically guarantee the most efficient application of given means to ends in
a society. This notion treats resources as known, to merely be plugged into a
given hierarchy of ends. As such, it ignores that many, even most, decisions
are unattainable on the market, due to the inherent divergence of plans and
actions which flows through the distinctive and separated minds of the
different actors. Expectations are going to be incorrect, and new expectations
and plans must be formulated continually (Lachmann, 1977e, pp. 65-80). Each
set of changed plans reconstitutes the "given" resources and the demands for
those goods. Instead of the formal Robbinsean calculus, then, it is the
continual efficient application of resources where ends and means are only
known by the distinctive individuals and where these items are in continual
reformulation because they do not match with those of other market
participants (Reekie, 1984, p. 34; Kirzner, 1976b, pp. 1 18-1 19; Hayek, 1948a, pp.
181-208).
The process of social coordination for the Austrian neither equates to
the equilibrium model nor to pure chaos. While the equilibrium model is
not useful at the macro-economic level, Lachmann argues, there is a
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remaining form of equilibrium in Austrianism, understood through the
rational action of individuals (Lachmann, 1976b, p. 131). Through market
processes, signals are sent via the instrument of prices to direct the actions of
the particular persons involved. Through the incentive of rewards and the
disincentives of losses, the actor is driven to correct errors in the use or the
misallocation of resources. Obviously, this coordination is an ongoing
process, what Mises calls "equilibration," and is never actually achieved in
the form presented in the actual equilibrium model. Competition, one might
say, is for the Austrian a verb, a process of trial and error in an everchanging
economy. As Lachmann notes, differences in expectations entail plans for the
future that are "incoherent" (Lachmann, 1976b, p. 128). Any other notion of
this process demands exceedingly ridiculous assumptions in which no
conflicting notions of the future exist and all plans are compatiable between
individuals (Hayek, 1 948a, pp. 77-9 1; 1 948b) . In reality, plans are never
completely compatiable, and each new moment brings forth a new set of facts.
However, there is still in the Austrian program a strong coordinating
component, or what Hayek calls the spontaneous order. O'Driscoll considers
this process to be the "first principle of economics" (O'Driscoll, 1978, p. 1 1 6).
Nevertheless, as he points out, a substantial portion of this century's
economic theory has been a reaction against the notion that an order may
evolve without centrally planned direction. Austrians, on the other hand,
represent the "inheritors of the Smithian system" (O'Driscoll, 1978, p. 1 1 8) .
Their central focus is the understanding of the institutional arrangements,
such as the price system, which arise to provide an economic order of
individuals based on separate human actions but devoid of central human
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plan or design. Hayek goes so far as to argue that the study of unintended
consequences is the most important task in economic theory (Littlechild,
1979a, p. 15).

Therefore, Austrianism is essentially a view which finds a

middle ground between the idea that the market represents an "anarchy of
production" and thus requires some form of central planning, and the
equally non-empirical notions of equilibrium theory in which the notions of
error and uncertainty are washed away under the assumptions of perfect
competition.
It is through voluntary exchange that this "discovery process" both
satisfies individual demands at increasingly more effective means and
coordinates the overall activity of the market. The critical component in both
these actions is the entrepreneur, as actor.

Profit and loss are both the

instruments and the guideposts of action (Kirzner, 1976b, pp. 1 20-1 24;
Rothbard, 1 962c, pp. 463-501 ). This is not the common definition of an
entrepreneur, who is often associated with the business owner or the
capitalist in general. In Austrian theory, it is functional rather than specific to
person (Reekie, 1984, p. 48). Its benefit arises, according to Kirzner, from a
"rarefied, abstract type of knowledge--the knowledge of where to obtain
information (or other resources) and how to deploy it" (Kirzner, 1 976b, p.
120). Its function arises due to the uncertainty of the future, as persons plan to
encounter what they expect to be the most likely set of events. In an actual
equilibrium, there would be no role for this entrepreneurial activity
(Rothbard, 1962c, p. 297). Spotting opportunities to gain through exchange is,
then, the definition of this activity. It is a result of alertness that serves a
valuable function in the satisfaction of individual utility through the
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generation of profits--a consequence of meeting previously unsatisfied
demand. But the action also facilitates the coordination of the economy by
removing "ignorance" and relocating resources in more demanded and/ or
more efficient areas. Yet, entrepreneurs exist in the same uncertain world as
all other actors; their skill is a form of speculation and their reward comes
from being correct. Through the signals of profit and loss, the success or
failure of the action by the individual is rewarded or punished, while
simultaneously sucessful actions are diminishing the disorder of an
uncertain future.
These insights on the coordinating roles of a market permeate the
Austrian criticism of central planning, which are once again finding
intellectual favor in light of the crumbling of the socialist economies of the
world (Mises, 1981 ; Hayek, 1935; Lavoie, 1985b). The economic problem is not
how to most efficiently allocate resources, as the early economic socialists
presumed, but instead how to continually collect this information, both in
regard to consumer demand (if individual freedom is on that particular
socialist agenda) and how to ably chose between resources to best provide
these final goods, over time. Yet, since the appropriate information rests with
the smallest component, the individual--in fact, in some cases only the
individual may have this knowledge--the more decentralized the planning
process, the more adaptive and, therefore, more efficient it will be. Hence,
central planning fails for at least two reasons: First, technologically, it cannot
collect all the information at any given moment necessary to make efficient
decisions; and secondly, (and far more importantly) this information does not
exist until persons "create" it by their actions. The market is the means by
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which this information arises; the chore is not so simple as to merely apply
available resources to the current needs. This information is dispersed and
continually being newly created. Action, in other words, is originative and
based upon the actors' expectations and own imaginations (Loasby, 1982, p.
128). Ignorance is inherent in the system whether the economy is centrally
planned or market based. However, when the decisions and resources are left
at the most localized levels, the flexibility and corrective processes may be
carried through more efficiently. The economic world is a process and each
new moment brings changes from the moment preceding it. The knowledge
only makes itself known in the action which occurs in the particular time
and place. And through the price system, this information can be efficiently
transmitted to the entire economy--without particular individuals having to
collect all the relevant data.
The Austrian focus on individual action and economic process also
provides for a clear dichotomy between it and what generally is the focus of
modern "macro" economics (Lachmann, 1976c, pp. 152-159). On one level, the
Austrian program has no place for macro analysis: All action originates from
purposive actions of individuals and is (in this terminology) "micro" in
origin. However, this focus upon individualism does not mean that the
Austrians do not investigate the broader concerns of indirect exchange, but
only that it is studied "from the ground up" (Reekie, 1984, p. 56).
An example of this difference in approach concerns the use of
aggregates in economic analysis. In this process of aggregation, all too often
the crucial component of the discovery process for the Austrians, particular
information, is diminished or even effectively washed away. In other words,
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the economics of a specific time and place is lost and the point where
coordination is actually implemented is replaced by a vague and often
misleading set of aggregate figures that purports to "measure" items. But
taken from their "local" context, the items are unmeasurable since they
represent heterogeneous and subjectively derived stocks of goods.
An example of how Austrian "macro" notions emerge from micro
foundations relates to their perspectives on interest and, subsequently,
capital. For the Austrian, interest rates are directly a consequence of a the
micro phenomenon of individual time preferences: Persons value items
more today than they will in the future. The degree of relativity between the
two time periods for any person represents his own individual interest rate
level. The same coordination process applicable for other goods applies in
this case also; time's "price" is demonstrated by the economy's interest rate.
Similarly, capital only has meaning/valuation at the individual level.
Physical heterogeneity denies one the ability to add up a "stock" of capital.
Lachmann argues, for instance, that "it is useless to treat capital change as
quantitative change in one factor under ceteris paribus conditions, when it is
plain that at least some cetera will not remain paria" (Lachmann, 1977b, p.
210). If the quantity of the stock is based on past sacrifice, one still begs the
question: Historical sacrifices are equally unmeasureable (Kirzner, 1976d, p.
139). Instead, persons apply their resources in ways they think will maximize
future returns, using prices as imperfect guides. It is this perceived expected
return that is important in defining capital: "[C]apital goods should be
regarded as an accounting concept for forward looking decisions ... at the
micro, acting level, rather than a heterogeneous macro aggregation" (Reekie,
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1 984, p. 65). Individuals in the confines of a complex economy make use of
their stocks in different ways--often mutually exclusive ways. Consequently,
it is meaningless to add these stocks together in a quantified form (Kirzner,
1976d, p. 141 ) . At best, one may understand capital structures through
something akin to a "sequence analysis" which outlines the chain of changes
that result from reforms in the market process (Lachmann, 1977b, p. 210).
From this analysis, the economist may be able to get some idea of the kinds of
expectations persons possess in regard to the future.
A focus on process also produces differing interpretations concerning
the nature of the business cycle (Rothbard, 1 962c, pp. 854-871; Lachmann,
1977d, pp. 276-282). According to the Austrians, these cycles are caused by an
overwhelming misallocation of resources produced by the simultaneous
cluster of economic errors which are the result of falsely sent information
throughout the economy in the form of monetary upheavals. Particular
individuals make errors all the time in the economy, and when these
mistakes are made, certain persons suffer the consequences of providing
products that cannot bear the costs of their production in the market.
However, with the subtle inflation of the currency by a government, as
through the manipulation of the credit markets, these mistakes are not
recognized immediately. First, the real price lags behind the changes in
apparent purchasing power due to the inflation. Second, the interest rate is
affected by this additional influx of money. However, the critical point is that
these influxes are misread: Entrepreneurs cannot distinguish these
government induced money increases from real changes in the saving
consumption rates of the actors in the market (Taylor, 1980, p. 72). Ergo, what
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appears to be a boom ensues. However, as the effects of inflation become
apparent, truer signals emerge. Laborers, for example, are no longer willing to
work at the previous wages. As the effects of the inflation begin to spread
throughout the economy, the misallocations become evident, and the bust
necessarily follows. Inflation creates a set of misleading and broadly inclusive
signals that generates a general cyclical pattern, due to the cluster of errors
caused by the redefinition of the the very important money supply.
As money increases, time preferences change and more resources are
devoted to higher order processes of production, as interest rates fall and
signal that these ventures appear to be potentially profitable. But these
changes in the money supply do not affect the entire economy in similar
fashion; they are not neutral (O'Driscoll and Shenoy, 1976, pp. 1 94-1 95) .
Money enters into an economy at a particular place, and it consequently spins
out its effects from this point outward.
If the points of entrance are in the investment sectors (through the
typical credit expansion), resource allocation shifts ever backward as demand
for higher order products increases. Endeavors that use these resources are
expanded or started on the indication that they now are profitable. But
eventually the falseness of the shift emerges as finally consumers recognize
the spurious nature of the boom. Hence, credit expansion suffers from the
misinvested resources. The process reverses itself; prices rise in the later
stages relative to the farther stages and resources begin to be drawn back into
their "true" stages closer to ultimate consumption . The result is a
readaptation to the pre-inflationary boost, with the losses and unemployment
that follows from misapplication. The only "solution" that will prevent the
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bust, and it obviously can be only temporary, is further dosages of inflation
which will, in turn, produce further malinvestment and stricter medicine on
"judgment" day. Unemployment and depression, especially in the higher
order goods, are inevitable.
The Austrian theory also accounts for "stagflation", a problem that, for
lack of theory, deeply injured the Keynesian policy paradigm in the 1970's
(O'Driscoll and Shenoy, 1976, pp. 201 -202 and 204-207) .

If government

manipulation of the economy continues, actors eventually come to expect the
inflationary pressure, but only after the initial damages are done. To continue
to falsely create the idea that these firms are profitable, government must
continue to raise the "ante" to fool the factors involved. Reflation, however,
only produces further maladjustments and the recessionary pressures grow
in force. To some degree, individual expectations eventually shift to partially
take into account these government efforts to manipulate economic
"variables". But at this point the consequence becomes both distortion
(recession) and inflation. The limitations on this action, if the policy is
allowed to continue, is ultimately the death of the money as the medium of
exchange.
Probably the most important historical application of the Austrian
business cycle theory is Rothbard's extensive examination of the Great
Depression (Rothbard, 1963a) . In a bit of revisionist history, he heaps
substantial blame for the severity of the depression on the policies of Herbert
Hoover, contrary to traditional interpretations of Hoover as one who
championed laissez faire and stood idle as the depression struck. In
Rothbard's view, Hoover took many of the exact wrong measures to lessen
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the recessionist tensions. However, what are the correct measures? In solving
this boom-bust dilemma, all Austrians proposals have at least one similarity:
Remove the control governments have to freely manipulate the supply of
money. s Rothbard, for example, presents several things that should not be
done: 1 .) the prevention or delay of liquidation or the further use of
inflationary tactics, since both only heighten malinvestments; 2.) the
stimulation of consumption; 3.) the artificial propping up of wages at current
rates, since in deflationary periods this creates a real wage increase and
subsequent labor surpluses (unemployment); and 4.) the subsidization
(compensa tion) of unemployment, since this policy postpones labor
adjustments and further increases the distortion and subsequent costs of the
adjustment period. As other Austrians, he concludes that the prevention of
the cycles depends on the removal of manipulations in the monetary system
(Rothbard, 1963a, pp. 26-33).
Austrians, then, differ substantially in their orientation to the study of
economics when compared to other scientific approaches. Focused on a
methodological individualism and a thorough subjective value theory which
views economics as an active process full of uncertainty and its consequences,
the Austrian program travels down avenues of economic theory that much
of the discipline does not proceed. Grounded in the reality of individual
actors in the actual market process, the Austrian School provides a much

5. Hayek (1984), for example, supports the denationalization of money,
leaving the definition of what constitutes a currency to the dictates of the
spontaneous order.
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more useful orientation to human action than the formalism of the
neoclassical schools or the aggregation of traditional macro economics.

Rothbard's Unique Contributions

Rothbard has made substantial contributions to Austrian economics.
We focus upon three areas which stand out in particular: 1 .) his additions to
Austrian monetary theory, particularly in the area of institutional reform; 2.)
his writings on monopoly theory; and 3.) his extensive and basically
unchartered work on the praxeology of violent exchange. We examine the
first two of these contributions in this section. The final area is discussed in
the following section.
Rothbard's monetary theory follows closely the earlier Austrians,
especially Mises (Mises, 1963, pp. 398-478; 1980 in general; Rothbard, 1962c, pp.
661-764; 1983b). Money has no unique meaning in the economy except that it
serves as the common medium of exchange. In the free market i t is a
commodity, although one that is of "peculiar importance" due to its exchange
purposes (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 662). Persons "buy" money by exchanging other
goods and services on the market, in other words. Having once purchased
money, they may then consume, invest, or hoard particular amounts of it.
Changes in the relative value of it will lead to readjustments of these
balances. Its purchasing power is, thus, determined by the total demand for
money to hold and the total stock of money existing (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 667).
Rothbard argues that the utility of money depends, except in limited
cases such as nonmonetary uses of metals, "solely on its prospective use as
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the general medium of exchange" (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 669). The utility of
money relies on the actual exchange value of it. What are the consequences
of this point?
. . . . For other goods, demand in the market is the
means of routing commodities into the hands of
their consumers. For money, on the other hand, the
'price' of money is precisely the variable on which
the demand schedule depends and to which almost
the whole of the demand for money is keyed. To
put it in another way: without a price, or an
objective exchange-value, any other good would be
snapped up as a welcome free gift; but money,
without a price, would not be used at all, since its
entire use consists in its command of other goods
on the market. The sole use of money is to be
exchanged for goods, and if it had no price and
therefore no exchange-value, it could not be
exchanged and would no longer be used (Rothbard,
1962c, pp. 669-670).
Rothbard proceeds to distinguish money from other goods: The latter's
increase always represents social benefits, whereas the former's increase is of
no benefit, representing "dead stock" (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 670). In a free
market, there is no "correct" stock of money, since whatever the stock, it will
be used to maximize social benefit. This, however, does not mean that nonm ar ket changes in the supply of money will not potentially generate
distortion, as with the activities involved in the business cycle.
It is unclear why Rothbard must make this convoluted distinction for
money. First, it separates money from its formation in the spontaneous
order. Money is a commodity like all other commodities, as Mises
demonstrated in his famous "regression theorem" (Rothbard, 1976a, pp. 1681 69). It serves a rather uniform use--the facilitation of exchange--but so do
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many other valued commodities. Likewise, the increase in its production
affects the demand for it, decreasing its value relative to other goods. Yet, it
cannot be separated from the commodity foundations: Its original means of
utility still apply.
It seems fallacious, then, to separate the uses of money into categories
and distinguish one use, exchange, so as to argue that changes in the stock of
money confer no social benefit. How can one say that increases in the supply
of the good does not confer a social benefit? If it is a commodity like all other
commodities, then it would seem that the making of exceptions is
unnecessary. If the medium actually is the free market solution (and not the
legally forced tender of fiat currency which is not a good to begin with,
evidenced by the fact it cannot and would not exist without the force of the
State), then there would seem to be alternative uses for the product if it
increased in quantity--like every other good. For example, if gold were the
chosen commodity as the medium of exchange and there were substantial
increases in the good, then the uses of the product would likely expand into
the areas of its more profitable uses, still conferring social benefits. It is
unclear why it is necessary to separate money in regard to exchange and
money as to its other uses (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 671). Money is like every other
good in a free economy, except it is the one most used in exchanges as a
medium and, thus, the one in the conversion that is likely to serve as a
common language and "determine" relative values of other products
(Rothbard, 1962c, p. 699). In a very real sense, then, a free market which
possesses monetary exchange is merely a highly evolved barter economy.
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In either case, money generally is used in the modern economy as a
medium of exchange. But one must also factor temporal components into the
discussion of money. This understanding of time implies that persons may
not spend their currency immediately. Every person will hold back certain
amounts of money for future use, which mirrors his future plans and
demands. In a state of uncertainty, these resources serve a very important
function of meeting these future expectations.
This recognition of a social function for cash balances in the
stabilization of speculative demand separates the Austrians from the
Keynesian program. 6 Since individuals live in uncertainty, they retain cash
balances relative to their perceptions of future needs. What Keynes disdainly
referred to as "hoarding" is to the Austrian merely a demand for retaining
cash balances. Keynesians might, for example, argue that involuntary
unemployment results from a hoarding of social expenditures depressing the
stimulating effects of these purchases. But, as Rothbard points out, this makes
sense only if wage rates are frozen; otherwise increased cash balances would

6. However, Rothbard (1962c, p. 678) argues money and interest rates
are unconnected:
If the demand for money increases, there is no
reason why a change in the demand for money
should affect the interest rate one iota. There is no
necessity at all for an increase in the demand for
money to raise the interest rate, or a decline to
lower it--no more than the opposite. In fact, there is
no causal connection between the two; one is
determined by the valuations for money, and the
other by valuations for time preferences.
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merely result in decreasing prices as a consequence of increased demands for
money. And this is not, as Keynesians might contend, involuntary
unemployment. This joblessness only occurs involuntarily if minimumwage
requirements are enforced, either through union contracts or government
policy.
These attempts by government to separate individuals from their
hoarded monies only misdirects economic activity. To alleviate these
distortive effects Rothbard argues favorably for private money and private
banking. In a market order persons are attracted to specific attributes relative
to the function of the good. Money is no different. 7 If the demands are
diverse, then a number of monetary forms are likely to evolve. Conversely, if
standardization is at a premium, then denominations will become more
uniform. Banks would simply be warehouses for money (Rothbard, 1962c, pp.
700-703). In most cases, then, receipts for the exchangeable commodity would
serve in actual practice as "money".
But there is an important nature to these certificates or receipts. For
Rothbard, these receipts are not future claims on money on the time market,
but "evidence of ownership of a present good" (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 700). In
other words, property rights are retained fully by the certificate holder; the
warehouse is only "storing" the resource. However, owners of the warehouse
soon recognize that at any given time a substantial amount of the actual
goods will lay dormant in the warehouse. As a result, the opportunity to

7. As Rothbard (1985b, pp. 9-10) notes, Gresham's Law, i.e., "bad money
drives out good currency," only applies in fiat systems. In a free economy,
consumers will only bank with the most reputable suppliers.
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lend these resources to other persons arises, allowing a extra return to the
bank. Or, to take it one step further, these warehouses might simply produce
false notes; since they resemble the actual notes, no one is likely to recognize
the fraud. According to Rothbard, both of these cases represent fraud. They
are not borrowed funds since no interest payment agreement exists between
the actual owner and the user. The homogeneity of the good--gold, for
example--allows the warehouse the opportunity to

secretly operate these

activities. In a free market, he concludes, banks must be required to keep
resources equal to the money-substitute certificates outstanding, i.e., 100 per
cent reserves.
Uncovered money-substitutes produce an influx of additional supplies
of "money" in the economy. Each increase in the fractional reserve system,
for instance, brings additional "profits" to the banks. But the consequence is
inflation. But how may the warehouse make an income?

Why would it

provide this service? First, Rothbard points out, it may operate as any other
warehouse, collecting storage servicing fees. Secondly, there may still be a
lending function: Banks merely borrow funds from other individuals and
relend at higher rates, serving as a sort of broker for the parties.
While Rothbard's contentions have merit, they seem to impose an
order on the market that ultimately may guarantee only inflexibility. Not
maintaining 1 00 per cent reserve requirements would seem to be fraud only
if the bank misleads the customer to believe it meets these requirements.
Why might not the "market" rate for actual reserves be something far less
than 100 per cent? By allowing persons to place their resources where they
please, and defining fraud as the misleading of the customer and the failure
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to carry out the advertised business practices, it seems the fractional banking
system is perfectly legitimate, as long as the money is backed accordingly.
Moreover, it seems odd that Rothbard would support such a legally
mandated rule, although he views it as a "general legal prohibition of force
and fraud" rather than a "form of administrative government intervention
in the monetary system" (Rothbard, 1962a, p. 1 19). The same criticism might
be leveled against the idea that gold must be the chosen currency, although
Rothbard is ambiguous as to whether this uniformity is required. For
example, how does one know whether gold is now or always will be the most
effective standard for currency? It seems the only way to guarantee its
effectiveness is to continually subject it to the forces of an open market. But
could not the same argument be posited concerning fractional-reserve
banking?
Of course, in a purely free system the customer might demand 1 00 per
cent reserves. Or, perhaps, the actual practice of banking might parallel
Rothbard's system, as borrowed funds and kept funds simply become
intermingled to represent what amounts to "fractional" reserves. And, once
the market rates for the reserves are established, it would seem that the
consequences of uncovered money substitutes would diminish.
In the inflation-inducing economies of the modern world, there is real
pressures for upwardly spirraling influxes of uncovered money substitutes.
An important Austrian contribution to economics is the nature of these
influxes. Prices, as the Austrian School demonstrates, do not move in
uniform and simultaneous fashion. Certain parties will benefit from the
change while others are injured; accordingly, the changes occur in distinctive
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parts of the market separately. Through the answering of signals sent out in
the change, different individuals will respond in dissimilar ways at diverse
times. Where the new money enters provides advantages for those persons
in those locations; those in sectors last touched by the influx conversely suffer
the greatest losses.
Therefore, inflationary effects are not likely to be proportionate to the
level of the increase in total supply of money. Again, money is not a neutral
good. These incremental effects which emerge piece by piece across the
economy distort economic activity and produce new outlooks concerning the
economy among individuals (for example, time preferences are likely
reformulated), and these changes will not be uniform (Rothbard, 1 962c, p.
71 2) . If, for example, persons' cash balances simply kept pace with the
increase in money, there would be no overall price increase. Of course, there
may be huge upheavals in specific sectors. These disruptions are the
foundation for the entire business cycle theory: Through the "fraudulent"
increase of the money supply, distinctive parts of the market are led to make
a cluster of economic errors.
Inflation also poses a second potential problem, namely, the
destruction of the monetary system (Rothbard, 1976a, pp. 1 75-178) . Initially,
with the advent of government sponsored inflation, individuals' cash
balances probably will increase, which means that prices will lag behind the
monetary growth. This result leads officials to conclude they have found a
"magical panacea", and further increases ensue. However, the citizenry
ultimately reformulates their expectations: With each new dose of money,
they come to anticipate even larger supplies. Consequently, demand for cash
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balances dwindles as the purchasing power of the money drops and prices
outstrip the growing supply of money. At this point all is lost. The economy
faces an apparent "liquidity crunch" demanding even further increases in the
supplies of currency, and the result is a vicious cycle of hyper-inflation and
destruction of the currency as persons seek to rid themselves of cash for other
commodities as rapidly as possible.
Clearly, money represents the "nerve center" of any developed
economy (Rothbard, 1964, p. 1 38). 8 In Rothbard's view, the last item that
ought to be outside the coordinating processes of the market is money. Yet,
through legal tender laws, the monopoly on minting, the establishment of
exchange rates, and the formation of central banking the monetary system in
the United States has always been under some form of political controL He
contends that rather than being stabilizing institutions, government agencies
operate to produce the subtle taxation that inflation coupled with our tax
structures allow. His solutions are very straightforward: 1 .) a 1 00 per cent gold
dollar through deflation of the existing dollar or revaluation of the dollar
concurrent with the existing money supply; 2.) the end of the Federal Reserve
System, with 1 00 per cent requirements for all demands for gold; 3.) the Fed
and the treasury relinquishment of all note-issuing powers, transferred to
private institutions; 4.) the removal of any fixed relative rates of gold to

8. It is rather ironic that among even the most ardent defenders of the
free market economy there is general support of government control of the
money supply (for example, Milton Friedman). Many of these theorists
eloquently demonstrate the advantages of the market and the failures of
central planning, yet are not willing to subject the most important
commodity to the same logic.
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other

commodities that are backing currency; and 5.) the provision for

private coinage (Rothbard, 1962a, pp. 133-134). Essentially, Rothbard demands
a gold-backed free banking system.
The same kinds of libertarian, free market themes are found in
another area in which Rothbard has made significant contributions, Austrian
monopoly theory. In his view, producers on a free market make money by
serving consumers. As long as these exchanges occur on a voluntary basis,
both the producer and consumer are satisfied ex ante, no matter whether the
producer decides to limit production or not. The fact that demand curves are
"inelastic" and appear to be at a "monopoly" price does not change this
situation. Nothing prevents consumers, for example, from reforming their
demand, i.e., boycotting the product, to reduce the price (Rothbard, 1962c, pp.
564-565).
To argue otherwise is to establish some form of socially objective
standards founded normally on a solid dosage of hindsight. But in a real
market error is unavoidable. Moreover, producers always seek to increase
their returns. The withholding of resources, e.g., as with a cartel, must be
viewed as a single action within a larger economy. By correcting errors, i.e.,
exploiting a profitable opportunity, these producers satisfy consumer
demands and increase social utility whereas otherwise these wants would
have gone unheeded (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 569). It is important to keep in
mind that the supply which is provided is done so voluntarily and amounts
to exactly that much more than would have existed had individuals acted
differently. Why, then, ought one to blame the producers who are alert to a
unsatisfied demand and are rewarded accordingly? That they are able to profit
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is not their doing so much as it is instead the inaction of everyone else not
realizing the circumstances subject to exploitation! The same logic applies
when producers withhold their product, as in the case of property destruction
by the producers so as to diminish supply (as with farmers burning their
crops). Nothing prevents the consumers from changing their demand
schedules out of "philanthropic dismay" to prevent the destroying of the
good (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 570).
Rothbard's arguments are quite topical in today's "collusion-phobia".
In his view, cartels and/or merger activities are no different in kind from the
ordinary activities of the firm. There is no secret optimal size of a firm: All
one can depend upon is that over time a free market's competitive process
will tend toward the optimal satisfaction of the consumers. Moreover, there
is no way to distinguish between acts aimed to "restrict" production and those
oriented to increase efficiency (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 575).
If the consequences of a "monopoly" activity does "restrict" production
to the point of leaving opportunity for additional profit, one is likely to find
entrepreneurial activity seeking to exploit these resources, forcing the cartel /
firm to compete. On the other hand, if the costs (and prices) continue to fall
for a firm as it grows in market share, then the "monopoly" is obviously
serving the consumer with a lower priced product. There are no rules as to
the optimal number of firms in any market.
However, cartels are generally highly unstable organizations (unless, of
course, mergers result). The control of production requires the permanent
unanimous support of the members. But the more efficent members have a
constant incentive to break out of agreements in which they are held back by
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the less efficient producers. Furthermore, even if the cartel might somehow
successfully hold itself together, this success merely means that outside
entrepreneurial actions become profitable (if profits, in reality, do remain) .9
There is one additional criticism: Could it not be possible for there to
emerge the "one big cartel"? On this point, Rothbard argues that economic
science may provide one conclusion on the size of firms: Any firm must be
limited by the needs of calculability, the necessity to refer its own operations
to relative ones to gauge its own efficiencies. Just as pure socialism is
impossible, the one firm is also unachievable since there would be no way to
rationally allocate all the factors of production. Similarly, as these limits are
approached by any industry, the efficiency of the firm diminishes (Rothbard,
1962c, p. 585).
Rothbard's critique of monopoly theory does not stop with a defense of
the market processes, however. On a more theoretical level, he contends that
the concept of monopoly has no practical meaning. Price, he argues, is a
"mutual phenomenon": To argue that a firm could have "control" over its
price is clearly a misnomer (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 587) . Producers provide
products at certain prices; consumers may or may not purchase them.
Through this exchange, a market order emerges and no producers have any
extra-market powers.

9. See Rothbard (1 962c, p. 583) . As he points out, critics of this
competitive process who argue that the market is somehow different in the
modern setting because of the huge firms (which presumably makes it
impossible to raise the capital to compete with them) fail to realize that the
same economy which allows such developed industry equally provides one
the ability to compete against it.
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... [I]t is completely false to say that the [small] farmer
and [Henry] Ford differ in their control over price.
Both have exactly the same degree of control and of
noncontrol: i.e., both have absolute control over the
quantity they produce and the price which they
attempt to get; and absolute noncontrol over the
price-and-quantity transaction that finally takes
place. The farmer is free to ask any price he wants,
just as Ford is, and is free to look for a buyer at such
a price. . . .Naturally, every seller. . . will attempt to sell
his produce for the highest possible price; similarly,
every buyer will attempt to purchase goods at the
lowest price possible . . . . 'Charging whatever the
market will bear' is simply a rather emotive
synonym for charging as high a price as can be freely
obtained (Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 588-589).
Rothbard completely rejects the neo-classical definition of monopoly
price and, consequently, the idea of monopoly. Its terminology, derived from
its static analysis of the economy, misconstrues the nature of profits and
losses (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 597). Incomes are made and lost in economic
actions which take place in an uncertain world. Hence, the consequences of a
specific supply of a product upon the economy is unknown until the good
faces the tests of newly emerging market forces. If the result is profits for the
producer, certain signals are transmitted to other entrepreneurs who move
into this particular less than perfectly competitive arena. Thus, consumer
preference alone limits competition. But all of these points lead to a second
fundamentally more damning criticism in Rothbard's view:
. . . . [T] here has been a great deficiency in the
economic literature on this whole [monopoly]
issue: a failure to realize the illusion in the entire
concept of monopoly price . . . [W]e find that there is
assumed to be a 'competitive price', to which a
higher 'monopoly price'--an outcome of restrictive
action--is contrasted . . . . [But] in the market, there is
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no discernible, identifiable competitive price, and
therefore there is no way of distinguishing, even
conceptually, any given price as a 'monopoly price'.
The alledged 'competitive price' can be identified
neither by the producer himself nor by the
disinterested observer (Rothbard, 1962c, p. 605).
In the real world, demand curves and supply curves are not known.
Instead, a producer will estimate costs and benefits and try to maximize
profits, wages, rents, etc. Competition is an ongoing activity, yet the neo
classical model views it as static and assumes away the very points of
observation concerning competitive practices (Armentano, 1978, p. 96) . One
may not merely assume that a cut in production represents monopolistic
restriction. Neither the economist nor the producer knows the consequences
of any action beforehand. There is, then, in Rothbard ' s view, neither
anything wrong with "monopolies" nor anything useful in the discussion of
them in theory!
Nevertheless, there is one circumstance where monopolies may be said
to exist, according to Rothbard. He proposes three possible defintions for
monopoly: 1 .) Producers who have achieved monopoly prices; 2.) the single
seller of a good; and 3.) a producer holding a special grant from the State
(Rothbard, 1 962c, pp. 590-593). The first of these definitions, as we have seen,
is unfounded since these prices cannot be known in a real market process.
The second interpretation might be legitimate in a sense, but, obviously, it is
so inclusive as to be meaningless. To a certain degree, all goods are
heterogeneous; each actor is a monopolist alone in his narrow market.
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Therefore, only the third choice makes sense in the market order:
Governments create the only kind of discernible monopolies. l O
It seems there are no flaws in this application of Austrian economics
on

monopoly theory,

although

it

d iffers

substantially

from

other

contributions on the subject by even Austrian economists (Armentano, 1 978,
pp. 99-101 and 1 04-108). Armentano, in fact, argues that these principles could
be effectively applied in contemporary public policy through a "radically
different theoretical perspective,"which goes well beyond most "free-market"
advocates in recent antitrust debates (Armentano, 1 988, p. 4). Whereas these
proponents of reform rely on equilibrium models, Rothbard' s Austrian
competitive model fundamentally redefines the issue by focusing on process
and institutional arrangements. Rather than attempting a case-by-case
analysis of firms in a boundless and undefineable market arena, based on
fundamentally spurious data, the market process approach seeks to provide
the guarantees for a competitive environment. In Rothbard's view, this
solution would eliminate government interference in the economy.
These alternatives seem to provide a potentially rewarding direction in
antitrust policy focused less on specific cases or even particular markets and
more on the economic environment's rules and processes. However, it must
be noted that these reforms would also represent a radical transformation of
the existing policy arena, demanding nothing short of the complete
elimination of all existing antitrust laws. Rather than being judge of whether

10. Armentano (1978, pp. 1 08-109) accepts the Rothbardian definition of
"monopoly" as the only correct one.
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"adequate" competition exists in a certain market, the State's role becomes
one aimed at simply removing legal and/ or political impediments to a free
economy.
Monetary intervention and State-granted monopoly priviledges are
two excellent examples of how, according to Rothbard, the market is
prevented from carrying out its coordination functions. He develops his
theory of exchange to not only entail free market actions but also to
encompass the study of

involuntary behavior. This perspective vastly

expands the uses of the praxeological method. In the final section of Chapter
III, we examine these writings in detail.

Involuntary Exchange: The Effects of Government on the Economy

Throughout all of Rothbard's writings there is a distinctive "dualism"
which serves as the base for his anarchist views. (See Chapters IV and V for
further development of these perspectives.) On the one hand, there are the
voluntary actions which take place in the free market. On the other hand,
there are the involuntary or violent activities of forced or coercive exchange.
To Rothbard, the State represents an organized manifestation of the latter
activity. Therefore, in his praxeological analysis, the market and the
government represent voluntary and involuntary acts, respectively.
The foundation for this dualism originates in the writings of the
German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer argues that the State
is built upon conquest. But more important for our present discussion is his
argument that humanity satisfies its desires in one of two opposite ways. One
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he calls the "political means" (or "robbery"): the "unrequited appropriation of
the labor of others. " The other he terms the "economic means" (or "work").
The latter activity relies on one's own labor or the voluntary exchange of the
consequences of such labor for survival (Oppenheimer, 1975, p. 1 2).

All of

human history, Oppenheimer concludes, has been a "contest between the
economic and the political means" (Oppenheimer, 1975, p. 1 3) .
The division of Rothbard's study o f economics (as well a s his theories
on ethics presented in Chapters IV and V) follows the Oppenheimer
distinction. Like Oppenheimer, he argues there are two kinds of exchanges:
violent "hegemonic" (or exploitative) acts and voluntary contractual acts
(Rothbard, 1962c, pp. 67 and 71 ). However, Rothbard apparently extends these
dual acts further to equate economic and political means always with markets
and governments, respectively--linking specific structures to particular
means.
This fundamental division may be found throughout Rothbard' s
discussion o f economics.

In his economics per se, he constructs the market

order devoid of any violent interaction. Conversely, he goes to great lengths
to demonstrate the non-voluntary nature of actions in which government is
involved (Rothbard, 1 977a, pp. 16- 1 7 and 203-247) . While we will not
continually repeat the same criticism, there is in this context a potentially
serious problem. This dualism sets up a sort of "evil-good" or, better stated, a
"efficient-inefficient" dichotomy which is observable at two levels. First, free
exchange promotes efficiency; coerced activity is inefficient. Of course, this is
the foundation of all of Austrian economics. But in Rothbard's work there is
a second set of definitions that many critics might challenge: The market is Qy:
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definition and observation directed always by free exchange, whereas the State
represents Oppenheimer' s "political means". In Rothbard's arguments,
institutional processes (markets and governments) and the means they
represent (exchange and conquest) become simultaneous. In other words,
there may be no involuntary act in the "free" market. Ultimately, Rothbard's
"science" rests upon Oppenheimer's and others' conquest theories of the
State, rejecting a priori the idea of "political consent" (and, subsequently, any
contractarian or consensus theories of government).
These distinctions are best found in Rothbard's most original
contributions

to

praxeology

concerning the

"economics

of violent

intervention" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 1 ) . Whereas his economics assumes that
no government exists (or, that all actions resemble Oppenheimer ' s
"economic means " rather than "political means") the praxeology o f
hegemonic relations introduces government and violence into the network
of exchange. Rothbard argues that any exchange that occurs on the free
market signifies the ex ante maximization of utilities among individuals. In
other words, freely choosing individuals decide for themselves what their
actions and ends are to be. However, coercive intervention forces persons to
commit acts they would have not otherwise done. Subsequently, there is a
necessary loss of utility by the person intervened upon, to the gain of the
invader. One may distinguish the two actions, accordingly: Voluntary acts are
those exchanges where, ex ante,

both parties receive increases in their

utilities, whereas interventionist acts are those where one person or set of
persons gain at the expense of another or others. Or, exploitation is only
possible in the interventionist setting (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 14) .
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Interventionist actions may be undertaken through any public or
private institution. However, Rothbard concludes that "the vast bulk" of
invasions are performed through the State, since it alone is "legally equipped
to use violence and since it is the only agency that legally derives its revenue
from a compulsory levy" (Rothbard, 1 962c, p. 766) . Therefore, he confines his
criticisms to only government intervention. Unfortunately, though, he never
demonstrates praxeologically how one possesses the ability to infer that every
action by the State is involuntarily imposed. As we shall see, this
dogmatically imposed dualism sheds doubts on the entire praxeological
nature of Rothbard's discussion.
Even if one accepts the argument that allowing voluntary exchange
increases individual utility, it only supports utility maximization ex ante. The
larger concern is likely to be ex post considerations. Rothbard argues that the
market also holds the advantage relative to its consequences, as it is able to
reduce economic errors in judgment and action with the least amount of
suffering.

The alternative to these market corrective devices is the use of

government and, as he notes, this option is absent the structural dynamics
that a market possesses which works to diminish inefficiencies and shorten
the lengths of any distortive effects (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 19-23) .
In order to prove his argument, Rothbard examines the ex post effects
of government and/ or violent forms of intervention on the free market. In
developing the science of intervention, he divides "invasion" into three
categories: 1 .) autistic intervention; 2.) binary intervention; and 3.) triangular
intervention .

We

discuss each

separately, examining some of
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the

government policies which fit each category and the consequences they
generate in society.

Autistic Intervention

The

simpliest form of i n tervention Rothbard calls

autistic

intervention: "[W)hen the invader coerces a subject without receiving any
good or service in return" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 11). These include actions such
as murder, assault, slavery, force religious observance, etc. The distinguishing
factor is that the person is required to follow commands that involve his
property alone; there is no regulated exchange between persons. The
intervener receives no goods or services for his actions but does limit the
parameters of the other's activities. Rothbard, however, does not detail the
economic effects of autistic intervention, since there is no observable
exchange.

Binary Intervention

Binary intervention are acts that force persons to make concessions to
other individuals by either requiring or denying an exchange between
persons. The relationship features two persons in the economic situation.
Rothbard argues this type of intervention has received scant attention from
economists concerned with the effects of government intervention, as almost
all research has been focused on triangular intervention. Yet, he argues, these
forms of intervention are equally important. He divides these activities into
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two general subsets: government revenues ( taxation) and government
expenditures.
Governments gain revenues either directly through taxes levied on
individuals or indirectly through the use of inflation of the money supply.
Praxeologically, Rothbard concludes, there is no difference between these
activities, on the one hand, and robbery and counterfeiting, on the other
(Rothbard, 1977a, pp . 83-84). In both cases, resources are transferred in
arrangements not agreed upon by the coerced parties involved.
Two distinct groups arise from these activities: the "tax consumers"
and the "taxpayers". Rothbard includes as tax consumers the "full-time
rulers", whose livelihoods depend on these resources (politicians and
bureaucrats, for example), and the "part-time rulers ", who benefit from
subsidies that are provided by the government. Taxpayers are those
individuals who are on balance providing the resources to support the rulers.
In reality, these types are often extremely difficult to define because of the
dispersion of costs and benefits that accompany a complex and actively
intervening government. This diffusion, though, does not make the shifting
of resources any less real. Essentially, these transfers represent consumption
expenditures by those officials having the authorities to make the re-routing
decisions, not because they actually consume the shifted resources but because
their wishes redirect the economy's patterns of production (Rothbard, 1977a,
p. 86) . These actions distort an economy's resource allocation, transmitting
information that does not originate from the consumers in the market and
refocusing resources on items that do not effectively satisfy true consumer
demand. As such, social utility, defined through individual satisfaction, is
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diminished. And this distortion is inevitable no matter what kind of
"revenue enhancement" is applied. Rothbard completely rejects the notion of
"neutral taxation" (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 87; 1981c, pp. 51 9-564) . The critical
question relative to the distortion imposed upon the economy is not the �
but the amount of the tax. Increases in the level of taxes heightens economic
damage.
What are the ways in which specific taxes affect the economy? The focal
point, of course, is who pays and who benefits from the tax. Rothbard
contends that taxes can never be "shifted forward', i.e., from the seller to the
buyer, or through the stages of production to the ultimate consumer
(Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 88). This argument goes against a substantial portion of
economic theory. Yet, if one is truly maintaining a thoroughly subjectivist
value theory, there appears to be no other possible conclusion.
. . . . It is generally considered that any tax on
production or sales increases the costs of
production and therefore is passed on as an
increase in price to the consumer. Prices, however,
are never determined by costs of production, but
rather the reverse is true. The price of a good is
determined by its total stock in existence and the
demand schedule for it on the market. But the
demand schedule is not affected at all by the tax. . . .A
tax, therefore, cannot be passed on to the consumer
(Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 88-89).
Rather, the effects of taxation fall upon the production side of the exchange.
Otherwise, why had the producer not already passed the "costs" along prior to
the tax in the form of higher prices? The reason is, of course, that individual
demand schedules are unaffected by these outside influences.
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Arguments that such levies as sales and excise taxes may be passed
along the stages of production are false, Rothbard concludes. Instead, they are
constantly shifted backwards to each good's original factors of production and,
subsequently, dictate the decisions of whether to utilize those resources in a
specific manner. What occurs is a shift from the goods adversely affected by
the tax toward the resources that the government purchases and / or
subsidizes with the collected revenues. Certain original factors valued in a
free economy might fall into disuse; others may be refocused on the newly
preferred goods and services of the now-consuming government. And these
changes will spill over into the complex network of exchanges in which these
products are attached.
Whereas a sales tax is generally applied across the board proportionally
on almost all final goods, excise taxes are aimed at particular goods and
services. As a consequence, the costs of the tax are imposed directly on a
selected subset of the economy, which drives these factors into other less
taxed industries. Still, Rothbard argues, everyone suffers because of these
taxes. Obviously, the specifically affected persons are most injured, as they
must shift into less lucrative areas. But consumers also suffer from the
distortion and loss of a portion of a product they demanded (which drives the
price of the remaining factors in that area up) .
All taxes in reality are "income" taxes, of course, but what unique
effects does the "official" income tax have on the economic process? Rothbard
argues that it is, first, a levy that cannot be shifted forward or backward in the
stages of production. Second, it will decrease the payer's standard of living:
The costs of working increase and conversely the costs of leisure diminish

86

(Rothbard, 1 977a, pp. 96-97) . Hence, the bulk of the distortion in this case
occurs within the preferences of particular individuals. Work for money
relative to work for barter is also penalized. As a result, income taxes work to
"bring about a reduction in specialization and a breakdown of the market,
and hence a retrogression in living standards" (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 96). The
advantages of a monetary economy are diminished . These losses, he
contends, also lower the taxpayer's real income and his valuation of
monetary assets. In turn, as assets diminish, time preferences increase--and
proportionally more of these resources go toward consumption. This
disincentive for saving is only doubled by the imposition of additional
income taxes upon interest returns on investments and / or saving, which
serves to drive the interest rates below the rates that time preferences would
bear on a free market.
On this point, Rothbard follows the correct neutral Austrian position
on the question of what kinds of taxes ought to be applied in government
fiscal policy. Many conservatives, such as a number of the recently popular
"Supply-Side" economists argue for a fiscal policy that creates disincentives
for consumption and conversely incentives for savings. Traditional
Keynesians, on the other hand, support a "demand-side" solution. The
presumption of both these policy prescriptions is that a given savings-to
consumption ratio is somehow "incorrect", and may be corrected with certain
fiscal policies. Rothbard argues:
[There is] a curious tendency among economists
generally devoted to the free market to be
unwilling to consider its ratio of consumption to
investment allocations as optimal. The economic
case for the free market allocations tend at all
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points to be optimal with respect to consumer
desires . . . . [P] eople voluntarily choose between
present and future consumption in accord ance
with their time preferences, and this voluntary
choice is their optimal choice. Any tax levied
particu larly on their consum p tion, therefore, is just
as m u ch a distortion and invasion of the free
market as a tax on their savings .. (Rothbard, 1 977a,
pp. 99-100).
.

.

However, Rothbard's conclusions concerning the social effects of
income taxes on time preferences is more difficult to prove--at least from a
praxeological perspective. Although it is true that the time preferences of
taxpayers will increase, it would seem that the tax consumers' preferences
would decrease as they rake in the benefits of the subsidy. Rothbard's
response to this argument is less than satisfactory:
. . . . Government expenditures, however, constitute
diversion of resources from private to government
purposes. Since the government, by definition,
desires this diversion, this is a consumption
expenditure by the government. The reduction in
income (and therefore in consumption and saving
investment) imposed on the taxpayers will
therefore be counterbalanced by government
consumption-expenditure. As for the transfer
expenditures made by the government (including
the salaries of bureaucrats and subsidies to
priviledged groups), it is true that some of this will
be saved and invested. These investmen ts,
however, will not represent the voluntary desires
of consumers, but rather investments in the fields
of production not desired by the producing
consumers. They represent the desires, not of the
producing consumers on the free market, but of
exploiting consumers fed by the the unilateral
coercion of the State (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 98).
He is correct to point out the existence of these "malinvestments". Moreover,
these mistakes will cause distortions within the market. However, it remains
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unclear why time preferences must increase socially. Depending on the
preference sets of the winners and losers in these "exchanges", it would seem
possible, though perhaps impractical, that they may stay the same or even
increase. It seems unlikely that the economist could make any predictions in
regard to these circumstance beyond those of particular individuals.
Corporate taxes are similar to other income taxes, although they
represent "double taxes" expropriating from "corporation" and owner's
income. As a double tax, these levies direct persons into other forms of
economic organizations. Moreover, because of the second rung of taxation,
upon income, the incentive in the corporate system is to leave earnings tied
up in capital at rates much higher than would have occurred on the free
market. Rather than encouraging efficient investment, the tax only benefits a
rigid form of investment, preventing would-be dividends from being utilized
elsewhere (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 102).
Windfall profit taxes distort for similar reasons: They lead persons to
make economic decisions which hamper or prevent the adjustments the
price sys tem produces in the market. By penalizing the successful
entrepreneur, the tax prevents the market from "knowing" the true
consumer demands. Furthermore, it lessens the incentives the investors
have in exploiting possible lucrative circumstances. Rather than
congratulating the person who has discovered new i tems or services which
fill a previously unfulfilled demand, these taxes punish successful
entrepreneurship.
Whereas these forms of "income" taxes are detrimental to the market
process, Rothbard finds taxes on accumulated capital to have a "far more

89

devastating, distorting, and impoverishing effect" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 12) .
These taxes, he recognizes, go well past mere taxation on present income;
they plunge into an economy's existing capital stock. Obviously, there is only
so long that this kind of activity may continue, for these actions ultimately
lower the standard of living for everyone, taxpayers and tax consumers alike.
Take, for example, a gift tax. Gifts are generally defined as income. But, in
reality, all they represent is a transfer of previously created wealth. To tax
these goods creates heavy disincentives both for the particular transfer and,
most importantly, for the initial production of these products. These
exchanges are a significant portion of any economy, as Rothbard points out,
since every bit of property that exists changes hands every two to three
generations, through inheritance. The effects concern not only narrowly
defined economic outcomes, but spill over negatively into sociological and
cultural issues concerning, for example, the family. l l
These kinds of taxes represent taxes o n wealth (the property tax would
fit neatly into this category, also) . But to tax wealth is to create incentives to
relieve one's self from such wealth and, consequently, to reduce the amount
of capital in the economy. As Rothbard realizes, it is this capital accumulation
that "differentiates our civilization and living standards from those of
primitive man" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 1 7).

1 1 . Similar arguments would apply to property taxes. See Rothbard
(1977a, p. 1 1 3-1 16).
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The progressive tax structure provides a similar although less severe
form of wealth drainage. Rothbard argues that the progressive tax
. . . acts as a penalty on service to the consumer, on
merit in the market. Incomes in the market are
determined by servi ce to the consu mer i n
producing and allocating factors o f production and
vary directly according to the extent of such
services. To impose penalties on the very people
who have served the consumers most is to injure
not only them, but the consumers as welL A
progress ive tax i s therefore bound to cripple
incentives, impair mobility of occupation, and
greatly hamper the flexibility of the market in
serving the consumers . . .. (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 1 8) .
Despite these damning points, Rothbard sees the entire debate over the
progressive tax as being overblown. First, the same kinds of criticisms which
may be applied to progressivism can also be applied to proportional taxation.
In both cases, the higher the income, the greater the tax. In either
circumstance, incentives for both work and savings are diminished and
distorted. The more pressing concern for Rothbard is, again, not the structure
of the tax, but the degree of the levy (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 1 22) .
Rothbard

critiques many of the possible "canons" postulated in the

defense of specific means of taxation. He finds it ironic that these kinds of
issues even arise in the modern age: Why, for instance, did the debates over
"just taxation" not go the way of the notion of "just price" in the post 1 870's
(Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 1 37)? Rothbard's similarly criticizes the implicit ethical
positions which sneak into the supposively "value-free" discussions of the
economics of public finance. There are no maxims of j ust taxation, he
concludes . Take, for example, the traditional canons of the father of
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economics, Adam Smith, which are generally accepted without a second
thought by modern economists .
. . . . Perhaps the most ' obvio u s ' was Smith ' s
injunction that costs o f collection be kept to a
'minimum' and that taxes be levied with this
principle in mind.
An obvious and harmless maxim? Certainly
not; this 'canon of justice' is not obvious at all. For
the bureaucrat employed in tax collection will tend
to favor a tax with high administrative costs,
thereby necessitating more extensive bureaucratic
employment. Why should we call the bureaucrat
obviously wrong? The answer is that he is not, and
that to call him 'wrong' it is necessary to engage in
an ethical analysis that no economist has bothered
to undertake (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 37).
Without this ethical foundation, no one can really talk about the proper kind
of taxation. Economics alone cannot determiJ],e the rightness of any of them.
Another of these canons is the demand for tax uniformity, i.e., the tax
code should be devoid of exemptions and apply to all persons equally.
Rothbard points out an implicit flaw in the logic of equal treatment:
. . .. [I]t seems clear that the j ustice of equality of
treatment depends first of all on the justice of the
treatment i tself. . . . Are we to maintain that 'justice'
requires that [persons] be enslaved equally? And
s uppose that someone has the good fortune to
escape. . . . [ H]e who maintains that a tax be imposed
equally on all must first establish the justice of the
tax itself (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 39) .
In other words, without ethical foundations which are not to be found in the
science of economics, one person's chastisements for tax evaders is another
person's idea of escaping the criminality of the tax collector! Uniformity
within the tax structure is unachievable, according to Rothbard, for two
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reasons. The first reason concerns the nature of the State: If there were not
income transfers, there would be no need or demand for a government. In
fact, one could argue that the essence of a State is redistribution, since every
act it performs in some way redistributes wealth from a set of losers to a set of
winners.
While Rothbard clearly distinguishes by definition tax consumers and
taxpayers, it seems these distiguishing factors are nearly impossible to discern
in practice. In the political complexity of contemporary society, the network of
these persons is incredibly confusing, complicated, and overlapping. It might
be argued that the continuance of transfers does not result from the benefits
of tax consumers so much as from the fact that almost all parties have a
perceived vested interest in its maintenance. This (false) perception results
from a comparision of one's concentrated government benefits and his
dispersed and often partially hidden costs. In other words, citizens clearly
perceive the benefits of tax consumption, but often face vague and / or
diffused tax payments. Of course, there are still some clear examples of both
sets of persons; as Rothbard notes, we may be generally secure in assuming
that bureaucrats are tax consumers, for instance (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 142).
Another reason Rothbard contends there cannot be uniformity relates
to the subjective nature of valuation. There really is no way to determine
non-arbitrarily what ought to be included as income. And, moreover, if non
monetary items are included, how does one determine the "values"?
Uniformity, therefore, demands additional principles, i .e., uniformity i n
relation to other principles (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 1 43-144).

As might be

expected, none of the possible criteria meet the standards of Rothbard's
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praxeology. For example, one's ability to pay is "highly ambiguous" and
allows "no sure guide for practical application" (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 144) .
Likewise, other "sacrifice" theories fail for similar reasons .
. . . . The many variants of the 'sacrifice' approach are
akin to a subjective version of the ' ability to pay'
principle. They all rest on three general premises:
( a) that the utility of a unit of money to an
ind ivid ual d iminishes as his stock of money
increases; (b) that these can be compared
interpersonally and thus can be summed up,
subtracted, etc.; and (c) that everyone has the same
utility-of-money s chedule. The first premise is
valid (but only in an ordinal sense), but the second
and third are nonsensical. The marginal utility of
money does diminish, but it is impos sible to
compare one person's utilities with another, let
alone believe that everyone 's valuations are
identical. Utilities are not quantities, but are
subjective orders of preference. . . . (Rothbard, 1977a,
p. 150) .
This thorough subjectivism produces the same conclusions in the critique of
regressive "benefit" theories of taxation, i.e., levies in accordance to the
benefits the taxpayer receives. In discerning the benefits of exchanges on a
voluntary market, all one may demonstrate is that a benefit ex ante has
occured; he cannot measure the degree of that benefit. Benefits are no more
defineable than costs.
Binary activities include not only the consequences of differing tax
structures but also the economics of expendi ture s . Rothbard divides this
category into two additional subsets: transfer activities and resource-using
expenditures (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 168) .
Transfer expenditures redirect transfer resources as "pure subsidy
granting activities" (Rothbard, 1977a, 169). Rothbard concludes that they also
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create a distinction that does not exist in the market: They separate the
production of resources from their distribution. Consequently, resources are
taken from where the market actors allocate them as efficient servants of the
consumer, to be placed in the hands of others who are presumably inefficient.
The economic consequences of subsidies are well established.
Resources are misallocated, mobility of capital and other factors are
hampered, and consumers foot the bill. However, as Rothbard points out,
there is an additional problem which is often overlooked .
. . . . Where government intervenes . . . caste conflict is
thereby created, for one man benefits at the expense
of a nother. This is most clearly seen in the case of
government transfer subsidies paid from tax or
inflation funds-an obvious taking from Peter to
give to Paul. Let the subsidy method become
general, then, and everyone will rush to gain
control of the government. People will be more and
more neglected, as people divert their energies to
the political struggles, to the scramble for loot. . . . .The
inefficient achieve a legal claim to ride herd on the
efficient. This is all the more true since those who

succeed in any occupation will inevitably tend to be
those who are best at it . . . . (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 1 70171).
In the present political situation, this point seems quite important. While
many writers have bemoaned the evils of "interest group liberalism" or
"hyper-pluralism", there are few who have recognized that the root of this
problem stems from the artificial dichotomy of human production and
distribution. By distinguishing existing bodies of wealth from the productive
capacities which created the wealth, a society, first, punishes the creators (and
likely diminishes their effort and number) and, secondly, practically
guarantees that a struggle over the "pile" of goods and services will ensue. In
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this environment, a political economy's focus shifts toward distributional
conflicts and, as a result, both the existing stock of resources and, much more
importantly, the "attitude" of the economy is transformed, imbalanced
toward higher time preferences and consumption. To postpone enjoyment or
focus upon productive acts in this distributive process is to miss the division
of the "pie". As one may imagine, the long-term consequences of this
behavior are severe.
These actions have similar effects regardless of whom they are
intended to affect. As Rothbard notes, relief for the poor, for example,
increases the marginal utility of leisure relative to work. This entitlement
(which distinguishes public "charity" from the private strands), in turn,
exhausts the resources of other non-governmental organizations aimed at
the removal of poverty.
Resource- using

expenditures,

the

second

category

of binary

expenditures, also redirect goods in ways not chosen by the market toward
ends chosen by governments. These services are provided as either "free" or
with attached user fees. In the former circumstance, the receipt and payment
of the service are "split" and, since it is provided freely to the citizen, the
demand for the service exceeds the market's demand. The result, Rothbard
concludes, is an inevitable overuse of the product. Therefore, it is another
form of subsidy with users gaining at the expense of non-users, as in the
example of public schools or state highways. Since no pricing scheme exists
for the allocation of the given good, a government cannot rationally
determine the proper levels of the activities. Rather than having prices to
determine where to allocate the resources it possesses, the State must rely on
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the narrow dictates of the specific agency personnel or government planner.
But in this case, it is the single person making the "consuming" decisions
rather than actual consumers, as articulated through the whole body of
information provided by market prices.
Might this dilemma be eliminated by the implementation of user-fees?
According to Rothbard, this solution, while perhaps preferable to free
services, suffers from the same fundamental and "fatal flaw".
. .. . It is .. . that government can obtain virtually
unlimited resources by means of its coercive tax
power. Private businesses must obtain their funds
from investors. It is this allocation of funds by
investors on the basis of time preferences and
foresight that rations funds and resources to the
most profitable and therefore the most serviceable
uses . . .. In short, payment and servi ce are . . .
indissolubly linked on the market. Government, on
the other hand, can get as much money as it
likes . . . . Government . . . has no checkrein on itself,
i.e., no requirement for meeting a profit-and-loss
test of valued service to consumers, to enable it to
obtain funds.... (Rothbard, 1977a, pp. 175-176).
Consequently, the rhetoric that permeates allocative decision-making within
the governmental organization is consistently dominated by demands for
more resources as the rational action. From this perspective, this is the
rational choice, in fact, since the cost side of the decision-making is severely
limited or non-existent. One faces the ultimate negative externality problem,
since costs may be almost completely avoided by the "producer". As Rothbard
notes, within the voluntariness of the market (with presumably clearly
defined property rights), the increase of such resources in one arena may only
come at the expense of some other activity, and the action is judged according

97

to its ability to satisfy consumer demands through the signals of profit and
loss.
Furthermore, when government creates enterprises, these businesses
have inherent advantages over any remotely related market alternative, since
the State plays by a wholly distinctive set of rules in their capital formation.
Ultimately, the result is the destruction of these market industries, since
investment flows away from these unfortunate competitors who obviously
cannot compete against the public industry.
Therefore, criticisms that governments ought to run themselves "as a
business" entirely miss the point. To be operated as a business demands the
strict discipline of the marketplace. First, the lack of market-accountable
organizational discipline makes this demand extremely problematic. Second,
the skills that individuals develop in this environment tend to be politically
effective rather than economically efficient (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 78) . To
borrow terminology from Public Choice theory, actors become increasingly
efficient at "rent-seeking" rather than "profit-seeking" . The same drains on
the economy faced in the capital markets occur similarly in the labor areas, as
potentially productive persons are drawn by higher than market wage rates
and / or heightened j ob security into government employment. From
Rothbard's perspective, these distortions begin with the first government
involvement; "for each governmental firm introduces its own island of
chaos into the economy" (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 1 80). In his view, the removal of
these governmental interventions can only lead to better service, lower costs,
less distortion of consumer demand and resource allocation, and, finally,
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greater social harmony, avoiding the mad rushes to live off the distibutive
State.
While this discussion is interesting, and Rothbard's application of
subjectivism is correctly administered, it all seems to be beside the point. If, in
his severe dualism, only markets can guarantee the rational allocation of
resources, why even discuss distinctive modes of taxation, for example?
Under his absolutist logic, there really is no way to distinguish one form from
another.
The crux of Rothbard's contention is that it is the voluntary nature of
exchanges which allow a true reading of demonstrated preferences. If
elements of force dictate the patterns of choices made by an individual, there
are unreliable actions to be observed and, subsequently, to be misunderstood.
But might there be voluntary forms of taxation and / or expenditures which
could be distinguished? For example, are there not political actions, in a
democracy at least, that are voluntarily accepted by the persons involved?
According to Rothbard, there are none. First, "nonvoters" may not be said to
have consented. But suppose that all taxes were, in fact, provided
"voluntarily"? For once, at least, he recognizes the possibility of a free riding
problem, arguing that under a gift system, services such as defense would
suffer since the benefit is garnered regardless of one's payment--resulting in
excessive demands and overly limited supplies (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 163).
A democracy could provide a "fee" for "voting", i.e., a poll tax, so as to
rest upon a voluntary foundation. Of course, this payment is, therefore, not a
tax at all but rather is more akin to representing dues. If these taxes existed,
the voting turnouts would likely drop substantially, as Rothbard argues.
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Accordingly, our current democracy does not represent a voluntarily
conceived system of decisionmaking. And democratic participation alone fails
to meet his criteria for voluntariness. First, voting "is a highly marginal
activity"; the voter receives "no direct benefits from his act of voting" and
"his aliquot power over the final decision" approaches zero (Rothbard, 1 977a,
p. 1 64). Second, voting in a collective setting produces a "disjunction between
voting and payment, on the one hand, and benefit on the other" (Rothbard,
1977a, pp. 1 64-165).

This "collectivization" of political resources is quite

similar to the diffusion of distribution and production in a State-infested
economy.
This discussion, however, is a perfect example of the way in which
Rothbard allows value-laden arguments to spill over into his praxeology. If
one is truly to maintain a subjectivist value theory, how may praxeology tell
us whether, for a given individual, voting is a "highly marginal act"? In fact,
it is rather obvious that for many persons the opposite is true. One might
argue that objectively these actions represent a form of wasted effort, but it is
unclear how one might reach this conclusion without something more than
praxeology may provide. Rothbard dismisses democracy--or for that matter,
all political activity--rather arbitrarily. The reason, of course, is that he
implicitly assumes that all political acts are equivalent to coercion.
His

second reason for rejecting democracy's voluntariness is

problematical for similar reasons. Disjunctions between payment and the act
of exchange--whether they are voting or investing in some other person's
project-and the receipt of benefit, occur constantly. If we assume, for example,
that a specific government action is consented to by those affected by it, why
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would the action, praxeologically speaking, be any different from an
agreement between a company and a group of stockholders? Simple empirical
observations of the historical atrocities of the State cannot alone eliminate the
potential of an act that is both "political" and voluntary. Therefore, it seems
that Rothbard slips into these critiques, under the guise of "value-free"
science, a set of implicit ethics of his own. These actions may be seen as
distortive or impoverishing only if they do not represent the demonstrated
preferences of the consumers. But praxeology does not provide the tools to
deny the possibility of democratic contractualism; only a system of anti-statist
ethics can accomplish this task.

Triangular Intervention

Triangular intervention involves an invasion which interferes with
an exchange between persons by a third person who either forces or prohibits
the exchange. One may sub-divide this category into two parts: price control
and product control. As we noted above, it is this category that tends to
receive the overwhelming bulk of attention from economists concerned with
the effects of government interference.
Price controls, if effective as a means of regulation (i.e., if they have
have a real effect upon the product), create artificial shortages or surpluses,
depending upon whether the edict establishes maximum or minimum
prices. In both cases, resources are either shifted into or out of these markets
in distortive manners. Entrepreneurs are sent false signals, in other words.
The same kind of controls may be applied with similar consequences to
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saving and investment markets through the institution of usury laws. In
these cases, persons' time preferences remain unchanged, so application of
maximum rates removes a portion of available funds. Paradoxically, then, the
individual supposedly benefitting from the dictum, the more risky borrower,
is locked out of the market by the shortage of available resources, since the
higher rates are denied (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 33). While the stated aim of such
controls is usually to benefit persons who seemingly cannot borrow funds at
the "market" rate, the result is to do just the opposite, preventing numerous
persons from the product at all, while also spilling over and distorting other
parts of the economy. Probably the only consistently sure "winner" in this
triangular arrangement is the person who creates and administers the
regulations (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 34) . Another likely beneficiary is the
individual with a long and successful credit rating and substantial equity.
Since the policy creates an artificial shortage of borrowed funds, only those in
least need of assistance will be able to garner loans.
Often, rather than interfering with the pnce of an item, the
intervening force might control the product directly. As a result, a demand in
the economy either is prevented from being fulfilled or is at least altered by
the force involved. Subsequently, opportunities for both capital and labor
resources are driven from their best opportunities, or driven into the less
efficient, more monopolistic, and more risky black market.
Rothbard distinguishes two forms of product prohibition: absolute
prohibition and partial prohibition (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 35) . Absolute
prohibition eliminates the product entirely, whereas partial prohibition
"rations" the product in some way (amount, style, formula, etc.). Control
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essentially represents a form of monopoly grant, so as to either provide or
deny certain activities. Since freedom of entry is denied by government edict,
the consumer is forced to deal with the grantee of monopoly priviledge. But
as is pointed out in the discussion of monopoly theory, with open entry there
can be no monopoly over time since profits are "ephemeral". The same logic
applies to "quasi-monopolies": As long as a specially enforced priviledge
remains, gains are made through coercive measures. Rothbard argues that
while one may not draw a distinction between "competitive" and
"monopoly" price, one can distinguish "free market" and "monopoly" price.
The difference, he argues, is that the second set has "conceptually identifiable
and defineable" attributes, whereas competitive price has no meaning in the
economy since value is subjective. The critical feature is the voluntariness of
the arrangement; to speak, therefore, of government monopolies is to
Rothbard a redundant exercise.
Rather than repeat the similar lines of logic of earlier discussions, the
following section outlines briefly a number of Rothbard's applications of
praxeology to particular public policies representing forms of special
government grants of priviledge: l 2
1 .) Compulsory cartels. By forcing all industries within a certain sector
to accept imposed production quotas, government arbitrarily sets levels
which over time increasingly distort the economy because of the rigidities in

80).

12. The proceeding discussions are drawn from Rothbard (1977a, pp. 41-
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production. As a consequence, quality and efficiency levels at best stay
unchanged; more likely, efficiency falls because of the removal of new entry
pressures.
2.) Licensing. An occupational license prevents many possible entrants
into a particular labor sector from actual entry, since they cannot afford the
requirements. Because this process is often heavily influenced by the industry
itself, the result is the maintenance of special priviledge status. This practice is
especially oriented toward monopolistic practices in labor markets, where
licenses (as with the restrictions gained by government-sponsored union
contracting) always restrict entry, driving up wages for those with jobs but
increasing overall unemployment.
3.) Safety and Quality Standards. On a free market, these concerns are
left to the voluntary demands of the consumer. These qualifications
eliminate the buyer's freedom to determine quality standards and restrict
competition. As long as actual fraud has not occurred there is no reason to
involve any other participant other than the parties i nvolved in the
exchange. (For a discussion of fraud, see Chapter IV.) If the parties involved
in the exchange consent, ex ante utility is increased.
4.) Tariffs . Tariffs are merely product monopoly controls applied
internationally. The loser is the consumer and the general standard of living,
since resources are required to be utilized in less than optimally efficient ways
by paying for the protection of the priviledged industry. The rhetoric of
unfavorable balances of trade is without any foundation: If exchange is
voluntary all trade is favorable ex ante, no matter which side of the debtor
creditor relationship one finds himself. The only saving grace of the tariff,

1 04

ironically, is that in the long term, it is likely to have less potentially
damaging effects than other monopoly grants. With tariffs, there is at least
still free trade within a region.

5.) Immigration Restrictions. These amount to "geographical grants of
oligarchy" in the labor markets . If an internationally free economy existed,
one would witness a flow of labor resources, i.e., individuals, toward the
higher wage areas. With restrictions on movement, however, current job
holders in the labor market benefit from the limitations at the expense of
those unemployed and / or prevented territorial entry. The greatest benefits
fall upon those laborers in the particular markets of the potential emigrants.
And these are the markets most in need of unrestricted entry. As a further
distortion, the artificially high wages boomerang back around, as capital flows
out into those areas where restictions abroad hold wage rates low. As a result,
there is inefficiency in the world markets due to the imbalance caused by
restrictions on immigration, exemplified by distorted divisions from country
to country of the overall population.
6.) Child

Labor

Laws .

These

normally

considered

bits

of

humanitarianism represent, in fact, labor restrictions on a substantial sector
of the population, to the benefit of the other portions. Childless families gain
at the expense of those with children. Also, since a large portion of potentially
productive labor is restricted by law from working (but who are still
consuming), the overall standard of living diminishes.

7.) C o n s cription. Actions such as a forced military draft remove
persons from their chosen economic advantages and require them to work at
wages below the market levels; essentially, then, conscription is a form of
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taxation. Furthermore, this activity shifts resources away from the demands
of consumers toward those of the government. Finally, like other labor
limitations, conscription removes a substantial portion of the labor force,
increasing the benefits for those remaining.
8.) Minimum Wage Laws. Persons whose productive capabilities are
below the set rate find themselves unemployed. Those persons in most need
of employment--namely, those at the margin--are locked out. Those
employees above this rate benefit from the artificial reduction in the labor
force. (This would explain union lobbying efforts to increase minimum wage
limits, despite the fact their own wages are substantially higher than the
legislated rates.)
9.) Unemployment Benefits. After these other restrictions aid to create
unemployment, this compensation subsidizes the loss, diminishing the
potential disdain of the kinds of restrictions the unemployed worker might
face. These subsidies especially immunize those individual s / groups
organized and active in developing the original restrictions, such as unions.
1 0.) Antitrust Laws . Ironically, these acts, according to Rothbard,
diminis h rather than facilitate competition. Since the only monopoly is a
government monopoly, it is impossible for any policy to reduce them.
Antitrust laws in reality are vague dictates that produce capricious and
arbitrary interferences in the market. Competition is a process, not a quantity:
As long as the market processes are carried out without fraud there is no
reason for any involvement. Politicos substituting their judgments for those
of the market can only create woefully misinformed policy which upsets the
critical risk components in the system, since participants, fearful of the
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interpretive edges of vague (and, therefore, highly discretionary) policy, play
close to the cuff.
1 1 .) Patents. Rothbard views patents as monopoly grants similar to
those listed above. Granting patents restricts the independent discoveries of
others for the same or very similar idea or invention. However, this seems to
be a rather curious position.
Patents, like any monopoly grant, confer a
priviledge on one and restrict the entry of others,
thereby distorting the freely competitive pattern of
industry. If the product is sufficiently demanded by
the public, the patentee will be able to achieve a
monopoly price. . . . (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 74).
Before we examine this puzzling conclusion, let us examine one additional
area that unfortunately creates even more confusion.
12.) Rights of Eminent Domain. The granting of a license of eminent
domain for an industry represents a "license for theft. " The consequence is
the distortion that

potential "takings" create. Moreover, the benefactors of

the grant receive an increase in investment above the market levels at the
expense of the initial property holders.
Throughout these discussions, Rothbard points out the nature of
monopoly, namely, the granting of a special priviledge upon a certain sect in
the economy. Furthermore, he concludes, these grants may only exist
through the State's interference. But he raises an additional concern: Are not
corporations themselves a grant of special priviledge? Rothbard argues they
are not, but are "free associations of individuals pooling their capital"
(Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 79) .

Since the issue of limited liability is open to all

transactors prior to doing business, no priviledge exists. Would not this point
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be contrary to his discussion of fractional banking, though? It is difficult to
discern any critical theoretical distinction between the idea of pre-accepted
limited liability and pre-consented fractional reserves. In both cases,
producers and suppliers enter "contracts" which seem to be voluntary.
Likewise, in both cases, the value/usefulness of the institutional arrangement
is determined through the competitive processes of the market.
Unfortunately, though, this entire discussion leaves one haunted by
what is not discussed. Why, for example, are not the existence of property
rights themselves a grant of priviledge? Whereas Rothbard may be able to
answer this question in Chapter IV in his discussion of ethics, there appears
to be no way to gain these answers praxeologically. Furthermore, it is unclear
how praxeology may link the existence of property rights to the consequences
of "voluntary" exchange. Is Rothbard's own "value-free" science implicitly
sliding values in the side-door?

Conclusion: Caught in His Own Praxeological Web

Throughout his discussion of economics, Rothbard stresses his
adherence to scientific objectivity. Yet, as we have seen, there are reasons to
conclude that his science is a tainted value-freedom. It seems that he is as
guilty of the inclusion of his own brand of ethics as are the systems he
critiques. While praxeology may be able to argue that the consequences of
voluntary action will produce certain results, it cannot draw distinctions
between what Rothbard calls market and government actions. To accomplish
this goal, a number of concepts demand definitions. But it would appear these
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definitions transport us into the realm of ethics. This point seems especially
true concerning what criteria establish voluntary activity. Otherwise,
Rothbard cannot use subjectivist value theory in order to make his points.
While we may accept the maxim that individuals making voluntary
decisions will maximize their own utility, we cannot accept, praxeologically at
least, that market actions are always voluntary.
With regard to the praxeology of violent intervention, Rothbard
distinguishes the "free" and "hampered" markets (Rothbard, 1977a, p. 256) . In
the free society, he argues, the economist's function is educational and, thus,
he may not establish the existence of ethical rules. On these points, he is
correct, for science can neither determine the proper rates or structures of
taxation, nor can it implicitly accept community standards without these
representing ethical positions.
Rothbard asks the essential question: "If the economist qua economist
must be Wer tfr e i ,

does this

leave him

any

room for

signifi cant

pronouncements on questions of public policy" (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 260)? He
concludes that the praxeologist may, first, uncover the implicit and
inconsistent ethics of tainted perspectives and, secondly, may demonstrate the
consequences of different forms of government interference. On the first
point, there is no debate. However, the latter function is troublesome. Before
one can discuss the effects of "violent", i.e., political, action, he must define
what is and is not violence. Praxeology, founded on the "truth" of
subjectivism, may not rely on anything but the demonstrated preferences of
the actors involved . Under subjective value theory, who is to say all
government action is coercive and all market activity voluntary? Under
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consistent subjectivism, do the concepts "artificial shortage", or "real market
conditions" have any meaning, for example? What allows us to conclude that
the present level of a product is optimal or sub-optimal without some
baseline upon which to gauge these terms? It is clear that Rothbard's baseline
is the voluntariness of the decision of the actor. Unfortunately, he then leaps,
willy nilly, to associate his dual bases of voluntary and involuntary action
completely with the existing social institutions of market and State. In other
words, market decisions are never involuntary.
Rothbard slips a set of ordering ideas into his theory which allows him
to create an ethically founded dualism between the two forms of activities.
There is nothing necessarily incorrect about this dualism (in fact, without
imposing these empirical and ethical observations the concepts of
political / hegemonic means and economic / contractual means would be
meaningless), but its rightness is not founded praxeologically. Furthermore,
one may even be able to convince persons that they would prefer what
Rothbard calls the "market" principle over the "hegemonic" principles. But
these principles only receive meaning through the provision of ethical
ordering, followed by an observation of reality. The institution of
Oppenheimer's economic means, defined as the non-existence of coercion,
may produce· these consequences, but we cannot assume nor can praxeology
provide us the knowledge that the institution of these peaceful means
correlates a priori with markets, without bringing other components into the
discussion. Could there not be "economic means" that are politically initiated,
and vice-versa? The choice is not as simple as following out the premises of
praxeological reasoning and merely choosing between the " society of
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contract" and the "society of status" (Rothbard, 1 977a, p. 266) . The decision
over whether one chooses the consequences of the market or the results of
State intervention is not where the ethical questions begin and Rothbard's
praxeology ends; they are inherently intertwined with his entire discussion.
While this is a perhaps a damning criticism of Rothbard's praxeological
critique of politics (although they do not take away from the power of the
ideas themselves), his own criticisms has led him to indeed explicitly
establish this system of ethics which he implicitly applies to the praxeology of
violent intervention. In Chapter IV, the ethics underlying Rothbard's
scientific inquiry are defined in the examination of his libertarian system of
political ethics.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF ROTHBARD

Introduction: The Establishment of Political Ethics

Praxeology alone cannot generate any specific kind of ethical system. In
order to justify libertarianism, therefore, Rothbard turns to the establishment
of a system of objective ethics based on natural law. As political theorist
Norman Barry recognizes, this formulation of a set of objective ethics is one
of the major characteristics separating Rothbard and anarcho-capitalism from
most forms of "minimalist" classical liberal systems. This natural law
foundation is, he notes, "more or less explicit rationalism of the kind
condemned by Hume and Smith in the eighteenth century and Hayek in
this," producing a "resolutely unhistorical methodology" (Barry, 1986, p. 1 66).
Rather than accepting the ethical framework of uncertainty or ignorance in
the evolutionary system of Hayek, for instance, Rothbard postulates a
rationally conceived and axiomatic system of ethics. Nevertheless, as an
Austrian economist, he is also thoroughly versed in the economics and
sociology of the spontaneous order and the invisible hand. While there are
times when in his writings the two distinctive ideas are used interchangeably,
it is very clear that the ethical system of natural law always takes precedence
over any form of consequentialism.
However, Rothbard admittedly never attemp ts to establish the
ontological foundations of his natural law libertarianism. In fact, his claims of
objective law amount to little more than the assertion that they exist. Instead,
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he follows the natural law arguments of Thomas Aquinas in contending that
natural law exists, is discernible by reason, and is separate of any question of
faith-bound theology or question of God's existence. Hence, ethical laws, like
physical laws, are discoverable through reason. All things, Rothbard argues,
have specific natures; humans, like all other entities, are open to observation
and reflection as to their true natures. In other words, objective reason "can
be employed by all men to yield truths about the world" (Rothbard, 1982a, p.
1 0). The good and the natural are, thus, synomonous; the achievement of
human nature is the fulfillment of the natural law. To violate these natures
is to fail to achieve human potential.
. . . .Since men can think, feel, evaluate, and act only
as individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for each
man's survival and prosperity that he be free to
learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act upon
his knowledge and values. This is the necessary
path of human nature; to interfere with and cripple
this process by using violence goes profound! y
against what is necessary by man's nature for his
life and prosperity. Violent interference with a
man's learning and choices is therefore profoundly
' antihuman'; it violates the natural law of man's
needs (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 28) .
Rothbard tries to bridge the infamous is-ought gulf through the use of
a teleological ethics which concludes that humans are naturally bound to do
the moral action. Ultimately, the survival of the human depends upon
following these principles. However, there are reasons to believe that there
remains an exceptional gap between these ideas. Presently, it takes only a
cursory observation of society to realize the problematical nature of this
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argument. It may be argued that on several occasions, Rothbard is overly
optimistic in narrowing this gulf.
Let us assume for the sake of the argument, however, that these are
not crippling concerns. Ethics for Rothbard is a realm wholly separate from
praxeology, for praxeology builds upon a subjective value theory and ignores
the fundamental values of the decisions made by actors in the social world.
Praxeological "happiness", then, is defined in a purely formal sense, based
upon individual preferences, without m aking j udgments

on those

preferences . This definition says nothing of the objective nature of the
choices made, whereas natural law, in fact, seeks to make statements as to the
ethics of the preference. One might argue intuitively, for example, that
Austrian praxeology leads to the support of a free market system. In reality it
may not; it can only support a market order on the condition that one accepts
the values the market is founded upon or the consequences it creates.
Obviously, this is a subtle distinction due to the deeply rooted support of a
freely functioning economic system which seems to follow from the
consequences of the Austrian research program. Rothbard, therefore,
embraces

the rather

unusual

(though not necessarily inconsisten t)

perspective of being an objectivist in ethics and a subjectivist in other realms.
This dictotomy leads Rothbard to be highly critical of the more popular
economist's utilitarian political ethics. First, his challenges the ultimate
foundations of an ethics based quantitatively, i.e., the "greatest good for the
greatest number" and the implicit recognition of individual equality.
Utilitarianism, he argues, is further trapped in a contradiction .
. . . . [U] tilitarianism

implicitly
1 14

ass umes

these

subjective desires [of individuals] to be absolute
givens which the social technician is somehow
duty-bound to try to satisfy. But it is common
human experience that individual desires are n o t
absolute and unchanging . . . . But how could that be
so if all individuals' values and desires are givens
and therefore not subject to alteration by the inter
subjective persuasion of others? But if these
desires . . . are changeable by the persuasion of moral
argument, it would then appear that inter
subjective moral principles do exist that can be
argued and can have an impact on others.
Oddly enough, while utilitarianism assumes
that morality, the good, is purely subjective to each
individual, it assumes on the other hand that these
subjective desires can be added, subtracted, and
weighed across the various individuals in society . . .
(Rothbard, 1982a, p . 202).
While this may be a damning criticism of utilitarianism, it is difficult to grasp
how this argument in any way establishes the existence of "inter-subjective
moral principles . " And Rothbard never clearly justifies how that in the
science of economics all benefits and costs are individually subjective,
whereas in ethics there exists an objective standard.
Nor does he explain the common problem of natural law theory,
namely the notorious disagreement over what actually are the laws of nature.
The followers of Thomas Aquinas were generally Catholic communitarians
and would have been unsympathetic of Rothbard's radical individualism, for
example (Barry, 1986, p. 1 76). While Rothbard might respond that philosophy
has evolved since the time of Aquinas, this foundational void still fails to
satisfy present-day natural law theorists, practically none of whom would
accept Rothbard's system of ethics. One might conclude that Rothbard, failing
to prove the existence of the roots of libertarian ethics, is guilty of the same
crime often attributed to fellow libertarian Robert Nozick--a libertarianism
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devoid of foundations) He simply accepts the ontological existence of these
truths. Moreover, he clearly distinguishes this natural law from positive law.
The former provides an objective set of rules that are eternal and immutable
by definition and are founded upon the fixed nature of humans. The latter,
on the other hand, contains numerous non-rational components, including
the dependence on tradition and the use of force as he defines it. In
Rothbard's view, reason alone is the only appropriate means to establishing a
politically ethical system. Accepting this method's primacy, natural law is
constantly a radical component in politics, threatening these non-rational
parts of the status quo.
This is an important point, for in modern interpretation natural law is
quite often seen as a distinctly conservative phenomenon. Yet, for Rothbard,
it becomes that which has been as of yet unachieved in the fulfillment of the
natural, and rational, society. Its realization requires a radical makeover of the
present world. His assumption, however, is that these natural laws may
objectively be established through rational discourse.
Rothbard also provides an additional twist to his understanding of
natural law by arguing that many natural law philosophers (especially the
ancients) failed to correctly enunciate true maxims. The failure arises for
these theorists because they rooted their political philosophy in the S tate
rather than centering it on the individual. They missed the mark by not
establishing the correct principles of justice in the source of moral and

1 . For a discussion of the requirements of demonstrating the existence
of natural law, particularly from a libertarian perspective, see Flew (1982, pp.
278-279).
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immoral action, the single actor. There is, then, a clear consistency between
Rothbard's system of ethics and the criticisms he and other Austrians within
the tradition of methodological individualism make concerning the study of
"macro-economics" : the "leap" these studies make from the real component
in action (the individual) to a misleading form of holism (the State) .
Thus, from Aristotle's correct dictum that man is a
'social animal,' that his nature is best fitted for
s o c i a l cooperation, the c l a s s i c i s ts l e aped
illegitimately to the virtual identification of
'society' and the 'State,' and thence to the State as
the major focus of virtuous action (Rothbard, 1 982a,
p. 21).
Instead, Rothbard founds his natural law on a more recent political
philosopher,

John

Locke.

From

this

merging of natural

law

and

individualism comes the framework of natural rights. One might view this
fusion as a synthesis both theoretically and historically of objective universal
law and subjective fulfillment of human interests. Thus, by "individualism"
Rothbard does not mean atomism. That interpretation, he argues, is an
"authoritarian straw man" (Rothbard, 1 978b, p. 28) .

Universal moral laws

transcend individual interests. In fact, it is the social nature of mankind that
encompasses the most basic natural facts: Cooperation, exchange, learning,
and interaction are critical both for the economic and ethical survival of
mankind. Nevertheless, these principles are derived from and mediate the
acts of individuals and they exist to "serve" the individual. It is the State that
is the "anti- social instrument, crippling voluntary interchange, individual
creativity and the division of labor" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 1 87).
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Political Philosophy and Individual Morality

In his political philosophy, Rothbard focuses upon the concept of
rights, which ultimately are social or political notions, i.e., boundaries within
which individuals may act in relation to others. Therefore, one must
distinguish personal ethics (how one leads his own life) and political
philosophy (how one interacts with other individuals).
[ There is a] crucial distinction we shall
make . . .between a man's right and the morality or
immorality of his exercise of that right. We will
contend that it is a man's right to do whatever he
wishes with his person; it is his right not to be
molested or interfered with by violence from
exercising that right. But what may be the moral or
immoral ways of exercising that right is a question
of personal ethics rather than political philosophy-
which is concerned solely with matters of right, and
of the proper or improper exercise of physical
violence in human relations (Rothbard, 1 982a, p.
24).
Thus, Rothbard seeks to formulate a "political philosophy of liberty"--a
"social ethic of liberty"--not a personal set of morals for individuals
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 25). This is a very important distinction in its application.
In the discussion of numerous libertarian applications to modern political
dilemmas, he defends positions that will most definitely offend the personal
moralities of many individuals. However, it is important to realize that
libertarian political philosophy is simply the specification of what legitimate
functions (if any) the State may entertain, or what certain persons may
impose upon other persons . Where activities are undertaken that do not
violently cross the paths of other persons, Rothbard's ethics are silent. Thus,
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the system makes no ethical judgments on individual behavior unless
interaction occurs within a social framework. Unfortunately, he never
explains how we may create an objective ethic at this level but cannot
formulate one at the level of personal economic or ethical decision-making.
(Coming from the Austrian tradition, one might be more likely to conclude
that an objective ethics may not be formulated.) Presumedly, though, no
legitimate overarching system of personal morality may contradict the
principles of libertarian political philosophy.
Rothbard concludes that political philosophy has failed at its truth
seeking task in contemporary scholarship in at least two ways. The dominant
failure emerges from political science's infatuation with "empirical fact
grubbing" and model-formulation. The fallacy in this case arises from the
perspective that value-free policy prescriptions may be drawn from scientific
research. The result is a type of backdoor philosophizing, in which
"scientists" make implicit value judgments under the guise of objectivism. In
almost all circumstances, these implicit value prescriptions generate an
advantage for the existing status quo. The second failure comes from political
philosophy's contemporary interests--an evasion of true philosophy for
historical study of "antiquarian descriptions and exegeses of the views of

other, long gone political philosophers" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 25). As a result,
modern political debate proceeds devoid of well-founded systems of ethics
applicable to modern political questions. For Rothbard, no advocacy of actual
public policy may legitimately occur without this component (Rothbard,
1973c, pp. 35-39; 1974c, pp. 101-106).
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Libertarian Ethics: Humans in Isolation

The concept of "Robinson Crusoe" appears in Rothbard's political
philosophy as well as in his economic theory. He distinguishes for the
purposes of clarification the notion of the individual alone in nature and the
idea of an actor in society. Through such abstraction one may attain an
understanding of what occurs in interaction among individuals without
becoming entangled in the network of society, and losing all clarity.
The learning process Crusoe encounters is the same for ethical
understanding as it is for economic survival. Through both introspection and
extraspection, he learns the "natures" of phenomona. This "fusion of spirit
and matter," or ideas directing energies, allows the discovery of natural laws,
as it does for economic laws (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 31).
But what natural laws of political and/or social relations may a lonely
Crusoe realize? First, he discovers the "primordial natural fact of his
freedom: his freedom to choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason
about any given subject" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 31 ). In other words, he discovers
his free will as an individual. From this realization, Crusoe recognizes that
he possesses and controls his self and his own body--a "natural ownership of
self" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 31).2 Even without any additional ownership, this
natural "fact" cannot be denied. These realizations are intertwined, for the

2. Not all libertarians accept the notion of "self-ownership"; see
Machan ( 1989, pp. 1 39-140). Machan argues that self-ownership is impossible,
since one cannot simultaneously be one's self and own one's self.
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right of self-ownership provides the human the opportunity to achieve his
ends and satisfy his human potential.
Is there not a tension in this connection between free will and natural
law? If one is bound by the dictates of nature, how can he have free will?
Rothbard draws a very important distinction between freedom and power.
Man is free to adopt values and choose his
actions; but this does not at all mean that he may
violate natural laws with impunity--that he may
leap oceans with a single bound. In short, when we
say that 'man is not 'free' to leap the ocean', we are
really discussing not his lack of freedom but his
lack of power to cross the ocean, given the laws of
his nature and of the nature of the world. Crusoe's
freedom to adopt ideas, to choose his ends, is
inviolable and inalienable; on the other hand,
man, not being o m n ipoten t as well as not being
omniscient, always finds his power limited for
doing all the things that he would like to do. In
short, his power is necessarily limited by natural
laws, but not his freedom of will. To put the case
another way, it is patently absurd to define
'freedom' of an entity as its power to perform an act
impossible for its nature (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 3334) !
Freedom is defined negatively: It is the absence of interference in person and
property by other persons. For that reason freedom and power may well be
antithetical concepts. And, since the abstracted Crusoe exists in total isolation,
it would be correct to say he is totally free, even though there are surely
numbers of things beyond his control or possession.
This distinction is crucial to the Rothbardian system and to
libertarianism in general. In many modern definitions of "positive" freedom
the notion becomes hopelessly entangled with the the idea of entitlement,
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opportunity, or empowerment (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 2 1 5-216) . This
perspective is unfortunately inconsistent, for in the natural world humans
are entitled to nothing. We in essence create (or do not create) our "worlds."
Therefore, in productive society any entitlement comes at the expense of
some other "creative" person--if it is defined as anything more than the
principle of non-interference. These truths do not vary in the social world,
for from a natural law perspective freedoms that do not exist in nature
cannot emerge outside of it. Rothbard's model of ethics is therefore
c o n s i s te n t . Notions of freedom which entail a n idea of power are
inconsistent, unachievable, and extremely conflictual, and as rights, cannot
exist simultaneously in the social world. As an absolutist ethical theory there
is no (logical) potential for any conflict of rights. Ultimately, the only
remaining natural freedoms must be negatively-founded, framed upon the
idea of the non-interference of others.
However, each "person's freedom of movement, one critic notes, will
be a function of what he owns" (Barry, 1986, p. 1 80) . While this assessment is
correct, it seems to ignore the fact that an individual also owns at least
himself in this system. And alternatives to this idea of ownership remove
even this moral imperative by "socializing" the notion of rights to include
particular forms of interference. In his isolated world, Crusoe has the ability
to transform . the physical resources available to him. He is free in the only
sense the term has any meaning--in nature. In this world there is obviously
no fear of conflicting claims--his "title" goes as far as his reach allows. Of
course, for the purposes of political philosophy, this isolated state has little
meaning relative to property rights--except in the foundation of their
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existence for both the isolated and populated worlds. But these rights need
not be transformed in society, for in both isolation and interaction Rothbard's
principles of ethics are the same. Civil society's emergence does nothing to
change the fundamental laws of nature.

Libertarian Ethics: The Introduction of Society and Human Interaction

Interaction changes our discussion in substance but not in principle.
Through exchange, as Rothbard demonstrates in his discussion of economic
theory, civilization expands. And through a market order and price system,
these exchanges can be calculated in extremely efficient manners despite the
high complexity of the economy. Rothbard calls this world of total voluntary
exchange a free society or a society of "pure liberty" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 40).
But exchanges require an ethical and legal foundation, namely, the notion of
ownership and a system of property rights. According to Rothbard, humans
may ethically acquire wealth through exploitation of virgin resources,
through voluntary exchange of previously created wealth or one's labor, or
through the reciept of gifts from someone else's stock of resources attained
through one of the first two methods. And each of these situations falls back
ultimately on human self-ownership and the consequences of the mixture of
one's labor accordingly.3

3. Certain philosophical traditions, namely the Marxists, reject the idea
of one's labor representing a commodity. But Rothbard ( 1982a, p. 40)
disagrees: Since labor is alienable from one's self, it is the productive services
and not the i ndividual in exchange.
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As we previously noted, by defining property rights as a consistent
extension of each person's own self-ownership, there is no inconsistency in
applying this framework to a complex society. Rousseau's famous paradox of
freedom and chains need never exist, according to Rothbard! Civilization
requires no surrendering of human freedom in order to garner the benefits of
civilized society; in fact, it thrives from the maintenance of pure liberty. And
pure liberty is the only ethic which is equally applicable to all persons
simultaneously in the community. All other notions of the ethical society
violate this requirement of universal application since any other system
contradicts the idea that all persons must live by a code of equal justice.
This

primacy

by

libertarians

of

"property"

rights

is

often

misunderstood by modern theorists, particularly modern "liberals" who
create the arbitrary dichotomy between property rights and "human" rights.
For Rothbard, it is not so much that property rights take precedence, but that
they are the only kind of rights. In other words, there are no human rights
that are not property rights, since all rights emerge from the natural fact of
individual self-ownership. From this perspective, free speech, for example,
results from the fact we own ourselves and what we say. Contrary to the
rationales so often heard in modern debate about the non-absoluteness of
speech (and the subsequent necessity to "balance" rights), speech is totally
absolute and consistent when thought of in terms of property rights.

As

Rothbard notes, the critical and often ignored issue in the debate over speech
is where the speech occurs. In other words, to utilize a common example, one
cannot yell "fire" in a theater because he does not o w n the theater. (See
Chapter V for additional discussions of the rights of expression.) The failure
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of the modern liberal perspective is that it treats humans as "ethereal
abstractions. "
. . . . If a man has the right to self-ownership, to the
control of his life, then in the real world he must
also have the right to sustain his life by grappling
with and transforming resources; he must be able to
own the ground and the resources on which he
stands and which he must use. In short, to sustain
his "human right'--or his property rights in his
own person--he must also have the property right
in the material world, in the objects he produces.
Property rights are human rights, and are essential
to the human rights which liberals attempt to
maintain .... (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 42-43).
To further illustrate this point, let us borrow a common and extreme
example often used against strict property rights theorists, namely, the
"lifeboat" scenario. The prime requirement, of course, is to unsort those who
may live from those who die in this dire situation. For Rothbard, these
determinations follow from distinguishing ownership of the boat. In cases
where the owner is a member of the party, he has sole responsibility to
determine who lives or dies, based on whatever criteria he values. Hence,
those persons he asks to leave are trespassers and may be discarded. If the
owner is not present and has not made his demands for the use of the lifeboat
known, or if he is dead, then the homesteading principle (discussed below)
applies. In other words, if the boat holds five persons, and ten persons are
trying to use it, ownership goes to the first five persons to possess the boat.
But in seeking to attain the boat, one is not free to aggress against other
persons seeking to accomplish the same goal. This resolution may appear
exceedingly harsh, but any conclusion is, by necessity, grim.
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Thus, all of Rothbard's theory follows from the natural facts of self
ownership and the homesteading principle. What are the consequences of
such a strict notion of property rights? Rothbard apparently rejects any notion
of an end-state (and generally egalitarian) idea of distributive justice, or the
"Lockean proviso" which compromises a view of property rights that is
purely historical. For him, it is completely the rule of "first come-first
served."
But even Rothbard would surely admit that such an notion o f justice
leaves open the distinct possibility of vast resource inequality due to extreme
differences in capital and land resources. And will not these vast inequalities
be utilized to unequally apply unethical means in the social process? This
problem does not concern Rothbard, who, in fact, maintains a rather extreme
anti-egalitarian perspective. First, individual freedom is critical both for
ethical reasons and for the survival of humankind; inequality of wealth and
control are therefore inevitable. Second, the ethics of egalitarianism represent
a "revolt against nature", which can only demolish civilization by violating
both the basic nature of man (largely by rejecting the idea that humans have a
distinctive nature) and, consequently, the laws of economics (Rothbard, 1973a,
pp. 348-357; 1971a, 226-245).

Forms of Interaction: Property Rights and Criminality

According to Rothbard, there are only two alternatives concerning
ownership: the libertarian notion of total self-ownership and the idea of
ownership by others. The latter alternative may be further sub-divided into
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two additional categories : the "'communist' one of Universal and Equal
Other-ownership" or the "Partial Ownership of One Group by Another--a
system of rule by one class over another" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 45; 1 978b, pp. 2930).
How do these latter two alternatives stand ethically? The partial
ownership ethic, Rothbard contends, fails for lack of universality by either
rendering certain entities as non-humans or allowing one group to aggress
against others. Hence, it fails to meet both moral and impartiality
requirements. Furthermore, by living off the production of others, certain
classes violate the natural requirement for life that they be productive in a
voluntary exchange environment.
The communist alternative suffers for similar reasons. In complex
societies, i .e., those composing more than a few persons, communist ethics
disintegrates into partial rule by others. It is rather easy to understand how
this breakdown occurs. In the complex economy, there exists a distinction of
property, either through de facto or de jure means. To fail to provide realistic
rules concerning possession, i.e., "rights" of property, the system provides a
vaccuum that is filled by either overt or covert applications of force. Rothbard
correctly argues that all property is ultimately private property. The important
issue is how one defines the parameters of ownership / possession and not
how one might eradicate notions of property. In the real world, then,
communism is utopian (as is the general category of egalitarianism) and is an
impractical economic and ethical formula. Since this ethic is essentially self
destructive, Rothbard argues, movement in the direction of communism
may also be viewed as contrary to natural law.
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Since humans are not "floating wraiths", ownership necessarily
extends to other material properties in society as it does in isolation.
However, according to Rothbard, natural law extends ownership only to the
point of actual use. In other words, although certain persons might arrive
first on Mars, they may not claim actual ownership of the entire planet unless
they are somehow able to homestead and mix labor with such a large land
mass.
What an individual creates by mixing his labor becomes his property so
long as he has not stolen it from another individual. Can this justification be
extended to include not only created property, but also the actual existing
lands? Rothbard argues that land is no different from other tangible
properties.
. . . [T]he justification for the ownership of ground
land is the same for that of any other property. For
no man actually ever 'creates' matter: what he does
is take nature-given matter and transform it by
means of his ideas and labor energy. But this is
precisely what the pioneer--the homesteader--does
when he clears and uses previously unused virgin
lands and brings it into his private ownership. The
homesteader--just as the sculptor, or miner--has
transformed the nature-given soil by his labor and
his personality. The homesteader is just as much a
'producer' as the others, and therefore just as
legitimately the owner of his property (Rothbard,
1982a, pp. 48-49).
The land is unowned prior to the homesteading. It is, he argues, valueless
until it is turned to production in some form. Rothbard rejects the Georgist
position because it fails to recognize that land, like all other resources, must
necessarily be controlled by someone. To place ownership in some abstraction
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called "society" or the State is to beg the question. In reality, no producer
creates new matter; he merely transforms it. There is no distinction between
land and other natural resources.
Wealth, the result of production, may then be obtained in one of two
ways. Following Oppenheimer's lead again, Rothbard concludes that humans
may either produce or steal resources (economic or political means) . Only the
first alternative, as we stated earlier, is legitimate, for the second one
contradicts human nature. An aggressor lives parasitically off others, but
parasites cease to exist in the absence of producers. Therefore, parasitism
represents acts wholly against the nature of humans:
Parasitism cannot be a universal ethic, and, in fact,
the growth of parasitism attacks and diminishes the
production by which both host and parasite survive.
Coercive exploitation or parasitism injures the
production for everyone in the society. Any way
that it may be considered, parasitic predation and
robbery violate not only the nature of the victim
whose self and product are violated; but also the
nature of the aggressor himself, who abandons the
natural way of production--of using his mind to
tr ansform nature and exchange with o ther
producers-for the way of parasitic expropriation of
the work and product of others. In the deepest
sense, the aggressor injures himself as well as his
unfortunate victim (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 49-50) .
The libertarian "creed", according to Rothbard, rest upon one central
axiom: "no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property
of anyone else"--the "non-aggression axiom" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 23) . This
concept of aggression or coercion is crucial to the entire libertarian model.
Unfortunately, there exists an unavoidable ambuiguity with the term . The
" invasive use of physical violence or the threat thereof" leaves the
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boundaries hazy. Does "physical" force, for example, exclude psychological
"force"? Or, might "invasion" be defined so loosely as to include practically
every minor "externality" (incessant whistling or one's hair color, for
instance)?
In his stinging critique of F. A. Hayek's discussion of coercion, we are
able to gain a bit more understanding of Rothbard's own perspective of what
constitutes invasion (Rothbard, 1 982a, pp. 219-228) . In The Constitution of
Liberty, Hayek defines coercion as "the control of the environment or
circumstances of a person by another" that creates the situation where, "in
order to avoid greater evil, [ the person] is forced to act not according to a
coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another" (Hayek, 1 960, pp.
20-21). Rothbard argues this definition opens the floodgates to all manner of
"non-aggressive" acts being defined as coercion (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 219).
Furthermore, by contending that in certain cases coercion should be allowed
to prevent even greater coercion (for example, punishing a nagging wife),
Hayek grants coercion an "additive quality" that it does not possess
(Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 219) . This quality results, Rothbard argues, from a failure
to distinguish qualitative differences between violent acts and peaceful ones.
As a ethical monist, Rothbard postulates only two alternatives: voluntary and
aggressive actions.
How does this monism employ itself in Rothbard's system of ethics?
To borrow one of Hayek's examples: Would it be coercion for a manager to
fire an employee in a mining town simply due to his dislike of the man
(Hayek, 1 960, pp . 1 36-1 37) ? To Rothbard, it would not be an illegitimate
invasion. As manager (acting in the interests and with the support of the
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owner), one is free to use or not use his property as he sees fit. Obviously, in
this libertarian system of ethics, there is no natural "right" to employment,
regardless of how serious the consequences may be because of the dismissal.
No matter how drastic one formulates the consequences, Rothbard's position
would not change until the action of the employer could be defined in his
theory as invasive. Thus, with regard to Hayek's definition, Rothbard
concludes:
. . . [We] are duty-bound to do one of two things :
either to confine the concept of 'coercion' strictly to
the invasion of another's person or property by the
use or threat of physical violence; or to scrap the
term ' coercion' altogether, and simply define
'freedom' not as the 'absence of coercion' but as the
' absence of aggressive physical violence or the
threat thereof' . . . . Unfortunately, [Hayek's] middle
of-the-road failure to confine coercion strictly to
violence pervasively flaws his entire system of
political philosophy. He cannot salvage that system
by attempting to distinguish, merely quantitatively,
between ' mild ' and ' more severe' forms of
coercion (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 223) .
Rothbard is correct to criticize the "quantitative" nature of Hayek's
coercion, but to accept a qualitative definition burdens him with the demand
of preciseness. Both the concepts of "physical" and "invasion" require more
exact and precise definitions in order to be truly meaningful. Otherwise, the
system provides no parameters of rightful or wrongful actions. In defining
his terms, Hayek fell into the trap of defining in degrees, whereas Rothbard's
failure is to beg the question by being overly vague. Until these definitions
can be established with more clarity, the model's ethical applicabilty is
diminished. Thus, the individualistic framework remains, but the legal

131

definition of "invasion" may mean practically nothing at all or it may imply
almost everything. Obviously, Rothbard, as a libertarian, would prefer to rest
nearer the former end of the continuum. However, nothing prevents the
extension of morals to include what might be called "quasi-invasive".
For instance, could the continual racial badgering of a minority person
be defined as an invasive act? Or, under the Rothbardian notion, would
"brainwashing" be a physical invasion? Would it be so immediately, or only
after an observable change, or at some other point in time? To be consistent,
it would seem that one may select one of two possible alternatives: Either the
act is immediately invasive or it is never invasive, since, by definition, this is
or is not a "physical" invasion. The latter answer is obviously more in line
with Rothbard's perspective, yet it would prove to be highly unsatisfactory to
many theorists (even some with libertarian tendencies) to ignore these
common but difficult to define relationships.
But let us proceed from the assumption that we have at least a partially
defineable foundation upon which to build. Is aggression always unjustified?
Rothbard concludes that historical investigation is necessary in any given
case; thus, property rights may not be extended to properties previously
expropiated. No one may act aggressively against the legitimate property of
another. Any given situation, therefore, must define the natural owner and
aggressor. It goes without saying that in the highly unethical and statist world
of today, existing legal property rights claims may well have serious ethical
problems.4

4. Similarly, Rothbard would reject Public Choice theorist James
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In

this context, a fallicious argument which tries to distinguish private

property and community property often arises against the libertarian modeL
The effect is to separate community property from the ethical constraints of
normal legitimate ownership concerns. But Rothbard makes no distinction
between a single owner and a group of individuals who happen to call
themselves a government.
Thus, the crucial question is n ot, as so many
believe, whether property should be private or
governmental, but rather whether the necessarily
' private' owners are legitimate owners or
criminals. For ultimately, there is no entity called
'government'; there are only people forming
themselves into groups called 'governments' and
acting in a 'governmental' manner. All property is
therefore always 'private'; the only and critical
question is whether it should reside in the hands of
criminals or in the proper and legitimate owners.
There is really only one reason for libertarians to
oppose the formation of governmental property or
to call for its divestment: The realization that the
rulers of government are unjust and criminal
owners of such property (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 55).
Does this not open a Pandora's box of persons with actual property claims
challenging specific historical situations? As a consequence, does it not
produce an extremely disordered society? Rothbard argues to the contrary:
Unless one can be shown to be a criminal of someone's person or property,
then the assumption must be that the possessor is the legitimate owner. In
fact, even if the present possessor is proven to be in control of criminally

Buchanan's (1 975) acceptance of the status quo as an ethical foundation in
establishing property arrangements.
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obtained property, there may be circumstances that warrant the status quo.
For example, if the owner or his ancestors are clearly identifiable, then the
property returns to the rightful owner(s), even if the property is no longer in
the ownership of the actual criminal. If the original owners are not
identifiable, however, it becomes more complicated. If the actual criminal
still possesses the item, Rothbard argues, he must surrender it. The good
returns to a state of "no-ownership" and will go to the first "homesteader."
But, if the present possessor is not the actual thief and the legitimate owners
are unknown, then the homesteader is obviously the present holder of the
property. The presumption is that unless there is clear evidence of both
criminal a ction and victim(s), the i tem remains in its status quo
circumstances, although ill-gotten gains may never remain with the actual
criminal. (However, the forced return of the items ought to distinguish any
separable items of value added by the illegitimate possessor.)
Within this ethical framework, one might argue that the "loser"
would be those persons who purchase properties that have been gained
criminally. Rothbard, however, suggests that the use of some form of title
search and / or insurance process similar to the types which already exist for
land sales (where property exchanges represent substantial resources) could
easily be applied under these circumstances.
It should be clear by now that Rothbard's system of ethics is built upon
a set of two alternatives: the theory of the rights of property and the theory of
criminality. The former idea represents legitimate action: Every person has
an absolute right of ownership of himself and all unclaimed resources he
discovers and transforms. Conversely, criminal action is the transgression of
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these legitimate claims, and in the ethical society, must be invalidated
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 59).

The Problem of the Limited Earth

One very serious criticism likely to arise against a system of ethics so
fundamentally based on self-ownership and the extension thereof is that
certain kinds of property, namely land, is, at least for the foreseeable future, in
a definitely limited supply. Under Rothbard's homesteading position, is one
to rely in every case on a simple first come-first served framework?
Furthermore, how may this seemingly arbitrary principle be justified within
a natural law system?
First, Rothbard's requirement of usuage for the establishment of
legitimate property claims eliminates a portion of this problem. In other
words, no person may make mere broad-sweeping claims to land and justly
establish rightful ownership. Thus, the scarcity of land created by this type of
claim would not constitute a problem within his system. To demonstrate this
proposition, Rothbard returns to the Crusoe model:
. . . Crusoe, landing upon a large island, may
grandiosely trumpet to the winds his 'ownership' of
the entire island. But, in natural fact, he owns only
the part he settles and transforms into use .... But so
long as no other person appears on the scene,
Crusoe's claim is so much empty verbiage and
fantasy, with no foundation in natural fact. But
should a newcomer--a Friday--appear on the scene,
and begin to transform unused land, then any
enforcemen t of Crusoe's invalid claim would
constitute criminal aggression against the
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newcomer and invasion of the l atter ' s property
rights (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 64).
However, Rothbard does not mean by this requirement that property must be
i n conti n u al use. Rather, it must have been employed at some point in the
past, so that one may be said to have "imprinted the stamp of his personal
energy upon the land" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 64) . Yet, as the world grows more
populated and the technological advances extend the abilities for persons to
mix with l arger parcels of property, the potential problem of not having
enough to go around remains or even increases. In fact, Rothbard's principle
extends this problem, since once the property has been transformed by a
person, i t remains that person's property for perpetuity. Thus, those coming
later face apparently even more difficult obstacles.
It is important to note, however, that his position is buil t upon the
satisfying of past aggressions against historical property claims--in no way a
trivial point. In cases where property has been aggressively stolen years ago, it
must be rightfully returned to present day ancestors. For critics worried about
the unequal division of property and its effects on one's ability to enjoy the
homesteading requirements, it is likely that substantial parcels of land would
need to be legitimately transferred out of the ownership of (presumedly more
powerful) aggre ssors. There would be, at least initially, an equalizing
tendency.
Rothbard identifies two forms of illegitimate l and monopolies: forms
of feudalism and "land-engrossing," or unfounded broad claims to virgin
property mentioned above. The first of these forms, he argues, is a serious
problem internationally and one often ignored by even free market
economists who underestimate the role of property rights in a j ust society.
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His libertarian perspective provides a unique twist to the debate concerning
land reform in less developed countries, since it at once supports a staunch
property rights scheme and condemns "state capitalism." For example, the
leasing of properties to industries by governments would be found to be
illegitimate, since the claims of ownership by these governments violate
principles of property rights. If, on the other hand, properly homesteaded
titles emerge, then investment, development, etc. are quite legitimate.
Unfortunately, in regions unsupportive of the market, the illegitimate
activities of "capitalists" and the legitimate actions of a free market have been
perceived comparably.
It is possible, even probable, that a large portion of the problem of
limited land and, more importantly, subsequent concentrations of property,
would disappear under a truly libertarian framework. Therefore, Rothbard's
idea of property rights represents radical land reform: The "immediate
vacating of the title and its transfer to the peasants, with certainly no
compensation to the aggressors who had wrongly seized control of the land"
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 71). Similarly, concerning the slavery issue in America,
Rothbard argues the moral solution would have been immediate abolition
with compensation paid not to the "owners" of the slaves, but vice-versa,
with the plantations going to the former slaves--the true homesteaders. For
example, these principles would generate extreme anti-capitalist but pro-free
market consequences simultaneously in less developed nations.
However, in discerning historical claims, one question arises
concerning Rothbard's compensatory rights. Why, in the unsorting of
legitimate and illegitimate historical property claims, do ancestors hold any
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sort of favored status in the process of readjustment? Of course, Rothbard
rightfully supports an individual's right to control his inheritance as an
extension of property rights over one's gifts (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 40-41). But
in cases where these wishes are not and cannot be known, what natural law
principles provide a special priviledge to persons merely falling within an
ancestorial line?
Let us assume for a moment that ancestors have no special claims. If
we rely upon Rothbard's argument, the property would presumedly return to
a state of non-ownership. Following the principles of homesteading, would
not the property remain with the ancestor of the aggressor (who did not
commit any criminal acts)? Are we, then, in the case of generational
aggression, returned in reality to a framework of accepting for the most part
the legitimacy of the status quo, dismissing historical circumstances? Perhaps
we can establish an exception in those cases in which present generation
"victims" can achieve the extremely difficult task of demonstrating past
aggression.

(Perhaps some form of individualistic and libertarian

"affirmative action" extremely different from the present policy?) Without
these historical connections, there seems to be no a priori rationale to benefit
the ancestors of invaded persons.S It would seem proper to require claimants

5. For instance, why should the beneficiaries of an "affirmative action"
program receive "compensation" from other individuals without having to
demonstrate injury? If we might for a moment assume that "discrimination"
is an aggression under libertarian principles, it would appear possible to
redress these injuries and provide restitution to the injured parties. But the
claimant must be required to show actual injury to himself, not some long
past ancestor. Of course, libertarian theory does not normally disallow private
discrimination, but the point ought to be clear.
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across generations to directly prove injury from the earlier aggression before
they may rightfully claim compensation. Of course, this principle need not
allow the obvious homesteading advantages which go to the thief's
ancestors. But it removes the incentive to demand the punishment of such
crimes, since no apparent person has claims against the ancestor. While this
reformed principle does not go so far as to justify the status quo ethically, it
significantly diminishes the rather radical compensatory historical
framework that Rothbard outlines by eliminating most inter-generational
claims.
This principle raises a potentially even more complicated issue in the
management of aggression, namely, the proper punishment of criminals in
society. Any libertarian model makes as it first principle the non-existence of
"society"! Crime is an individual act perpetrated by criminal(s) upon
victim(s) . Rothbard argues that the libertarian principle of punishment must
be one of proportionality. As a code, proportionality establishes the
maximum punishment allowed the victim upon the proven aggressor. To
advance beyond these limits is to become

an

aggressor oneself. Of course,

since the punishment is the victim's decision, he is free to choose less than
the maximum standard. Rothbard again makes the assumption that the heirs
have some legal standing in this decisionmaking process (Rothbard, 1982a, p.
85) . Either the heirs, or the murdered person through a pre-determined will,
may establish the form of punishment demanded in cases in which the
victim is deceased. The burden or the relief of satisfying justice falls upon the
ancestors.
In Rothbard's view, the critical component in the theory of
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punishment is restitution, a factor that has been increasingly ignored as the
State expands its monopoly in the instigation of punishment.6 If, for
example, a simple theft occurs, the aggressor is required to restore at least the
amount or items taken, either through return of the resources or
enslavement until the resources are redressed. For certain types of crimes,
restitution may demand more. In cases of aggression, for instance, restitution
equal to the monetary loss of the victim is insufficient and proportionality
must be applied in a different form. First, the criminal must lose rights to the
same extent as he has taken them. In the cases of monetary theft, for example,
the criminal should pay double the crime, as well as other specifically
established costs for non-monetary items (fear, mental anguish, etc. ).
Likewise, in assault cases, the victim would be free to beat the aggressor twice
as badly, or at least "more than the same extent" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 88).7 The
victim is again free to choose a less serious punishment, or to reach a
contractual agreement with the aggressor to allow some other form of
punishment.
Of course, this "two teeth for a tooth" principle tends to run counter to
modern notions of punishment. Deterrence, for example, a utilitarian notion
at foundation, creates potentially dangerous and unjust social consequences

6. On the notion of restitution in a libertarian society, see also Rothbard
(1980b); Nozick (1974, pp. 59-63); Ferrara (1982); and Barnett and Hagel (1977).
7. As Rothbard notes, the practice of restitution would produce the
opposite results of the contmporary punishment model in which the
taxpayers are required to pay the expenses of arresting, trying, convicting, and
incarcerating criminals. See also Rothbard (1982a, pp. 86-87).
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such as the over-punishment of more frequently and less severe petty crimes
or even the conviction of innocent people to make a social point (Rothbard,
1 982a, p. 91). Neither does the notion of rehabilitation satisfy the principles
of justice. If implemented in its entirety, the logic of this form of
"punishment" results in completely indeterminate sentences--a complete
dismissal of any idea of proportionality. Moreover, it transfers completely the
dispensal of justice to a third party, the State, which leads to a subsequent
disintegration of the principle of equality under law. As Rothbard notes,
"therapy" quite often calls forward much harsher punishment than simple
proportionality, or, on the other hand, it may produce rapid "rehabilitation"
for severe crimes. Each of these principles ignores the only person who
ethically has "standing" in these cases, namely, the victim.
Several potential criticisms arise from Rothbard's discussion of
punishment. The first problem,

an

admittedly minor one perhaps, deals with

the rather arbitrary nature of his "two teeth for a tooth principle." Rothbard
himself does not seem overly committed to this perspective, calling it a "fall
back" position (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 88). Moreover, he is unclear as to the
proper extent of restitution in specific cases. This understandable lack of
clarity is not a major shortcoming for the libertarian system. The crucial
components are unscathed by this unavoidable problem: It removes any sort
of State's interest and retains the individualistic nature of crime and
punishment. · Still, as with the definition of "physical invasion" (though
obviously not to the same degree) the rudiments of proportionality lack
adequate clarity.
Peter Ferrara argues that this principle of double punishment may just
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as easily be characterized as a combination of both restitution and retribution,
and still be defined without a State interest. Whereas Rothbard's position is
defined/ according to Ferrara/ as "a strict lex talionis whereby the victim has
the right to do to the criminal exactly what the criminal did to the victim,"
there is no apparent reason why this lex talionis cannot be viewed as
retribution for the aggression (Ferrara/ 1982, pp. 127-128).
Perhaps a more pressing criticism concerns the potential removal of
more impartial third parties in implementing the actual punishment.
Rothbard readily allows persons to "take the law into there own hands,"
although he anticipates that in a free market such activities would be
handled by those with comparative advantages in those arenas. Otherwise,
the executor of the punishment may be liable for exaggerating the
punishment or mistaking the criminal--both for which they themselves
would become criminals.
On the other hand/ a criticism might alternatively emerge from an
opposite kind of problem. It is surely conceivable that individuals might not
be able or may not be courageous enough to implement punishment against
an aggressor. By removing the force of the State from the punishment of
criminals/ one possibly leaves the separate individual in a frightened and
intimidated position. Rothbard's response seems less than adequate: If the
victim does not choose to respond, then no rights have been violated. In
cases where the victim is a pacifist, this argument might carry some weight;
the "debt" is simply forgiven. It is very easy to imagine, however, how even a
majority of victims might face unconquerable intimidation from their
aggressors. Of course, they are free to hire other persons to get their justice,
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and, as he notes, the present system cannot avoid cases lost through
intimidation, either.

Still, there are times when the State's monopoly of

force serves as a valuable instrument in the protection of victims' rights.
Yet, it would seem such active participation by those directly affected
may produce positive consequences arising from heightened enthusiasm.
While there obviously exists a greater incentive to capture the aggressors, this
advantage may be outweighed by the loss of objectivity which comes from
third party investigations. However, these persons are liable for their actions
-not only their acts of punishment but also their activities in uncovering
evidence. Hence, as Rothbard correctly notes, it is quite likely that police and
judicial work would be left up to those persons trained in those areas.
How are these rights to punish aggressors woven into libertarian
ethics?

According to Rothbard, rights of punishment emerge from natural

rights of self-defense.
If every man has the absolute right to his justly
held property, it then follows that he has the right
to keep that property--to defend it by violence
against violent invasion . . . .To say that someone has
the absolute right to a certain property, but yet lacks
the right to defend against attack or invasion, is also
to say that he does n o t have total right to that
property (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 77).
Similarly, persons have the right to hire contractually persons to carry
out the same function. The extent of this self-defense is as simple as the
ancient "nose-fist" analogy, i.e., legitimate self-defense ends at the point
where another's property rights in person or thing begins. In itself, this rule
communicates very little information. Retaliation does not, for instance,
apply to what Rothbard calls "non-violent harm" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 77) . To
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adopt one of his examples, while boycotts may have particularly damaging
effects on a producer, the "injured" party has no right to respond to these
actions in a violent way. (Of course, nothing would prevent the producer
from retaliating in other non-aggressive ways, say, by refusing to provide
other products or perks desired by the boycotters. Likewise, while unions are
free to peacefully strike, so is an employer free to fire anyone he pleases and
to replace them accordingly.)
Thus, the crime must be, according to Rothbard, a violent or
"invasive" act before retaliation is justified (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 77). Included
in this category would be at least three acts: actual physical aggression,
intimidation or threat of violence, and fraud or "implicit theft." It is not
exactly clear how these categories parallel with the definition of invasion
relative to the ethics of aggression. Would, for example, intimidation
represent "physical" force? These categories are at once minutely narrow and
infinitely broad. For example, where does one draw the line between hearty
persuasion and criminal intimidation? Rothbard contends that the threat of
aggression must be "palpable, immediate, and direct; in short,that it be
embodied in the initiation of an overt act." Furthermore, we must "bend
over backwards to require the threat of invasion direct and immediate, and
therefore to allow people to do whatever they may be doing" (Rothbard,
1982a, p. 78) . In other words, the "self-defender" maintains the burden of
proof to show that actual violence occurred or would have surely happened.
If the violence did occur, the transgressed is warranted to defend against that
invasion.
But to what degree may one return aggression? As with the difficult
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question of punishment, it is often exceedingly difficult to legitimately gauge
the extent of the response which may be proper. In the case of a threat, the
danger must be immediate and overt. Once this fact is established, the ethical
validity of the response retreats again to the notion of proportionality, i.e.,
loss "to the extent that [one man] deprived another man of his [rights]"
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 80) . It goes without saying that this principle applies with
equal force to police or other types of community security personnel.
Rothbard also defines fraud in contractual agreements as an act of
violence, either by failure to implement one's obligation after benefitting
from the other party or by unauthorized adulteration of properties involved
in the exchange. However, he argues, the failure to carry out a contract is not
always a fraudulent act. Contracts are only enforceable if actual theft occurs.
For instance, to borrow one of his examples, one may not be required to
follow up ori a promise of marriage six months in advance--since no actual
property has changed hands. If, however, actual property is appropriated,
then the agreement is enforceable and violent self defense is warranted to
retrieve the property. He, therefore, veers away from an absolutist position
on contracts by arguing that these agreements are a derivative of the right of
property. Only in those contracts where failure to execute would signify
property theft would there be legitimate means to enforce them. If, on the
other hand, the property has not been transferred from one party to another,
no theft has occurred. Property rights are absolute; contract rights, in his view,
are merely instruments to facilitate the benefits of ownership and a free
society.
An important consequence of this "title-transfer" position is the
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rejection of any notion of a "breach of promise." The fulfillment of a contract
is not based upon any form of expectation on the part of the as of yet
unfulfilled recipient, but is founded solely on forms of "implicit theft" where
title has gone from one party to the other without the latter fulfilling his
obligation . This issue is a very important and conflictual point in
libertarianism. Rothbard argues there is no form of property in one's
promises or expectations. These contracts are, then, unenforceable. In this
instance we have what Barry calls the "superficially startling view" that any
contract resting on promise or expectation, rather than being implicit theft,
may be breached at will (Barry, 1986, p. 183) .
. . . . The basic reason is that the only valid transfer of
title of ownership in the free society is the case
where the property is, in fact and in the nature of
man, alienable by man . . .. i.e., in natural fact can be
given or transferred to the ownership and control
of another party . . . . But there are certain vital things
which, in natural fact and in the nature of man are
in alienable, i.e., they ca n not in fact be alienated,
even voluntarily (Rothbard, 1 982a, pp. 1 34-1 35).
These "vital" items include the human will or control of one's self. Likewise,
these rights are inalienable. Thus, Rothbard argues, it would be inconsistent
to conceive of a notion of rights--which by their nature are founded on
"absolute self-ownership"--in concert with alienability.
Rothbard uses this argument to reject social contract theory as well.
. . . . A basic fallacy is endemic to all social contract
theories of the State, namely, that a n y contract
based on a promise is binding and enforceable. If,
then, e v e r y o n e---in itself of cour se a heroic
assumption--in a state of nature surrendered all or
some of his (sic) rights to a State, the social contract
theorists consider this promise to be binding
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forevermore . . . . While, on the contrary o t h e r
attributes of man: specifically, his self-ownership
over his own will and body, and the r ights to
person and property which stem from that self
ownership, are 'inalienable' and therefore cannot
be surrendered in a binding contract. If no one,
then, can surrender his own will, his body, or his
rights in an enforceable contract, a fortiori he
cannot surrender the persons or the rights of his
posterity (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 230).
This position further explains Rothbard's subordinate role for the right of
contracts. A "slave contract", for instance, would not be enforceable since no
person may alienate ultimate control over himself. And since the "slave" is
not an implicit thief in Rothbard's definition, neither would he owe any
payment for removing himself from any life-long obligation.
But is there no property in any form of promise? What of the costs
borne by the person left "holding the bag"? For Rothbard there is no
legitimate claim; instead he chalks the loss up to poor entrepreneurship and
forecasting--an unfortunate learning experience. Therefore, persons ought to
be free at any time during the course of a job contract, for example, to quit and
move elsewhere (including military enlistees!). The only recourse for the
employer apparently involves blacklisting such individuals, unless, of
course, some form of conditional property exchange has actually occurred. In
these cases of exchange, tangible property is involved--and these resources are
alienable.
While this perspective may be within the parameters of libertarian
ethics, it

seems to be rather disconcerting once one speculates upon its

potential consequences. For example, let us again borrow a Rothbard
example.
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. . . . Suppose that a celebrated movie actor agrees to
appear at a certain movie theater at a certain date.
For whatever reason, he fails to appear. Should he
be forced to appear at that or some future date?
Certainly not, for that would be compulsory
slavery. Should he be forced, at least, to recompense
the theater owners for the publicity and other
expenses incurred by the theater owners in
anticipation of his appearance? No again, for his
agreement was a mere promise concerning his
inalienable will, which he has the right to change at
any time. . . . The fact that the theater owners may
have made considerable plans and investments on
the expectation that the actor would keep the
agreement may be unfortunate for the owners, but
that is their proper risk . . . . The owners pay the
penalty for placing too much confidence in the
actor. It may be considered more moral to keep
promises than to break them, but any coercive
enforcement of such a moral code, since it goes
beyond the prohibition of theft or assault, is itself
an invasion of the property rights of the movie
actor and therefore impermissable in the libertarian
society (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 1 37).
One may assume the principle would be the same had the owner
refused to allow the actor to appear upon arrival . For theorists concerned
with the consequences of individual actions, this perspective is quite
troubling. Who, for instance, would be willing to take the heightened risk of
ever trusting persons with which one would contract? In addition, it might
increase the likelihood of "pay-backs", which woul d damage civilized
exchange and, subsequently, society's standard of living. It is, however,
unlikely that the results of these principles are all that controversial. First, for
any reputable person, failure to carry out promises would rather quickly
diminish one's standing in his profession. Secondly, to avoid these potential
problems, Rothbard suggests the use of "performance bonds" which would
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require the promiser to put up a bond that would cover pre-appearance costs.
As alienable property, this could transfer to the other party.8 Interestingly,
this process avoids the requirement so common in today's legal system of
having to bring suit to collect damages after the breach of contract. As a result,
Rothbards notes, contemporary courts are forced into the difficult role of
trying to ascertain "fair" levels of compensation, rather than performing their
proper function of guaranteeing the performance of contracts.
One existing legal mechanism somewhat related to contracts but
unavailable to a libertarian society would be the instrument of bankruptcy.
These actions clearly violate the property rights of the creditor, Rothbard
contends. If the debtor is simply hiding assets, he is guilty of both theft and
fraud. If the bankruptcy is due to lack of resources, then the debtor should be
required to surrender future income, plus interest, until the debt is paid in
full. Of course, nothing prevents the creditor and debtor from individually
working out their own arrangements. Or, to borrow a position similar to that
of the nineteenth century libertarian Lysander Spooner, one may treat the
debt at its initiation as a form of a partnership (Hall, 1986, pp. 176-177).
Thus, Rothbard's system of ethics may be rather simply summarized in
a concise code of action. Humans own themselves and are free to mix
themselves with the natural environment--homesteading property that is to
that point in time unused by any other person. Contrarily, violent acts-
Oppenheimer's "political means"--are acts of criminality and unethical under

8. Rothbard (1982a, pp. 137-140) explains that these bond arrangements
were quite common and successful in the Middle Ages, proving to be a
"remarkably flexible instrument" in diminishing the concerns of critics.
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the libertarian code. In no cases are these acts of violence ethically justifiable,
no matter who the actor is. From these principles, what role does the State
play in Rothbard's political philosophy?

The State in the Rothbardian System

The answer to the question of the government's role is quite logical:
There is no role for the State in Rothbard's political system .
.... For libertarians regard the State as the supreme,
the eternal, the best organized aggressor against the
persons and property of the mass of the public .... Jn
fact, if you wish to know how libertarians regard
the State and any of its acts, simply think of the
State as a criminal band, and all the libertarian
attitudes will logically fall into place (Rothbard,
1978b, p. 46) .9
Governments, according to his essentialist definition, commit violence
through avenues not usually open to private institutions in society.
Governments are not institutions built upon any notion of a social contract,
but rather they are formed and are maintained through the continuance of
conquest and force. Their most common violation is the confiscation of
property through taxation. The State also frequently requires service or denies
otherwise legitimate activities of persons . It is responsible for the majority of
destruction historically, largely through its ability to monopolize and coalesce
aggression. Moreover, it lacks any "guardian" to check the actions of this

9. For extended discussions of this same theme, examine Rothbard
(1974a); (1972a, pp. 60-75); (1978d, pp. 191-207).
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monopoly force. Crime, obviously, occurs in the "private" world. But the
State provides a "legal, orderly, systematic channel for predation on the
property of the producers; it makes certain, secure, and relatively 'peaceful'
the lifeline of the parasitic caste in society" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 51).
Since the State is built upon a grand scheme of theft, Rothbard
concludes that we have no obligation to obey its commands. This principle
provides a far-reaching conclusion: Ethically, one is free to evade taxes, to
homestead government (stolen) property, to violate government contracts,
and to refuse to follow government orders. (For practical reasons, he does not
necessarily suggest civil disobedience, however!) The State is not merely
another entity in the private society; it is "an inherently illegitimate
institution of organized aggression" (Rothbard, 1982.a, p. 1 86).
Rothbard finds the overwhelming support of a monopolistic State
apparatus to be highly ironic, given the treatment usually afforded "private"
monopolies in social theory. Citizens have granted incredible powers to
governments --to

control

money,

to

dis pense

j us ti ce,

to

regulate

transportation avenues and postal services, to police society and the defense
apparatus, to name a few--that few individuals in theory would tolerate in
the market sector. Unlike a legitimate private organization, the State may
force persons to purchase their "product. " Always, Rothbard concludes,
taxation represents theft.
It would be an instructive exercise for the skeptical
reader to try to frame a definition [of taxation]
which does not also include theft. Like the robber,
the State demands money at the equivalent of
gunpoint; if the taxpayer refuses to pay, his assets
are seized by force, and if he should resist such
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depredation, he will be arrested or shot if he should
continue to resist. It is true that State apologists
m aintain that taxation is 'really' voluntary; one
simple but instructive refutation of this claim is to
ponder what would happen if the government
were to abolish taxation, and to confine itself to
simple requests for voluntary contributions. Does
anyone really believe that anything comparable to
the current vast revenues of the State would
continue to pour into its coffers (Rothbard, 1982a, p.
163)?
In Rothbard' s view, the answer to this question is obviously "no". But
does this response settle the issue, or has he conveniently dismissed the
complex question of "free riders" in social exchanges? Are there not "public
goods" that individuals demand but, due to the product's special
characteristics of non-exdusibility, would largely avoid the costs of in a freely
functioning economy? Would not in these cases individual rationality
mislead a free economy interested in the "actual" demand by permitting free
riding? And, would not these goods then be severely underproduced? To the
degree any of these questions raise legitimate concerns, how else might these
products be provided without the use of government coercion, i.e., taxation
and regulation? Otherwise, what incentives exist for the user of the product
to bear the costs and, consequently, what advantages exist for the producer to
provide the good when profits disintegrate due to free riding beneficiaries?
Rothbard responds to this dilemma in a number of ways. First, the act
of requiring the less than interested person to contribute still represents
coercion; the inclusion of the entire set of persons does not eliminate the
non-voluntary nature of requiring an act that would have gone unperformed
otherwise. And these principles still take precedence over the potential
underproduction of particular goods.
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Secondly, by providing these so-called public goods there is no way to
ascertain the levels of contributions that the person would have been willing
to provide in a voluntary setting. In a free society with an open market, the
exact amount of individual demand is known and shown by the
demonstrated preferences of the involved actors (Rothbard, 1956, pp. 225-232) .
If the payment is due to forced action, one cannot know the extent of demand
any given person has for the project. It is, for instance, very unlikely that a
libertarian "volunteers" the payment for specific government projects,
despite the claims that these items represent public goods.
Thirdly, in the statist solution to the free rider problem there is a
component which likely results in the o verprod uction of the given item.
Through the use of coercion, the "voluntary" portion is expanded to entail
levels well above "true" demand. As a result, rather than satisfying "true"
demand, these programs simply increase the size of the State at the expense of
individual consumer sovereignty.
Rothbard evidently denies the entire idea of public goods and free
riders. In fact, he follows Austrian subjectivism to conclude the only true
demand is the demonstrated preferences of free exchange. One might argue
that he places too much emphasis on the unfrettered market. Might not
demand for these goods also be demonstrated through political mechanisms?
These factors are unreliable signals, according to Rothbard. As we
demonstrated in Chapter III, voting and day-to-day activities of apparent
political consent do not satisfy the requirements of demonstrated preference,
not even for those persons who participate politically

or even those

individuals who appear to support the proposed action. The existence of
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democratic decision-making powers has only "enabled an ideological
camouflage to be thrown over the naked exploitative reality of political life."
Democracy creates the fictious "we" and, therefore, buries the concern for
individual ethics. If, for example, "we" impose involuntary servitude, certain
persons will suffer the costs of aggression whereas others will benefit from
this criminal activity. In no way, for Rothbard, can the number of persons
within a society alone ever establish justified action, nor may decisions made
under the duress of political processes be viewed as voluntary decisions.
Political acts represent actions of aggression or responses thereof, whereas
market processes represent freely chosen activities.
Therefore, the discussion of the voluntariness of democratic processes
is largely idle chatter for Rothbard, since consent and the State mix like oil
and water. The usual political condition, he argues, is oligarchy. This
tendency is due to two separate reasons. In the first place, there is a natural
inequality and subsequent division of labor unavoidable in human relations.
Diversity and differing levels of talent are inherent in society. In the second
place, the State is an organization controlled by a powerful minority who
exist off the "fruits of parasitic exploitation." Whereas a market economy
based on the principles of non-aggression relies on legitimate means to
achieve the means of survival, the political system depends on the transfer of
one's legitimately attained wealth to non-producers, or, "parasites".
Who are encompassed in this oligarchic organization? They include
the full-time administrative and / or elected structure and those private
individuals or groups who successfully seek priviledges of some form from
the first group. From our discussions in Chapter III, we found that Rothbard
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divides society into two portions: those who make up this ruling structure,
the "tax-consumers", and those who support the rulers, the "tax-payers".
Based on this distinction, the State is tantamount to nineteenth century
American anarchist Lysander Spooner's highwayman--only worse!
. . . .It is a status that allows the State to feed off its
victims while making at least most of them
support, or at least be resigned to, this exploitative
process. In fact, it is precisely the function of the
State's ideological minions and allies to explain to
the public that the Emperor does indeed have a fine
set of clothes . . . . The ideologists must explain that
murder by one or more persons or groups is bad
and must be punished, but that when the S ta te
kills it is not murder but an exalted act known as
' war' or ' repression of internal subversion' . . . .
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 167).
Rothbard, however, faces a perenial problem in political philosophy. If
parasitism is successful only if maintained by a rather small numerical
minority (a self-evident truth), then why does this criminality continue? He
may not argue that the subjects are actually consenting to the criminality, nor
does he want to rely on tradition or habit to explain the inactivity in the face
of what appears to be such obvious aggression. For his own theory to be
"activated" there must be a substantial role for human reason. Yet, reason, in
his view, would not lead humans to consent to the actions of the State. Thus,
consensus theories are empirically incorrect. He attempts to escape this
dilemma by expanding the oligarchic structure to include an additional class
of historically influencial individuals, namely, the intellectuals. "Rulers"
have used this very important alliance to increase their control with the aid
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of a given society's intellectuals, who, in turn, use ideology as their weapon.
Essentially, the masses have been duped .
.... The masses do not create their own abstract ideas,
or indeed think through these ideas independently;
they follow passively the ideas adopted and
promulgated by the body of intellectuals, who
become the effective 'opinion moulders' in society.
And since it is precisely a moulding of opinion on
behalf of the rulers that the State almost desperately
needs, this forms a firm basis for the age-old alliance
of the intellectuals and the ruling classes of the
State. The alliance is based on a quid pro quo : on
the one hand, the intellectuals spread among the
masses the idea that the State and its rulers are wise,
good, sometimes divine, and at the very least
inevitable and better than any concei vable
alternatives. In return for this panoply of ideology,
the State incorporates the intellectuals as part of the
ruling elite, granting them power, status, prestige,
and material security. Furthermore, intellectuals are
needed to staff the bureaucracy and to 'plan' the
economy and society (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 54-55).
Rothbard goes to great lengths to defend this position (Rothbard, 1 978b,
pp. 54-69) . Whereas the original intellectual "class" was found within the
Church, today one is more likely to locate it in the realms of expertise, i.e.,
"value-free" scientists, economists, planners, political experts, etc. A number
of techniques have been employed to keep the masses in line, including the
glorification of tradition or habit, the deprecation of the individual, the
subsequent exaltation of the collectivity, the smashing of dissident voices in
the bud, the establishment of the notion of ruler inevitability, the
collectivization of State criminal actions, the creation of the fear of other
States (and the subsequent necessity of one's own government), the creation
of a nationalistic spirit, the infusion of guilt for persons too successful for the
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good of the rulers, and the exploitation of fear for the unknown alternatives
to the status quo. All of these arguments may be categorized in one of two
ways: The rule of the State "is inevitable, absolutely necessary, and far better
than the indescribable evils that would ensue upon its downfall" or the rulers
represent "especially great, wise, and altruistic men--far greater, wiser, and
better than their simple subjects," as in the form of divine right or today in
the fashion of a technocracy (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 59) .
But why do intellectuals need the State? The masses have little use for
the "product" of the intellectual. Therefore, it likely follows that one finds a
high propensity of parasitism among intellectuals. Their "product" is
unmarketable in a free economy driven by consumer demands. It also seems
to follow that where the State controls more of society's wealth and property,
one is less likely to encounter intellectuals who are not "lapdogs" for the
existing political power elite. Yet, as Rothbard notes, even in Western
societies where there has existed important criticism against the powers of the
State, it is still highly possible for the rulers to turn the intellectual elite and
their arguments to the benefit of the government:. For example, one might
argue that the surrendering of portions of the American Bill of Rights to
expediency is pertinent in this regard, as demonstrated by the current "War
on Drugs". Even broader kinds of concerns arise in the present-day scurry for
government-funded research grants by the academic community.
The State, according to Rothbard, also employs other instruments to
maintain its control. Education especially is crucial in the maintanence of the
"moulded" mind. This is an extremely important point that is often subtly
avoided in the contemporary debate over the perils of education. Lower level
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schools are heavily dictated by the whims of the State apparatus through
public education, while post-secondary education is increasingly coming
under the spell of public monies and, in turn, public control. In addition to
these influences, there is the "virtually total control" the State has over the
airwaves through heavy regulation and, consequently, quasi-nationalization
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 169). All of these factors serve as major sources of real or
potential abuse.
It must be emphasized that the State does not
merely use coercion to acquire its own revenue, to
hire propagandists to advance its power, and to
arrogate itself and to enforce a compulsory
monopoly of such vital services as police
protection, firefighting, transportation, and postal
services. For the State does many other things as
well, none of which can in any sense be said to
serve the consuming public . . . . Often it pushes its
way into controlling the morality and the very daily
lives of its subjects. The State uses its coerced
revenue, not merely to monopolize and provide
genuine services inefficently to the public, but also
to build up its own power at the expense of the
exploited and harassed subjects: to redistribute
income and wealth from the public to itself and its
allies, and to control, command, and coerce the
inhabitants of its territory (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 171).
This seems to cover all possible avenues; hence, the State has no purpose in a
free society. In fact, it cannot exist if the rights of humans are to maintained to
their fullest.
Rothbard's criticisms of the limited or laissez-faire State are equally
unsympathetic. Once the State is created there are no means by which it can
be checked. It can be expected to expand. It is obviously in the interest of a
ruler given limited power to increase his control. And with power comes the
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ability to gain even greater domination. Hence, limited government creates a
false security for those individuals interested in individual rights. Moreover,
it provides an adequate window of opportunity for the expansion of statism.
However, it seems that Rothbard paints himself into a theoretical
corner with his attack on limited government. He argues, for instance, that
the persons who utilize the State will have an economic interest to expand
their powers (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 176). It is unclear why these persons must
first put on their "political" hats before attempting to expand their realms,
though. If we could rely on the market and a social respect for the ethics
which presumably emerge from such an order, there would be no problems.
But one does not eliminate "political means" simply by assuming away the
existence of the State. Rothbard is surely correct when he argues that the
overwhelming number of atrocities committed throughout history were
perpetrated by or through the State. But he further argues this historical
record of conquest "demonstrated that any power, once granted or acquired,

will be used and therefore abused" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 176). What he does
not explain, however, is how in a society with admittedly differentiations in
power, political violence will not arise and be utilized to violate human
rights--whether through the State or some other equally ingenious
institution. The obstacle of coercive power may not be simplistically assumed
away. The solution to the problem of power is to determine the ways in
which these institutions may be prevented from arising and serving as potent
means of oppression. Eliminating the commonly defined State does not deny
the evolution of other institutions that may provide the exact same invasive
services . Rothbard comes perilously close at times to assuming that the
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removal of one set of institutions (the State) creates some sort of vaccuum
that necessarily will be filled by another set of preferred processes (the free
market).
For example, in a critique of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, Rothbard criticizes the "invisible hand" notion of the minimal State
by arguing that such a structure has no historical reality. In other words, no
State has ever evolved in the manner Nozick portrays. Instead, Rothbard
argues, history demonstrates that conquest and force have created and
maintained the modern State (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 229-230) . But does not this
criticism apply even more strongly in the case of Rothbard's anarcho
capitalism, since no society has ever even remotely approached this model?
If, in other words, one agrees that the State is unequivocally founded on
conquest, what magic occurs which redirects this inherent violence toward an
anarchy of peaceful and respectful self-ownership? Conquest theorists face a
dilemma when they propose a system of ethics which they claim are
achievable. Perhaps Rothbard's system approaches the utopian models which
he criticizes more closely than he is willing to admit.
Rothbard's cogent attack on laissez-faire fails not so much for being
incorrect, but for failing to distinguish his own ideas from the same
criticisms. He is correct to deny the possible existence of either the limited
State (in revenue or power) or the "neutral" State.

The twentieth century

world's infatuation with the Big State seems to prove these assessments. In
the United States, for example, the culture of limited government gradually
gave way to these alternative viewpoints. He is also right to conclude that law
need not arise through the State. Nevertheless, the critical question concerns
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the type of mechanisms that may legitimately be employed to achieve the
control of aggression in the real world of unequal economic power, human
self-interest, and opportunity for illegitimate advantage. Many forms of
anarchism face the criticism of being utopian in nature, as they rest upon a
too elevated notion of humankind or demand unreasonable changes in
human nature (Barry, 1986, pp. 162-163). While Rothbard may not face these
extreme hurdles, there are still some very difficult questions concerning the
theory's practicality. Does he have a workable alternative that will address
these difficult questions?
In the next chapter, we move from a discussion of Rothbard's
foundation of ethics and his blistering critique of the government to an
investigation of his alternative mechanisms to the State. Chapter V explores
the application of anarcho-capitalism in the arena of public policy.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANARCHO-CAPITALIST S OCIETY

Introduction: The Stateless Society

Rothbard seeks to establish the foundations of the just society in the
development of his political philosophy. In the process he demolishes the
function of . the State in terms of the definition, interpretation, and
enforcement of these principles by opting instead for an anarchist society built
upon the free market. Sharp criticism of the State, both historically and
theoretically, is naturally a much simpler task than formulating a feasible and
preferable alternative. Liberal political theorists, for example, have
traditionally faced the rather persuasive charges of anarchist literature against
the actions of the State. However, no Stateless model which provides a more
desireable and/ or feasible alternative has yet to appear.
Rothbard has at least one advantage over many previous anarchist
writers in that he does not assume some kind of metamorphosis of human
nature which enables the system to mesh with the real world (a common
problem in m any of the "leftist" theories of anarchism). From his
perspective, any political system must ultimately be tested against social
reality and if it is based on unreal or utopian foundations, it must be rejected.
Rothbard, therefore, accepts human nature "as it is" and seeks to produce a
workable anarchist system within these parameters.
Chapter V investigates a large number of Rothbardian applications of
ethics to real-world public policy problems. In each case, we examine the

162

arguments for theoretical consistency and practical applicability alike. One of
the potential a dvantages of Rothbard' s system is that he integrates an
optimistic consequentialism with an absolutist ethics demanded by his brand
of libertarianism. Hence, he argues that anarchism is both ethical and
achievable. We conclude by exploring whatever flaws or shortcomings exist
in his integrated system.

Specific Policies

There is no specific order to these preliminary expositions. Each arena
of policy is explored as a di stinctive substantive issue. In each case the
criticism focuses most prominently upon Rothbard's ability to formulate
workable policies that are simultaneously true to libertarian principles.

Rights of Individual Expression

It is in many ways unfruitful or misleading to make dis tinctions
among personal rights in the libertarian system. As we explained in the last
chapter, all libertarian rights for Rothbard arise from the same foundations of
self-ownership; hence, the dichotomy of property and personal rights i s
fallacious. Ultimately, all rights are property rights.
This consistent ethical foundation demands a framework for the rights
of expression that is far more absolute--relative to property rights--than any
contemporary court would be willing to accept. On the other hand, for
individuals less concerned with possessive rights, these arguments fall far
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short of expectations concerning rights of expression. Rothbard, for instance,
sets aside a number of present "exceptions" to the freedom of speech. Never,
for example, should a speaker be restrained for "inciting a riot." Such a
rationale totally denies human freedom of wilL One has committed no crime
of property or person through mere incitation. Only if the speaker participates
in the physical invasion, or in cases where the person is manager of a
perpetrated crime, would he be guilty. And in these circumstances, one is not
guilty of illegal speech but of property infringements.
There is, however, a gray area in this last exception. Rothbard argues
that the "law of accessories" dictates that the "boss" is also responsible in the
criminal planning of events (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 95). To distinguish the boss
from the riot inciter may at times be a somewhat difficult task, although
Rothbard argues that it is, nevertheless, "clearcut" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 80).
From the viewpoint of the listener, if individuals are not free to accept or
reject what they hear, how may there be a distinction between the henchmen
and the crowd participants? Since advocacy can never be considered a crime, a
more consistent application would treat the boss as a mere supplier of
information until whatever time he receives some share of the booty or, in
fact, physically invades the victim. Under the same principle, one punishes
the listeners for their actions and not the speaker for his w o r d s . The
consistent application would be that there may be no crime in words (or
thoughts). But this conclusion leads to an intriguing understanding of the
common concepts of libel and slander, as well as other issues concerning the
dissemination of information. Such concepts have no legal meaning in
Rothbard's system.
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. . . . What the law of libel and slander does, in short,
is to argue a 'property right' of someone in his own
reputation. Yet someone's 'reputation' is not and
cannot be 'owned' by him, since it is purely a
function of the subjective feelings and attitudes
held by other people. But since no one can truly
ever 'own' the mind and attitude of another, this
means that no one can literally have a property
right in his 'reputation' . . . . Hence, speech attacking
someone cannot be an invasion of his property
right and therefore should not be subject to
restriction or legal penalty (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 95) .
Thus, any person "slandered" has suffered no property loss. One's reputation
in actuality is not one's property at all, since our "reputation" is solely what
other persons think of us. If one owns his mind, then he cannot own
another's mind, so these beliefs are not, properly speaking, his own. The
truthfulness or falsity of the information is, as a result, insignificant.
Would not the consequences of this position be disasterous?

For

Rothbard, this determination is the correct ethical position because it is
consistent with the principles of self-ownership. But one may just as easily
defend this perspective with a consequentialist argument. Today's l aws
concerning expression, for example, are riddled with exceptions which make
the value of these "protections" less than secure ( malicious intent
requirements in libel cases, for example) . Yet, what would occur if persons
were not programmed to believe all they read or hear, even though it is often
false information? To allow the press, for instance, to print any information
removes the assumption that what one reads is always true, and so
diminishes the reputational damage, unless the printer has worked diligently
to develop and maintain an unblemished record for accuracy. In all
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likelihood, levels of print would arise, ranging from the most reputable to
the completely irreputable publications, with the consumer being required to
distinguish between the levels. Persons would be "reprogrammed" to be
more skeptical, and an undistinguished press would face the constraints of
the market, no longer able to wrongly hide behind amendments which tend
to protect the reputable and irreputable publishers indiscriminately. Just as
the market distinguishes levels of efficiency in other business realms, it
would likewise favorably influence the production of the printed and spoken
word.
Therefore, persons have a right to disseminate their "knowledge", no
matter what the consequences. For example, Rothbard consistently supports
the act of blackmail (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 124-125). After all, both parties
benefit in the exchange, and without theft on the part of either person. By
agreeing not to disseminate a certain set of information about Person B,
Person A has agreed to an exchange of security for closed-lippedness. Of
course, once the contract is made, both parties are bound by the ongoing
ethical principles to uphold the agreement.
Nevertheless, there is apparently a potential drawback in this scenario.
What if Person A decides to "bleed" B by making continual demands for
additional payments? There is a distinct possibility that the information is of
the type that is inalienable for A, i.e., his knowledge of B remains even after
the agreement to remain quiet is arranged. However, the answer to this
dilemma rests upon Rothbard's understanding of the nature of this
information. B, once he reaches his saturation point for paying the additional
blackmail, must simply allow the information to be made public, at which
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time he may sue the blackmailer for violating the original blackmail contract.
Before one feels sympathy for B, it is important to remember that he never
had sole "ownership" of the knowledge. A also "owns" the information; his
agreement exchanged some sort of property for the maintenance of silence.
Similarly, persons have an absolute right n o t to be required to
disseminate information. This principle applies in all cases, including those
situations that concern the State's power of subpeona. In other words,
everyone has a right to "protect [or not protect] the confidentiality of their
sources." The only exception to this right of dissemination occurs "if [the
information) was procured from someone else as a conditiona l rather than
absolute [form of] ownership" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 1 23). For example, if
someone shares trade secrets on the condition that the information not be
transmitted, but nevertheless releases the knowledge, he violates the contract
established previously between the two individuals.
A common complaint likely to come from critics unaccustomed to a
libertarian system of ethics is that Rothbard and other libertarians fail to
appreciate the highly conflictual nature of the different rights of expression.
However, there are no conflicts in these rights from Rothbard's perspective. If
modern liberals, for example, consistently founded their system of rights
upon an idea of self-ownership, most of the "expression" questions flooding
the courts today would be moot.
. . . [T]hose problems where rights seem to require
weakening are ones where the locus of ownership
is not precisely defined, in short where property
rights are muddled. Many problems of 'freedom of
speech', for example, occur in the government
owned streets: e.g. should a government permit a
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poli tical meeting which i t claims will distrupt
traffic, or litter streets with handbills? ....
The whole problem

would not arise, it

should be noted, if the s treets were owned by
private individuals and firms-as they would be in a
libertarian

s ociety . . . . O ne

would,

in

a

fully

libertarian society, have no more 'right' to use
someone else's street than he would have the
'right' to pre-empt someone else's assembly hall; in
both cases, the only right would be the property
right to use one' s money to rent the resource, if the
landlord is willing.... (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 1 1 7) .
The right to speech, then, i s dependent upon the ownership of the
place the speech is delivered. Or, to borrow a common example, yelling "fire"
in a crowded assembly hall is wrong not because of some convoluted dear or
present danger rationale, but rather because the owner of the hall would not
allow it.

If these sorts of issues were judged based upon the principles of

ownership, any existing conflicts over rights of e xp r e s s i o n would be
eliminated. Of course, the removal of conflict altogether would depend upon
how well the rights of property are defined. Rights of expressions are no
different from any other negative externality: They are the result of improper
or underdeveloped definitions of property rights. (For more on other
externalities, see the discussion of environmental issues below.)
Similar principles apply to other forms of expression. The owner of a
newspaper, for instance, is free to determine its content, just as the owner of
the assembly hall. Radio and television stations are free to set their own
programming wi thout regard to any sor t of governmentally founded
"fairness" principle. (It is important to note that in conjunction with this
freedom, there must be the application of the homesteading principle for the
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airwaves, removing the monopoly presently maintained by the State. This
principle would increase the number of property owners able to "be heard".)
Rothbard's consistency demonstrates the inherent contradictions in
systems that separate property rights from rights of expression. Without
defined property rights, the right to communicate is perched upon an
extremely unsteady base. Rothbard employs as an example one of the systems
that seeks to sever the relationship of these rights, "democratic socialism", to
make his point:
....An abstract constitution guaranteeing 'freedom of
the press' is meaningless in a socialist society. The
point is that where the government owns all of the
newsprint, the paper, the presses, etc.. the
government-as-owner must decide how to allocate
the newsprint and the paper, and what to print on
them. . . . . Any government may profess its devotion
to freedom of the press, yet allocate all of its
newsprint only to its defenders and supporters. A
free press is again a mockery; furthermore, why
s h o u ld a socialist government allocate any
considerable amount of its scarce resources to
antisocialists? The problem of genuine freedom of
the press then becomes insoluble (Rothbard, 1 982a,
p. 99).
There is additional criticism which might be brought against Rothbard
and his effort to make expression rights dependent upon property rights.
Persons who are unfortunate enough to own no property appear to be locked
out the process of effective communication. This critique, if it were in fact
true, would appear to be a rather damning one until it is understood that this
scenario represents little or no change from the present reality.

Defined

rights of property do limit, however, the open conflict that arises when two
or more sets of rent-seekers demanding government assistance battle over
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the same parcel of land or other property in order to have their respective
views heard. The continual growth in the amount of "public" ownership of
lands only creates greater conflicts over the rights of individuals to possess
these properties, so as to satisfactorily "express" themselves. It is unlikely that
this redefinition discriminates against the poor or underrepresented any
more than the present system. Their voices carry little weight in
contemporary society. However, by allowing different regions to adjust to the
demands of expression accordingly, the change would probably allow a bit
more order, while forcing protesters to pay the "costs" of their activities. And
these costs currently fall disporportionately upon the weakest sectors of
society.

"Victimless" Crimes

In the past few years, there has been a clear diminishment of toleration
for what are commonly called "victimless crimes". These "vices", which
often produce

detrimental results for the partaking individual but fewer

clear consequences as spillover effects for others, are increasingly gaining the
wrath of numerous special interest lobbies for a plethora of reasons ranging
from health concerns to moral sanctimony.
The terminology "victimless crime" ought to tip the reader off at once
to Rothbard's position on such issues as gambling, pornography, illicit sexual
activities, or drug sales and usuage. If no victim exists, there can be no crime;
hence, neither the "State" nor "Society" has any legitimate claim to intervene
in these arenas. Rothbard concludes that most of the debate over
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pornography, for example, is "distressingly beside the point" (Rothbard,
1 978b, p. 103). For him, the consequences of pornography on the participating
individual are politically non-issues. Issues are "political" only if they are
clear acts of invasion by one person against another. Although some
individuals may find "smut" disgusting, they are not justified to employ
force to impose their personal values upon other persons. Indeed, to interfere
is to make of the intervener a criminal. The act of imposing morality rests
upon an inherent contradiction, for moral action makes sense only if an
individual chooses the behavior by his own free will (Rothbard, 1 978b, p. 105).
An immoral act (such as a legislative dictum) cannot be applied to force a
moral one (the choice not to be "perverted").
These same principles are also applicable to "sex crimes". For instance,
Rothbard supports the complete legalization of prostitution, since it is
nothing other than a specific occupation. Rather than focusing upon the act
of prostitution, legal officials would be better advised to concentrate upon
activities that are truly illegal which often accompany these businesses. (This
argument, of course, assumes that once prostitution is removed from the
black market, these accompanying illegal acts would remain. It is more likely
the criminal component would disappear completely, as the profitability
which arises from the risk of illegality is removed.)
A common thread woven throughout the justifications for these types
of governmental interferences in these types of activities is paternalism, i.e.,
certain persons (usually entailing the poor and/ or the uneducated) are unable
to protect themselves against the temptations of these vices. Therefore, wise
elites must act on their behalves. As Rothbard notes, there is nothing
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preventing persons from "propagandizing" until their hearts are content
concerning the "evils" of these activities. However, if one recognizes the free
will and self-ownership of individuals, he cannot allow acts of force to make
these decisions for persons.
Are these acts always devoid of criminal spillover, though? For
example, what about the complaint that the viewing of pornography leads
persons to commit criminal acts? Rothbard is generally silent on this
question, although from a libertarian perspective, this criticism itself is highly
problematical. First, the proposition that there is a direct causal linkage
between the two activities is empirically far from convincing. But, secondly,
and more importantly for the libertarian, this sort of argument denies the
natural human control of will. Are we, for instance, prepared to make
criminals out of magazines, card tables, or rolled containers of tobacco? In
other words, there can be no crime until a criminal act has been committed;
at best, only in the most drastic cases, where spillover effects are clearly going
to invade other persons rights, would preemption be justified. (Of course,
would this response even be considered "preemptive" in nature at that
point?)

Abortion, Birth Control, and Childrens' Rights

Perhaps the most controversial area of public policy within the
libertarian movement concerns the issue of fetal rights. Rothbard argues for
an extreme "pro-choice" position, concluding that the decision of whether or
not to have a baby belongs solely to the woman. Therefore, the State has no
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legitimate right to intervene either to deny or to require any forms of birth
controL
Abortion is the most thorny of these issues, obviously. Rothbard
contends that the question of when human life begins is "irrelevant" in
regard to the question of legality.
If we are to treat the fetus as having the same rights
as humans, then let us ask: What human has the
right to remain, unbidden, as an unwanted parasite
within some other human being's body? This is the
nub of the issue: the absolute right of every person,
and hence every woman, to the ownership of her
own body. What the mother is doing in an abortion
is causing an unwanted entity within her body to be
ejected from it: If the fetus dies, this does not rebut
the point that no being has a right to live,
unbidden, as a parasite within or upon some
person's body (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 108}.
Ignoring for the moment Rothbard's rather shocking terminology, is not the
mother responsible for the fetus, since she is in part the "cause" of his (its}
existence? Since she is an absolute owner of herself, he reasons that the
woman is free to change her mind and abort the fetus at any time during her
pregnancy (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 108). And since the fetus represents a "parasitic
invader", abortion ought not to be viewed as murder, but as "the expulsion of
an unwanted invader from the mother's body" (Rothbard, 1982, p. 98). There
is no implicit "contract" in the act of conception between fetus and mother.
As noted in the last chapter, promises do not represent enforceable contracts.
The contract is enforceable only if there has been some implicit theft
involved. Furthermore, all contracting parties must be "voluntarily and
consciously contracting entit[ies] " (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 98}. To "enslave" the
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woman and require her to keep the fetus violates Rothbard's theory of the
inalienability of a human wilL
For Rothbard, there is no "right to life" in natural fact. Even if one
concedes that the fetus is a living human, it would have no natural right to
obligate the mother to carry it. But to follow to completion Rothbard's own
logic, would not one be required to abstain from the use of violence in the
dismissal of the fetus from the body? Or, if it is an aggressive parasite, do the
principles of self-defense allow one to abort? Would a violent abortion be
proportional? These seem to be important questions. Although Rothbard
dismisses the gigantic debate over the issue as to when life begins, this
question is, nevertheless, quite important.
Suppose, for instance, that a person driving down an interstate
highway stops to pick up a hitchhiker. Upon entering the car, the hitchhiker
asks if he may ride to the next town. The driver promises to carry out the
request. Would the driver, halfway to the destination, be allowed to change
his mind and demand that the hitchhiker remove himself from the car?
From Rothbard's perspective there would presumedly be no invasion
involved in the decision, since the promise is not enforceable contractually.
What if the driver dumps the hitchhiker in a desolate desert where the
chances of survival are nil? Rothbard would likely respond that, while this is
morally undesirable, there is no violent invasion of the hitchhiker; thus, the
act is legitimate. At the exact moment the driver demands that the hitchhiker
depart, the latter becomes, one might say, a "parasite".
Or, let us explore this scenario from another direction. Once the
hitchhiker entered the car on the consent of the driver, what if the driver
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locked the doors and proceeded to drive in an extremely wreckless manner,
eventually hitting a telephone pole and severely injuring or killing the
hitchhiker? May we still define the hitchhiker as a parasite, even though he
is given no opportunity to leave on his own accord? Similarly, is the
"defense" of the driver (killing or maiming) proportional to the "attack" of
the passenger? Applying this same scenario to the abortion issue, how may
one treat a woman's decision to abort or how does one handle the even
thornier issue of miscarriage?
These examples are raised not so much in order to answer these
questions as to point to the critical components of the debate. To determine
ethically the proper actions of driver and hitchhiker would seemingly require
the judge to explore the original "contract" made when the two persons met.
The judge also must be able to determine the "human-ness" of the
hitchhiker. But perhaps there are important d ifferences between the
hitchhiker and a fetus. For purposes of the abortion issue, the central
question seems to be the nature of the conception as it relates to woman and
fetus and to the nature of the fetus / child. But can a fetus formulate a contract
in the absence of a third party acting with a "power of attorney" on its behalf
(which would not seem to be allowable in the libertarian system)? At best, the
fetus' rights require that it be taken from the mother's womb without any
violence to the "baby". As a potential-human, it would seem that it requires
at least this much respect; any ethical error should be to the benefit of the
fetus. If it is biologically able to survive, then so be it. The driver may not be
required to carry the hitchhiker to his destination without there being some
conditions that would create implicit theft if the driver violently removed
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the hitchhiker from the car. Of course, the newly conceived fetus has made
no such prior arrangements. Nevertheless, the driver is not free to aggress
against the hitchhiker except in cases of equally proportional self-defense.
Moreover, having "consented" to bring the "passenger" aboard, both mother
and driver must under porportional justice provide the adequate opportunity
for the fetus and the hitchhiker to depart at the time they become parasites.
The principle of proportionality creates dilemmas over the nature of
miscarriages caused by abuse. While it allows the fetus to be treated as a
parasite, would it allow the mother to act wrecklessly to the degree of
willingly killing the fetus? Assuming they could survive, what rights, then,
would the children have? Rothbard argues, that as the creator of the baby, the
mother becomes the "owner" of the child .
. . .. A new-born baby cannot be an existent self-owner
in any sense. Therefore, either the mother or some
other party or parties may be the baby's owner; but
to assert that the third p arty can claim his
'ownership' over the baby would give that person
the right to seize the baby by force from its natural
or 'homesteading' owner, its mother. The mother,
then, is the natural and rightful owner of the baby,
and any attempt to seize the baby by force is an
invasion of her property right (Rothbard, 1 982a, p.
99).
However, this principle leads Rothbard into highly murky waters .
Obviously, he does not intend for the ownership of children to be permanent,
nor in this special case do libertarian principles allow for the same absolute
control of property. Therefore, the property rights of parents over children are
limited "in time" and "in kind" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 99). The parent is
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"trustee", for as soon as the baby leaves the body of the mother, he "possesses
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the right of self-ownership by virtue of being a separate entity and a potential
adult" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 99).
Are these views consistent with the position Rothbard maintains on
abortion? This inquiry explains why the concern as to when "life" begins
remains critical, even in the libertarian model. The same negative freedoms
which apply to new-born babies would seem to also pertain to fetuses, if they
can be established as living human beings. At some point of the pregancy,
survival outside the womb is surely probable. The remaining question is:
Does abortion or abusive miscarriage constitute an act of murder? By
employing Rothbard's own principle of proportionality, the " parasitic"
actions of the baby would not constitute the ethical equivalancy of the
woman's murderous act. In fact, until the woman desired to remove the
fetus, would its actions even be considered parasitic, since they were carried
out with the mother's (implicit) consent?
Therefore, may a notion of negative rights based upon selfownership be used to prevent abortion? In a limited sense it may, in cases in
which the fetus is formed to the point of being viable outside the womb. And
in other circumstances, in no way may violent means be used to "kill" the
fetus. However, before right-to-lifers leap with joy, it is important to note
what this conclusion does not entail. On this point, Rothbard is on stronger
grounds. While force may not be used against the baby, neither may the
mother nor anyone else be required to take actions which have the
ramifications of sustaining the child .
. . . [T]his means that a parent does not have the right
to aggress against his children, but also that the
parent should not have a legal obligation to feed,
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clothe, or educate his children, s ince such
obligations would entail positive acts coerced upon
the parent and depriving the parent of his
rights . . . . The law, therefore, may not properly
compel the parent to feed a child or to keep it
alive.... (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 100).
Is this a satisfactory principle? First, one might argue that the parents
have an enforceable duty to feed their children, for example. As an
undeveloped human the child is not a full self-owner and cannot be
demanded to provide for himself. But, as Rothbard notes, in order to obligate
one to meet the child's needs, one is required to illegitimately violate the
rights of others by demanding an unfounded duty of them. Hence, parents
may legitimately be liable for child abuse but not child neglect (Rothbard,
1982a, p. 1 00; pp. 1 03-1 04).
Are there ethical principles which would allow one to set the parents
aside as the persons responsible for these obligations to the new-born child?
One might argue that the parents stand out because they are the "creators". It
might be argued that the act of creation implies some type of contract. Of
course, relying on his theory of contracts, Rothbard rejects this possibility.
Yet, there seems to be some degree of arbitrariness in the Rothbardian
definition of children. Nowhere does he adequately explain why parents
have ownership of their offspring. Admittedly, if homesteading principles
are applied, it is quite logical to conclude that the child "belongs" to the
parent (or, at least to the mother). But this argument hinges on the
assumption that a child is "property", which Rothbard does not adequately
defend. It is unclear how the failure to amount to a full human necessarily
makes an entity property. Are there not grounds in the case of human
children to perhaps create a third category that is neither human nor
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property? Otherwise, one is left with the distinct possibility that children can
be slaves--a position Rothbard rigorously denies for adults, even if the slavery
is freely chosen. And he consistently supports this idea of virtual
enslavement, arguing that since children are property, they can be transferred
from adult to adult like any other commodity. Hence, a "purely free society
will have a flourishing free market in children" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 102).
Ironically, from an end-state framework of justice, this institution of
child-trading is actually quite attractive. As Rothbard notes, this "market"
already exists, although in the legal markets it possesses rather steep price
controls approaching zero. It is called adoption. The consequence of
removing these price controls would be to satisfy the dire shortages on this
market by transferring children from less wanted situations to persons or
families with higher demands for the children. In these exchanges, as in free
exchange in general, all parties would be better off, he concludes.
But Rothbard is not an ethical consequentialist. From an end-state
perspective, one might well imagine an intricate system of human slavery
beneficial to the slaves themselves. For him, however, such a system would
fail since it attempts to alienate the inalienable will of individuals. Thus, a
conclusion that results in an advocacy of "baby-selling" rests upon a rather
arbitrary position that children are property, although no a priori reason
exists to assume that this is the moral state of affairs.
In denying the idea of animal rights, for example, Rothbard argues that
humans have rights because they are
... grounded in the nature of man: the individual
man's capacity for conscious choice, the necessity
for him to use his mind and energy to adopt goals
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and values, to find out about the world, to pursue
his ends in order to survive and prosper, his
capacity and need to communicate and interact with
other human beings and to participate in the
division of labor. In short, man is a social and
rational animal. No other animals or beings possess
this ability to reason, to make conscious choices, to
transform their environment in order to prosper, to
collaborate in society and the division of labor
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 1 55) .
Would not children be as easily placed in this category as in the category of
quasi-property? If capacity is the critical component, why must babies, for
instance, be viewed as "future human adults" rather than simply humans
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 156)? If we assign babies to the category of property, why
not also place humans who fail miserably to meet their capacities in this
classification?
This position of children as property places Rothbard in difficulty by
forcing him to make exceptions to the principle of property rights. Numerous
rights of the parent become murky in their role as trustee. One problem
concerns at what point the trustee relationship is completed. Or, as one might
state, when does property becomes "human"? Wishing to avoid having to
choose an arbitrary age, Rothbard argues that the child has full rights "when
he demonstrates that he has them in nature--in short, when he leaves or
'runs away' from home" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 1 02). Therefore, just as parents
are free to ignore or sell their children, the children for their part are free to
go seeking better accomodations without the parents having any recourse
(beyond persuasion) to require the child to return.
Does not this create further difficulties with the property argument?
For instance, a farmer's cow might wander off to another farmer's herd of
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cattle. No matter how long the cow remains "lost" (assuming the new farmer
does not "mix" labor and positively transform the cow), it still rightfully
belongs to the original farmer. To argue that cattle and children are not the
same moral entities is to simply prove the point being made: Cows may be
traded whereas children may not be exchanged.
Nevertheless, in other circumstances, Rothbard recognizes rights of
children. For instance, in consistent libertarian logic, he opposes educational
truancy laws, child-labor laws, "incorrigibility" and "waywardness" statutes,
indeterminate juvenile criminal sentencing, and the absence of basic due
process in j uvenile proceedings.

But the proper defense of these existing

policy failures only increases the tensions in Rothbard's discussion of parent
child relations and the issues of birth control. On this issue, many questions
remain. It would seem that in the cases where the fetus is viable, the right of
the mother to "abort" the child goes only so far as the release of the baby from
the body. At that point, the child may be "homesteaded", i.e., adopted. For
this reason, the rhetoric of absolute "pro-choice" often heard in libertarian
circles seems to be an inconsistent application of ethical principles. One's
choice extends only as far as another individual's rights. The satisfaction of
this principle depends upon the meaning of the concept " individual"; it is
unclear how Rothbard or libertarian theory can provide this definition with
the mere postulation of a non-agression axiom.
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Education

In order to create a Stateless society, a primary function which must be
adequately provided in a market sector is the education of the community.
One of the sacred cows of modern statism is "public education", with all the
advantages and disadvantages which flow from it. In Rothbardian society,
there obviously are no public schools nor is there compulsory education. One
of his criticisms of public schooling in America is that it forces children "into
spending a large portion of the most impressionable years of their lives in
public institutions" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 19; also, 1 974b, pp. 1 1 -32) .
Increasingly, a comparsion of public education and public incarceration seems
appropriate, particularly in urban arenas.
Part of the reason for the continuation of this farce, Rothbard argues, is
the "misplaced altruism" of the middle classes (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 120) .
These groups commonly seek to act in the "best interests" of other groups,
usually lower and working classes. He contends that this misguided effort is
the result of a confusion of formal education and education in general
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 120). There is no reason why certain basic skills, for
example, must necessarily be learned in the strict confinements of a public
school. This process constricts the uniqueness of each child. Moreover, many
skills deemed critical by the educational establishment are not as important as
is often contended by these groups, particularly when considered in light of
the child's lost creativity and productive capabilities which results from the
crippling intrusion by the State.
Ultimately, however, it is the conscious desire to conform young
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persons and not misguided altruism that directs public education, according
to Rothbard .
... [F]rom the beginning of American history, the
desire to mould, instruct, and render obedient the
mass of the population was the major impetus
behind the drive toward public schooling. In
colonial days, public schooling was used as a device
to supress religious dissent, as well as to imbue
unruly servants with the virtues of obedience to the
State ....
One of the most common uses of
compulsory public schooling has been to oppress
and cripple national ethnic and linguistic
minorities or colonized peoples-to force them to
abandon their own language and culture on behalf
of the l anguage and culture of the ruling
groups .... and to mould them .. .into 'one people' ....
(Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 123-125).
He argues that the debilitating conformity of public education places shackles
upon the individual. This position is completely consistent with his natural
law perspective of human as creator and unique individual. To avoid the
charge of unequal treatment, any education bureaucrat, he surmises, must
treat all persons in the same way (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 27). Sheltered from the
efficiency demands of a free society, the bureaucrat is likely to take the
uniformed path. Unfortunately for the government planner, each student
does not require the same educational methods. This tension between the
uniqueness of children and the uniformity of centralized bureaucracy
increases as the public sector usurps larger shares of the education market.
Uniformity heightens conflict as fewer people are satisfied with the product
provided. If education were left to the free market, Rothbard concludes,
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differences in educational techiniques and substance would emerge to the
level of diversity demanded from the consumers of the educational product.
These arguments are applicable to many arenas beyond public
education. Our present society is arguably a haven for public conflict. It could
be forcefully argued that this conflict is in large part due to the increased
"politicization" of our society in this century. In this environment,
government decisionmaking tends to uniform the kinds of activities
available in any given arena of human action. If the solution to a demand is
limited to a single alternative which is determined by the State, persons with
diverse interests and perspectives are required to struggle in an arena of
political coercion to achieve their individual demands at the expense of all
other parties. This struggle of different interests will not likely overcome a
government's natural tendency to produce uniform processes and policies.
Therefore, it is likely that most if not all parties will be dissatisfied with the
political outcomes. This inability to fulfill particular individual needs is
especially probable in a political process that is highly equalitarian,
democratic, and participatory. And each new conflict and "resolution" only
brings forth the next level of heightened conflict. I
Thus, publicly controlled schools are not desirable because of the
consequences they create for the persons (children and adults) subjected to
them. But as one might have guessed, for Rothbard there is a more

1 . The currently popular and relatively successful reform efforts to
increase "choice" in public education seems to demonstrate this point. Even
the normally "liberal" Brookings Institution has arisen in support of the
notion of vouchers. See Moe and Chubb (1990).
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condemning reason for the removal of the public school system, namely, that
the provision of taxes to fund a system is an ethical violation of the absolute
right to one's property. Obviously, people without children who are
"benefitting" from the service are heavily burdened.
In Rothbard's view, children do not have a "right" to an education. As
with a living wage, there is no way in natural fact that such a guarantee may
be promised. In addition, the "middle-ground" stance often supported by
laissez-faire libertarians which provides for the public funding of education
without the public control of it is similarly rejected. For example, he rejects
Milton Friedman's well-known voucher plan (Friedman, 1 962, pp. 85-107;
Rothbard, 1 976i, pp. 1 02-107) .

Whereas he agrees it would be a "great

improvement over the present system in permitting a wider range of
parental choice and enabling the abolition of the public school system,"
vouchers still represent the "immorality of coerced subsidy" (Rothbard, 1978b,
p . 1 35). Moreover, one may anticipate that with the provision of any subsidy
will come eventually (re)control of the service.
There are, however, other problems connected to the public financing
of education. Compulsory attendance and a subsidized product promote an
excessive demand for the particular service. These legal and economic
realities serve to create additional social problems by filling the classsrooms at
all levels with students who would be better served doing something other
than interfering with persons who demand the product at its real costs. The
"mania for mass schooling," Rothbard concludes, has "led to a mass of
discontented and imprisoned children" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 36) . These
subsidies are even more oppressive for higher education, since the
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overwhelming number of persons benefitting from them come from higher
income families . Due to the huge financial advantages enjoyed by state
supported schools, privately funded institutions face incredibly tough odds in
competing with the subsidized schools, especially if these schools are not
historically well-situated.
But does publicly provided education not prod uce positive
externalities that would otherwise go unprovided in the absence of State
intervention? As with other similar government services, Rothbard rejects
this argument--for the same reasons. First, costs are subjective; therefore,
social costs or benefits cannot be measured . Secondly, even if these benefits
could be measured, there is no way to prove they are all positive externalities,
especially in the present public education system (Rothbard, 1976i, pp. 1 05106) . The product generated by many public schools, for example, leaves
much to be desired. Furthermore, there are no means to measure whether
private alternatives might not provide even more positive spillovers. This
argument in support of public education is too limiting in the way in which
it defines education. After all, might not these positive externalities occur in
every activity of a human's "education"?
Rothbard's approach to the policy of education may be summarized
rather succinctly:
. . . Get the government out of the educational
process. The government has attempted to
indoctrinate and mould the nation's youth through
the public school system, and to mould the future
leaders through State operation and control of
higher ed ucation. Abolition of compulsory
attendance laws would end the schools' role as
prison custodians of the nation's youth, and would
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free all those better off outside the schools for
independence and for productive work. The
abolition of the public schools would end the
crippling property tax burden and provide a vast
range of education to satisfy all the freely exercised
needs and demands of our diverse and varied
population . . . . The miasma of government, of
moulding the youth of America in the direction
desired by the State, would be replaced by freely
chosen and voluntary actions . . . . (Rothbard, 1978b,
pp. 140-141) .
So far as the effects of educational subsidy are concerned, Rothbard is right on
target. For instance, in the past fifty years State-subsidized universities have
achieved an undue competitive advantage in the world of tax-supported
education. As a result the comparative enrollments of State-funded and
privately funded schools have changed dramatically (Friedman and
Friedman, 1984, pp. 142-147).
Politics is in many ways the art of ordered aggression, and these
subsidies are classic examples of this physical invasion of one set of economic
winners at the expense of another set of economic losers. By overestimating
the demand for formal education at all subsidized levels, the signals sent
through the market are highly distorted. From a purely consequentialist
standpoint, there are serious doubts concerning the usefulness of the entire
myriad of public education. 2
Is Rothbard's ethical grounding of the purely private provision of
education also justified? Yes, since the rights of self-ownership supersede any
end-state concerns in his system of ethics. Nevertheless, one might argue that

2. Furthermore, the provision of education does not approach what
might be viewed as a public good. For example, see Goldin (1988, pp. 77-78).
187

in certain cases persons may find themselves in situations where they are
unable to implement any decisions. For example, would it be just to hold a
six year old ghetto youth accountable for his condition? His advancement,
without some form of assistance is, to say the least, problematical. Rothbard
might respond by arguing that although this situation is an unfortunate state
of affairs, there is no way to demand assistance legitimately in order to aid
this child, since such aid can only come through the coercive expropriation of
another's property. While it may be highly laudable for one to voluntarily
intervene on the behalf of the child, there is no obligation to do so. To argue
otherwise is to create an opening for a state of parasitism and violence. Is not
what is true in the assisting of this child in this scenario also not as equally
valid for many other persons in many other circumstances? If one grants an
exception in this circumstance, he opens the floodgates to unbridled
violations of individual rights, unless he can somehow distinguish this
particular situation from all the other states of affairs.
On its .face there seems to be no reason to make such a distinction with
regard to education. First, there is no way to draw any boundaries around the
meaning of education. One of the unfortunate consequences of the
contemporary educational mentality is its equation of education with only
formal education i.e., in a classroom with an instructor, which is a definite
fallacy. Yet, something is still troubling. Education might best be defined as
acts of learning and creation that confronts natural man. Furthermore, one
could perhaps argue that the ability to compete in the free society rests upon
the ability to attain the tools for that competition. If the fulfillment of human
nature is the ultimate good, then it might be argued that the ethical priority
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of negative freedom is less important than the ability to enjoy that freedom.
Rothbard argues essentially that the satisfaction of human nature and the
framework of negative rights are synonomous. But are they in circumstances
such as our ghetto youth example?
But this argument leads one directly into the fallacies of positive
freedom. And, as a consequence, one commits the natural fallacy of
supporting an egalitarian foundation of ethics. In nature, no one has these
"rights"; in civilized society, these positive rights may only be gained at the
expense of true natural rights. We are, thus, forced back to Rothbard's
position. But we are trapped in the dilemma of this perspective's total
impracticality. Moreover, it recognizes the harshness of natural facts, and
persons in political society are likely to refuse to accept such realism. Perhaps
a compromise position supporting forms of guaranteed loans or partial
vouchers might satisfy most parties, as it is able to recognize the ethical and
practical concerns of Rothbard's critique while simultaneously acceeding to
the present realities of the policy debate. But Rothbard is completely correct
on at least one point: We cannot tolerate the continuation of the educational
status quo. In the very important arena of education, there is too much at
stake to allow the government such dominant control.

The State and Involuntary Servitude

As Rothbard points out in his discussion of education, libertarian
ethics prevents the existence of compulsory school attendance laws. Yet,
there are many other

far more insidious and life-threatening matters in
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which the State imposes its control over one's body. As we demonstrated in
the preceding chapter, for Rothbard, any form of slavery violates the
inalienability of the human wilL
Probably the most blatant example of this control in the modern world
is the military draft. While actual conscription is presently in hiatus,
registration remains and this would be a rather ridiculous policy if it were not
for the likelihood that this process will be transformed again into an actual
draft situation at the sign of the first major "crisis". Therefore, the difference
between a forced registration and actual conscription is one of degree only.
But how can a society defend itself against external aggression without
some mechanism to provide this defense? The first mistake made in this type
of inquiry concerns the usuage of the term "society". For Rothbard, this term
is a "mythical abstraction" that certain individuals (those usually not doing
the fighting and dying!) utilize "to cloak the naked use of coercion to promote
the interests of specific individuals" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 80).
How does one provide for defense if coercion is not utilized? First,
Rothbard argues, nothing prevents one in a libertarian society from
defending himself individually when invaded. Of course, all of us do not
have a comparative advantage at defense. Therefore, part of the community
is likely to contract with the others to provide their "expertise". Why, he asks,
must these persons be conscripted?
.... No one is conscripted on the free market, yet on
that market people obtain, through voluntary
purchase and sale, every conceivable manner of
goods and services, even the most necessary
ones . . . . Why can't they hire defenders as well? . . . .
(Rothbard, 1978b, p . 80).
190

Indeed, the military never seems to have a shortage of officers, or even non
conscripted clerical workers. But enlisted men face under a draft situation
what is tantamount to an intrusive tax. Unwilling to pay the market rates for
these defenders, the political system imposes the burden on a small minority
of persons, namely, those citizens drafted and those others linked to those
suffering the direct effects of the involuntary servitude.3
This notion is consistent with Rothbard's theory of contracts, to the
effect that individuals are free to employ themselves with defense
organizations based on free exchange (ignoring, for the moment, the
possibility that the organization is a criminal actor, in which case, the contract
is between criminals and has no moral sanction) but they may not be required
to carry out the length of the enlistment contract if they wish to quit.
If we accept the human rights premises of Rothbard, there appears to be
no grounds to challenge these conclusions. Unfortunately, this vestige of the
past remains, despite the existence of the thirteenth amendment of the
Constitution. Instead, in fact, there appears to be increasing support for yet
another form of involuntary servitude, national service for (of course) young
persons, the least powerful force in our political process. Whereas libertarian
theory is clearly defined concerning conscription, there is a more complex
issue of involuntary servitude, namely, forced institutionalization or
hospitalization of mental patients. Once aimed historically at maintaining
public order (by removing these persons from society) present compulsory

3. Rothbard (1978b, pp. 82-83) further decries the potential violence of
maintaining a standing army.
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commitment is rhetorically at least more humane or, at least, more
paternalistic. 4 The logic behind commitment, according to Rothbard, is
flawed. The central argument is generally to the effect that a person who is to
be commited is "dangerous to self or others". But to be dangerous to one's self
is not an issue that pertains to the State, since a person has absolute control of
his own will and subsequently his own life. No one, therefore, has a right to
interfere with another individual's right to chose his own course of action.
(Criminal suicide is to the libertarian an ethical oxymoron, for example.)
Of course, if one interferes forceably with another individual, recourse
is required. The flaw in the logic behind institutionalization is the confusion
of potential violence and actual violence. To act on the possibility of potential
violence is to allow "an open sesame for unlimited tyranny" (Rothbard,
1978b, p. 91) . Under this principle, anyone might well be locked away,
incarcerated until the experts deemed him safe for the rest of us! On the other
hand, the spurious claims of insanity pleas in crimes ought not be allowed.
Such a concept distinguishes the crime from the criminal. Conversely, it
ironically creates for the criminal the danger of an indeterminate sentence
devoid of any relationship to the actual crime.
In the case of involuntary commitment, are Rothbard's principles
consistent with the entire corpus of his thought? It appears that they are.
However, one potential problem exists, which relates to his discussion of
children's rights. Are there not obvious cases where an adult has no capacity

4. For an excellent review of this radical libertarian position, see Szasz
(1989, pp. 19-26).
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to act sensibly? And if this is true, how would this circumstance be different
from that of a baby or a small child? If we apply Rothbard's principle of
"trustee-ownership" to this particular relationship, would it not be legitimate
for the "owner" of this person to act on his behalf? If the person has never
left his parents, it would be consistent to say they remain his trustees. But
what of the more difficult situation in which a once well-functioning adult
suffers a debilitating mental breakdown? In a sense these persons are no
longer "humans", but they are, like children, still potential adults. It is easy to
discuss the inhuman nature of mental commitment without dealing with
the real ethical concerns in this scenario. Is this person now property, to be
homesteaded? If he is, would not the logical historical owner be more than
likely the relatives? And are they not free to commit the person, at least until
that person demands to leave or runs away--as with the child leaving his
parents?
While Rothbard and other libertarian critics have been extremely
astute in their critique of involuntary commitment, there remains a number
of rather thorny ethical issues with regard to the notion of self-ownership
and the rights of humans, as well as the rights of "less-than-humans". As
with the abortion issue, these cases are found in the gray areas between
humanity and property.

Rights at Trial and the Judicial System

A critical part of the anarcho-capitalist model is the judical system. It is
through a court's legal structure that ethical principles find their identity in
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the social world. Therefore, there must be within the judicial process the
means to define the boundaries of property rights in society. And, of course,
the courts themselves must also abide by the ethical principles of
libertarianism. In other words, the legal system may not be viewed
conveniently as some sort of super-judiciary outside the constraints imposed
on the remainder of the society.
This latter constraint imposes some extremely tough limitations on
the actors involved in both the collection and utilization of evidence. Quite
often, human property rights conflict with what are commonly viewed in
contemporary society as legitimate enforcement powers of the State. For
example, since within Rothbard's system all forced labor is tantamount to
slavery, so then is the common practice of coerced testimony. In fact, the
entire power of subpeona is illegitimate. No one, he argues, may be forced to
attend a trial; since even the defendant is innocent to proven guilty, even he
is not required to appear.
The Rothbardian legal system would not have a "district attorney",
since there exists no "State" interest. Furthermore, there would be no
incarcaration of alleged criminals prior to their trials except in those cases in
which "the criminal has been caught red-handed and where a certain
presumption of guilt therefore exists" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 88). (It is unclear
how Rothbard can make this distinction from the general principles of
natural fact, however. ) The common contemporary problem faced by so
many suspects in funding bail would be eliminated, since incarcaration
would be ended prior to the trial. Nor would society require compulsory jury
duty. Rothbard concludes that the State (or the court) ought to be required to
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pay market wages to attract an adequate number of jurors. Finally, no person
would have an absolute right to an attorney, since the costs of this burden
would have to be borne by other individuals.
These ethical impediments would not only involve actual court
procedures, but would also apply to the police's or security agency's collection
of evidence .
.... [I]f everyone is supposed to be subject to the same
criminal law, then exempting the authorities from
the law gives them a legal license to commit
continual aggres sion. The policeman who
apprehends a criminal and arrests him, and the
judicial and penal authorities who incarcerate him
before trial and conviction--all should be subject to
the universal law. In short, if they have commited
an error and the defendant turns out to be innocent,
then these authorities should be subjected to the
same penalties as anyone else who kidnaps and
incarcerates an innocent man (Rothbard, 1982a, p.
81).
The "authorities" would have little means to garner testimony from anyone
except through the voluntary cooperation of the persons involved in the
investigation. Since it is itself criminal to invade the property of another,
there would be no legal means to conduct searches or wiretaps of another
person's property regardless of warrants, unless one is willing to accept the
risks of criminal trespass if the suspect turns out to be innocent or the
intrusion by the investigator surpasses the requirement of proportionality in
the punishment of a criminal. For Rothbard, the constraints upon law
enforcement officials are rather confining .
... .It is proper to invade the property of a thief, for
example, who has himself invaded to a far greater
extent the property of others. Suppose the police
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decide that John Jones is a jewel thief. They tap his
wires, and use this evidence to convict Jones of the
crime. We might say that this tapping is legitimate,
and should go unpunished: provided, however,
that if Jones should prove not to be a thief, the
police and the judges who may have issued the
court order for the tap are now to be adjudged
criminals themselves and sent to jail for their
crime of unjust wiretapping (Rothbard, 1978b, p.
1 09).
Rothbard argues this principle has two "happy consequences": First, the
officers of the court would act only in extremely certain situations where the
evidence against the individual is overwhelming and, secondly, the
investigators would be equally accountable for their own criminal actions
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 09). If police officers use undue force to gain confessions
or information, they are liable for these actions, unless the suspect is, in fact,
found guilty. If the suspects are found to have commited illegal activities,
then "the police should be exonerated," unless the torture is greater than the
crime (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 81-82). These principles eliminate the issues
which accompany the present debate over the Court's usuage of the
"exclusionary rule", i.e., illegally seized evidence may not be presented
against a suspect in a trial. Rothbard's position on this issue appears closer to
the view of the Reagan administration and especially Ed Meese's arguments
than to the common civil libertarian position. However, the intent of his
views is quite different from the "law and order" mentality of Meese and
others. Rothbard's position on rights of the criminally accused diverge
immensely from the present interpretations of our legal system. Warrants
would be allowed, but with a strict accountability placed upon the user and
authorizer of these court orders. No one would be compelled to testify against
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himself or anyone else; the ability to compel such testimony through the use
of force would be relative to the crime of the testifier. Neither party in the
investigation would have the power to compel witnesses to appear at a trial.
If the party is guilty of no crime, then no testimony may be demanded. The
issue of the right to a speedy trial is for the most part a moot point, since
except in the most rare cases, the accused would not be retained. The right of
counsel would be dependent on the willingness and abilities of the accused
parties to afford such assistance. Jury trials would still exist, but compulsory
jury duty would not be allowed. Apparently, the parties involved in the cases
would be responsible for "purchasing" these agents. And, finally, no cruel or
unusual punishment would occur, unless, of course, the crimes commited
were "cruel and unusual."
Rothbard argues that both police protection and a judicial system
ought to be provided privately. Those critics who deny the possibility of
private police protection operate from a critical misconception, he concludes .
... [T]here is a common fallacy ... that the government
must supply 'police protection', as if police
protection were a single, absolute entity, a fixed
quantity of something which the government
supplies to all.. . .In actual fact, there are almost
infinite degrees of all sorts of protection ....
[And] the point is that the government has
no rational way to make these allocations. The
government only knows that it has a limited
budget....with no indication at all as to whether the
police department is serving the consumers in a
way responsive to their desires or whether it is
d oing so efficiently. The situation would b e
different if police services were supplied on a free,
competitive market.. .. On the free market, protection
would be supplied in proportion and in whatever
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way that the consumers wish to pay for it ....
(Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 215-216).
What may we anticipate in such a system? First, as with any private business,
the police would face a scarcity of resources and would be unable to enforce
all crimes. Therefore, they would rationally allocate resources and enforce
"whatever the customers are willing to pay for" (Rothbard, 1 978b, p. 216). In
other words, those consumers with more to lose would contract through
their "pocketbooks" for greater security in the areas most preferred by them.
Secondly, those companies which satisfy their customers, not only for
security but also for numerous other criteria (courtesy, for example), would be
the most successful institutions and the businesses most likely to be imitated.
As in the case of private education, a private security market provides a
highly diversified product. Finally, the probability of protecting victims'
rights and retrieving their property would be greatly enhanced since the
consumer would be "king". The focus of criminal invesigations would be
redirected from a vague notion of the "public interest" to the actual
individual consumer who is faced with the real concerns of criminal
aggression. In his anarcho-capitalist society, Rothbard anticipates that security
would be provided by either the landowners or insurance companies. Persons
would likely pay monthly premiums and contract protection from a specific
company. Furthermore, nothing prevents agreements between agencies to
handle special situations. Hence, one may expect a highly complex internal
security network to evolve if it is given the freedom to develop through the
trial and error processes of the market.
One may raise at least four criticisms in opposition to a private interior
police force. Rothbard responds to three of these concerns (Rothbard, 1978b,
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pp. 21 8-222) . First, one might argue that police protection is a "natural
monopoly", i.e., because of the unique nature of this good, no more than one
provider of the good could survive in the long term. However, this
argument is less a criticism against private police forces as it is an assumption
that only one police force would survive. Furthermore, under a private
system, there always remains the opportunity for new entry if the single
producer fails to satisfy citizen demands. And, as technology evolves, it is
becoming increasingly clear that in a number of areas such as security, the
natural monopoly argument is becoming obsolete.
A second criticism leveled against the provision of private police forces
concerns the inability of the impoverished to be able to afford the services. If
the services are not provided by government, would these individuals not
have to fend for their own survival. Again, as Rothbard demonstrates, this
criticism is not an argument against the feasibility of private-sector police.
The concern over provision to the poor is relevant to any good or service.
Under a market of private police, the poor would be furnished in the same
ways they are (or are not) supplied for other goods, namely, through charity.
Furthermore, because of the increased efficiency provided by the discipline of
the market, the product is likely to be more affordable and in more diverse
forms to meet differing income demands.
A third complaint is the potential for "clashing protection agencies",
i.e., wars between different police forces. Given the current statist
alternatives, Rothbard minimizes the dangers of these private wars. First,
even if these kinds of actions did occur occasionally, society "would at least be
spared the horror of inter-State wars, with their plethora of massive,
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superdestructive, and now, nuclear, weapons" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 220).

If

the

world were privatized, conflict would be localized, meaning that destruction
would likely be limited in scope and devastation, since great weapons would
kill both sides. Mass destruction only arises because of the "slicing off of
territorial areas into single, governmental monopolies" (Rothbard, 1978b, p.
220). Secondly, nationalism, which is a critical component of modern war in
the age of the nation-state, would also diminish. Finally, to fear the "anarchy"
of a localized private police system is to ignore the very real and potentially
more disconcerting "international anarchy" which exists presently between
nations who for many reasons do not like each other (Rothbard, 1978b, p.
221).
But these examples are worst case scenarios and, as Rothbard correctly
notes, there is no a priori reason to assume these situations would occur any
more than they do currently. Consumers pay the bills in a market system and
they will likely demand forms of protection that are as non-intrusive as
possible. It would be rational to solve the conflicts not by escalated violence,
but by peaceful arbitration in the courts. Present differences between
distinctive American states do not explode into open warfare. There are no
preconceived reasons to assume that changes in the manner of police
protection will fundamentally alter the levels of war or violence.
A fourth criticism on which Rothbard is rather silent relates to the
problems of positive spillover effects and, hence, the potential for large
amounts of free-riding activity in the provision of internal defense. If the
service is non-excludible, then it would seem to face the dangers of persons
attempting to garner the benefits of the service without being required to pay
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the costs of the product. If this activity occured, two negative circumstances
would result. First, when persons discover that they are able to benefit the
fullness of the pertinent protection without demonstrating these levels of
demand by payment, they will withhold their resources. As all persons
realize the benefits of such action, the level of protection would drop,
perhaps, significantly. Secondly, since the company who is providing the
service would not be able to impose these costs, the profitability of the
enterprise would diminish substantially. Thus, the good would apparently be
" underproduced". To carry the argument to its logical conclusion,
government must correct these misread demands through the use of
coercion.
However, is the use of force necessarily the only solution to perceived
free-riding? Public goods theory unfortunately rests upon static temporal
assumptions. For example, it assumes that after the parties involved in the
series of exchanges recognize what appears to be efficient behavior through
the withholding of their demands for police services, they would then retire
from the process of making plans and achieving their specific ends. Hence,
both free riders and non-free riders would cease action and stand content,
even though a substantial set of their demands are unsatisfied. This
assumption is extremely unrealistic. Would these individuals not observe
the decline of the product they demand and, subsequently, note that other
persons are following the same strategy they are attempting, to the detriment
of both parties. It is a quite spurious assumption to completely ignore the
potential for cooperation and exchange to alleviate these potential spillover
effects. Since it is to the benefit of almost all the parties involved that police
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protection exists, then we can expect it to be present. Or, over time,
cooperation will overcome free riding. Of course, there will remain a few
persons who are seeking to free ride or who are unable to afford or do not
demand the service. And, these persons will overly benefit from the
provision of the service. But there is absolutely no reason to assume that they
will make up a substantial portion of the beneficiaries.
Is Rothbard overly optimistic in assuming the entrance of profitable
organizations into a free market for internal security? It seems fair to assume
that if profits exist, entrepreneurs arise to exploit these opportunities.
Therefore, we must not fall into the trap of defeating his argument with a
"straw man" argument which rests upon the uncertainty, rather than the
viability, of these contentions. The important question is whether the profits
for private police firms would exist. Two potential problems stand out as the
most serious concerns. The first, the potential existence of spillover and free
riders, we have hopefully laid to rest. However, the second concern is quite
different. Due to the "burdens" Rothbard's ethical theory requires of the
police and courts, it is very possible that extreme disincentives exist for
anyone considering entrance into these professions. For example, if police
officers are held criminally liable for their actions, would there be many
police officers, and at what price? The protection of the rights of the
criminally accused is quite "costly". These principles might make successful
police work much more difficult and eliminate a substantial portion of the
savings in costs that the dynamics of a market order provides. It would also
be much harder to provide the service. Of course, if we compared these costs
to those the contemporary State would face if they were required to play by
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ethically legitimate rules, then these differences in costs would likely
evaporate. Also, Rothbard's ethics eliminates many of the extremely
expensive traditional crime-fighting services. Since only real crimes and not
mere vices would be the jurisdiction of the police, some of the more difficult
problems would be eradicated. These "crimes" without victims, which for
self-evident reasons are difficult to enforce, are the focus of a substantial
portion of modern police budgets.5
An even more thorny concern in the privatization of internal defense
is the problem of arbitration in a Stateless society. As with the protection
business, the "exchanges" which occur in the courts may leave at least one
party in the action unsatisfied. Therefore, the imposition of the law upon
individuals is unlike normal market exchanges of goods and services in that
it necessarily must entail some degree of coercion.
Of course, in many cases the parties involved may be willing to accept
the verdict which emerges from the arbitration process. People are often able
to work out their differences. In the present system, there is not

an

overwhelming effort to disregard the legal code. Obedience of the law is
obviously not completely a function of force. Thus, the criticism that arises
which expects high rates of refusal from individuals asked to accept private

5. The perfect contemporary example is the United States' "War on
Drugs". It is an exceedingly difficult task to fight "crime" when none of the
parties involved in the activity view the act as criminal. Without the
assistance of a "victim" the State begins its task with extreme handicaps, since
it must capture persons who are providing their consumers with a valuable
product. These costs are only increased when there exists the kind of demand
that spurs the present narcotics market.
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verdicts--within a community that presumedly accepts the decision--is
unquestionably exaggerated.
Nevertheless, in some cases, persons are going to deny their
criminality even after the evidence leads to this verdict. In Rothbard's private
system, how will courts alleviate this important problem? It may be useful to
explain how these courts would operate privately. He concludes that they
would function considerably more efficiently and morally than our present
institutions. State-maintained courts, like all other government institutions,
face the problems that are generated by the "taint" of politics and the
inefficiencies that are chacteristic of any kind of monopoly. Rather than being
financed by taxpayers, private courts would form agreements with private
persons. One might, Rothbard surmises, subscribe to a permanent service;
more likely, one would hire on a case-by-case basis. Or, courts and police
agencies might operate through contracts or as one firm (Rothbard, 1978b, p.
223) . The task of arbitration would be similar to the present modes of hiring
legal defense.
The use of private courts is not at all outlandish. In fact, it is an
increasingly popular practice, brought on in part by the inefficiencies and
unsatisfactory results of government courts. Rothbard's courts would operate
in a similar fashion with the parties involved determining the rules by
which the proceedings would operate.

But these institutions would be

devoid of the overarching arm of the federal and state governments that
cloud present private arbitration. Instead, they would depend on what David
Osterfeld terms "bilateral laws" which are "created on the spot by the
individuals concerned" and, thus, are only binding upon the particular actors
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(Osterfeld, 1 989, p. 55) . These activities would represent, then, a process
similar to voluntary exchange and would encompass all the benefits that exist
with this sort of flexibility.
But is it not this "overarching arm" that ultimately determines the
acceptance of these decisions? How would a private court enforce its decision
if the losing p arty simply ignored it?

Rothbard, turning to historical

examples, argues that the most effective tool in enforcement is the power of
ostracism and community boycott (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 224). But these tactics
are likely only effective in cases where the "criminal" is a fixed member of
the community who values his reputation in the region. Most criminals
probably do not care about these matters.
A portion of this problem is eliminated by the fact that all property and
decisions would be private. Since the streets, roads, parks, etc. would also be
privately owned, the incentive to prevent crime would be greatly increased.
Public ownership of property creates a "tragedy of the commons" in the area
of crime prevention just as it does in any other area.
Still, crime will occur. How will the unwilling criminal be made
willing? To understand how private courts might work, it is important to
trace Rothbard's argument stage by stage (Rothbard, 1 978b, pp. 225-227).

If

a

criminal act is commited against an individual, he would appeal to his
protection agency who would, in turn, work to locate the criminal. Suppose
they apprehend the person they have evidence commited the crime. Most
likely, the case will be taken to the victim's judicial service, particularly if the
alleged criminal is uncooperative. If both parties are members of this court,
the problem of the arbitration's bindingness is largely eliminated. The alleged
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criminal would be informed of the charge; he may appear at the trial if he
desires. However, he, like all other persons involved in the case, cannot be
forced to testify. If the defendant is found guilty, the court, through its
marshals, would act to seize the criminal for sentencing and subsequent
restitution.
It is obviously more complicated if the alleged criminal is not a client
of the same court. The victim would probably first plead his case to his court.
If a verdict of guilty follows, the plaintiff may turn to his company and refuse

to accept the verdict of the victim's court for what he argues are legitimate
reasons.
The problem arises if the two private court decisions conflict.
However, rather than turn to open warfare, it is likely better for business that
these courts have rules for such circumstances that allow appeals, or that they
at least establish procedural agreements on a case-by-case basis. The
subsequent decision would then be final and binding. Rothbard argues that
since only two parties exist in a criminal dispute, the "sensible" number of
appeals would be when a similar conclusion is found by two courts
(Rothbard, 1978b, p. 227). There is apparently no reason in natural law why
this principle must always be binding, however.
A strength of this system may simultaneously be viewed as a
weakness. Private arbitration avoids the dangers of the present monopoly
structure. Persons in the process may freely choose between different forms of
judicial decisionmaking. However, the system has no court of last resort like
the present Supreme Court. This lack of central and final authority leaves
open a wide range of legal processes and rules for any given community. But
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there is no a priori reason why this diversity would be necessarily bad.
Essentially, the only parties who have any standing in a given case are the
criminal and the victim. The manner in which decisions are reached is not
overly critical as long as ethical principles are satisfied.
Rothbard, therefore, is correct to argue that a structure of law will exist
even without the State apparatus. In his system there would be no legislative
"will" and no statutory law. Law would arise and be defined as it has been for
centuries through common law processes, but devoid of a legislature.
But the most significant question in this discussion of private courts
remains to be answered. Why are we to assume that private judges, who are
bound ultimately by what the specific community will tolerate, will
consistently render libertarian decisions? Or, apply this same inquiry to the
thorny concern of enforcement of the "law". Suppose, for instance, that we
return to Rothbard's discussion of the power of ostracism and boycott. In
boycotting an "evil" merchant, the other merchants may surely achieve the
results that Rothbard anticipates; lawbreakers will be kept honest by the forces
of community influence in many cases. The power of these techniques are
often underestimated in today's highly politicized society. However, why are
we to suppose that the larger number of merchants are acting as the "good
guys"? We surely may not assume that majority behavior equates to
consistent libertarian principles in the present political system; the larger and
more powerful majorities continually smash the libertarian rights of
individuals. Has Rothbard fallen prey to the utopian trap which has
devastated the Marxist vision, namely, that under a changed environment,
human nature transcends through some form of mystical metamorphosis
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which overcomes present limitations. Why should we expect the state of
anarchy to also be a libertarian system? Unfortunately, Rothbard's response to
this concern is unclear. He argues that libertarian ethics would exist
apparently because they represent the natural order of human society. He
contends that a legal code must be one that is generally accepted by both the
community and the courts (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 225). Due to this requirement,
the code "would insist on the libertarian principle of no aggression against
person or property, define property rights in accordance with libertarian
principle, set up rules of evidence . . . and set up a code of maximum
punishment for any particular crime" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 225). Furthermore,
he contends:
Of course, in the future libertarian society, the basic
legal code would not rely on blind custom, much of
which could well be antilibertarian. The code would
have to be established on the basis of acknowledged
libertarian principle, of nonaggression against the
person or property of others; in short, on the basis
of reason rather than on mere tradition, however
sound its general outlines. Since we have a body of
common law to draw on, however, the task of
reason in correcting and amending the common
law would be far easier than trying to construct a
body of systematic legal principles de novo out of
the thin air (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 230-231) .
I f Rothbard is implying b y these comments that to be ethical any system
must establish these rules, then there is no theoretical dilemma. However, if
he means that one may expect this ideal world as an historical reality, then
the argument needs to be further defended. One may not simply assume into
existence these principles. We must be convinced that given the State-less
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environment, these principles would be the chosen legal code.6 Otherwise,
we face the possibility of a society built upon a Hobbesian anarchist nightmare
of brute force.
Despite the unlikelihood that human society would ever approach
Rothbard's state of ethical bliss, his model does provide a number of
attractive advantages over the existing statist framework. First, certainly, the
common law has distinct advantages over statutory law in providing the
principles of individual justice. In fact, if one denies the idea of any sort of
collective notions of justice, e.g., the public interest or social justice, there are
no reasons for legislatures to exist. The decisions of these judges are limited
in scope and, furthermore, focused upon the proper matters, namely, the
persons who actually have legitimate standing in the case and the particular
issues of that suit. Secondly, while it might in the short run create chaotic
circumstances, the removal of monopoly status for both the provision of
protection and arbitration provides the opportunity for both a more efficient
and an enhanced ethical delivery of libertarian justice.

National Defense

A legal code's success depends in large part on the society's willingness

6. This requirement is likely the most important difference between
Rothbard's theory and David Friedman's utilitarian anarcho-capitalist model.
See Friedman (1978, pp. 155-164); also see Sampson (1984, pp. 215-232). As an
ethical skep!ic, Friedman avoids the overarching moral code in which
Rothbard requires. Instead, he relies on the market process to determine a
community rules.
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to accept the rules. One of the reasons Rothbard's system of law without
government may, in fact, be more than a utopian dream is due to the legal
and sociological consensus that exists within any given community. But we
live a very large world which appears quite often to be devoid of any
common ground which would allow the forces of consensus to weave its
magic. If other actors do not accept the legitimacy of the libertarian society,
what prevents them from taking advantage of the rather fragile abilities of
decentralized anarchist systems to defend themselves against non-libertarian
orders? In other words, despite the potential superiority of the anarcho
capitalist "game", can it survive if a portion of the players "cheat"? This
question is most pertinent in regard to the dangers of external enemies and
the requirement of an adequate defense mechanism.
However, Rothbard is prepared to extend anarcho-capitalist principles
to even the realm of national defense. First, he argues that the threat of
armed invasion of our society rests in substantial part on the perceived threat
that our own "defensive" actions create. In the anarchist society, the fear
created by the concept of nation-states would be gone. With these critical
"tension-makers" removed, aggressive actions would be s quelched by
coalitions of defense protection agencies who combine and defeat the
remaining outlaws (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 238).
Is this not an especially naive perspective? For example, suppose that
tommorrow the United States government disbanded and left the former
citizens to arrange their own defense and police protection. Would we
support this action even if we were all anarchists ? If we severely
decentralized our defenses, would we not open ourselves to armed attack
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from other countries who maintain their centralized and coordinated
armies? Could not the Soviets (for the sake of argument) use their
comparative advantage of centralization, coordination, cooperation, and a
different set of (unethical) rules to roll over each of the emerging private
protection agencies in our newly-conceived territory? Rothbard, however,
argues this hypothetical scenario leads to an unfair criticism .
.... When we contemplate any sort of new system,
whatever it may be, we must first decide whether
we want to see it brought about .... [W]e must first
assume that it has been established, and t h e n
consider whether the system could work, whether
it could remain in existence, and just how efficient
such a system would be .... [W]e have said nothing
about how to get from the present system to the
ideal; for these are two totally separate questions .... If
someone agrees that a world libertarian society,
once establi shed, is the bes t that he can
conceive ... then let him become a libertarian ... and
then [let him] join us further in the separate-and
obviously difficult-task of figuring out how to bring
this ideal about (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 238-239).
Unfortunately, it is not so easy to separate the proposition of the ideal
from the accomplishment of that ideal; the two activities are inseparably
intertwined. Even Rothbard recognizes that the larger the original group
agreeing to end the State, the greater the likelihood one has of avoiding the
domination by the remaining States (Rothbard, 1 978b, p. 239).

He fails,

however, to realize that the dynamic processes which make size an issue also
implies no one would likely ever "secede". A country that unilaterally
disarms on the hope that a private sector for defense would emerge faces the
very real possibility of being overrun by a more powerful enemy who chooses
to remain statist. The world, unfortunately, would still retain many of the
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characteristics of a government-sponsored jungle. All we would have done
by ending our defense capabilities is handicap our abilities to play the current
"game".
Of course, one might argue that the metaphor of the jungle is itself
mere perception, reinforced by the violence of an unjust system. Actually,
almost everyone would love to live in libertarian peace, if they could be
assured that everyone else would follow suit. But this assertion, right or
wrong, ignores the most important issue. In the case of persons making
decisions in our example, perception, one might say, is reality. And we must
accept these realities in building a system of ethics. Because of the frictions
generated between behaviors based upon interests and ethics, one faces all the
components of a classic prisoner's dilemma in which, although all parties
may view the present circumstances less desirable than the libertarian model,
they will remain as they are. To act otherwise allows other players to coup
substantial benefits by avoiding the ethical rules. Hence, human self-interest
might well dominate ethical considerations. If the nature of the act of
dismantling the State's military structure can generate such a complex set of
decisions, then it is obvious that the questions of anarchist tactics and the
proposition of the good society are not as separable as Rothbard wishes to
argue. If the ideal is utopian and the effort to achieve it creates circumstances
far inferior to the present system, why consider the route at all?
Yet, for Rothbard, even unilateral reform does not create overly dire
circumstances .
... .In the first place, the form and quantity of defense
expenditures would be decided upon by the
A m e r i c a n c o n s u mers them selv e s . Those
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Americans who favor Polaris submarines, and fear
a Soviet threat, would subscribe toward the
financing of such vessels . Those who prefer an
ABM system would invest in such defensive
missiles. Those who laugh at such a threat or those
who are committed pacifists would not contribute
to any 'national' defense service at all. Different
defense theories would be applied in proportion to
those who agree with, and support, the various
theories being offered ....
But let us assume the worst. Let us assume
that the Soviet Union at last invades and conquers
the territory of America .... [T]he Soviet Union's
difficulties will have only just begun. The main
reason a conquering country can rule a defeated
country is that the latter has an existing State
apparatus to transmit and enforce the victor's
orders onto a subject population ....
Furthermore, the occupying Russian's lives
would be made even more difficult by the
inevitable eruption of guerrilla warfare by the
American population ... [N]o occupying force can
long keep down a native population determined to
resist. ... And surely the anticipation of this sea of
troubles, of the enormous costs and losses that
would inevitably follow, would stop well in
advance even a hypothetical Soviet government
bent on military conquest (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 239241).
While these arguments may be partially valid, they unfortunately do not
respond to our concerns. Once again, Rothbard ignores the possibility of
substantial free riding activity. Despite Rothbard's argument to the contrary,
there are many modern cases in which occupying forces, in fact, did control
countries despite a citizenry which would have preferred alternatives. Look
at the Czechs, for instance. We may not, then, simply assume the existence of
what would appear to him to be rational activity on the part of resistors or,
for that matter, the invaders, to be the norm.
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Tibor Machan, representing a common minimalist criticism, directs a
slightly different argument against private defense. He argues that the service
implies some "type of geographical homogeniety" among the areas to be
covered by the defense agency (Machan, 1975, p. 149). How would police
agencies, for example, move from area to area, since property rights are
absolute? What guarantees exist that these companies would be able to
effectively carry out their services? However, it is unclear why this complaint
is a problem. This same concern might be applied to any delivery system,
from milk delivery persons to defense agencies. What makes defense services
different?
The crucial difference concerns the extremely high costs of transition
from the statist society to the anarchist world. The incredibly high levels of
uncertainty impose especially high costs upon the transformation. There is
no guarantee that these defense forces would arise in a private economy to
adequate levels fast enough to prevent the incentive of other states to take
advantages of the turmoils of transition. The prevention of free riding, as we
noted in our discussion of police protection and courts, requires both
adequate levels of time and a pre-existing degree of consensus. Without these
variables there appears to be no reason to believe that persons would not free
ride, seeking to benefit from the largely non-excludible good of defense from
foreign invasion without facing the costs. Hence, those persons not
purchasing defense protection would likely include more individuals than
simply those who are pacifists or those who scoff at the risks of invasion.
However, unlike the free riding with other goods, in which large portions of
free riding dissipates once the actors are given time to reconsider the
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consequences of their choices, the temporal factor in the military arena opens
a window of opportunity for annihilation. Modem war technology makes the
s takes of advancing into the unknown highly problematical, while
generating increased pay-offs for exploiting those groups implementing these
efforts. And the possibility of achieving an enforceable and universal
transformation of the entire world simultaneously goes against astronomical
odds. Private defense is not possible because it fails logically but because the
world simply cannot reach this system from where we are today.
Due to these problems, the tactics of reform are not simply strategic
obstacles. This issue must be the foundation of the discussion of the private
provision of defense. Libertarianism would be best served by locating means
by which the coercion of government may be kept to a minimum within the
defense arena. Rothbard's anarcho-capitalist system approaches its limits with
the private provision of defense. He must surrender to the possibility of the
existence of a "public good" or to at least the possibility that time and space
factors deny his system the ability to overcome certain free riding
propensities.

War and Foreign Policy in the Less Than Anarchist World

In the ideal Rothbardian world, of course, there would be no foreign
"policy". But if we assume that governments exist, we may still be able to
apply the ethical imperatives of libertarian justice upon the actions of the
State. Unfortunately, due to his absolutist ethical monism, Rothbard's
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discussions of foreign policy often become confusing and even ethically
arbitrary.
For Rothbard, the same negative rights fr amework of non
intervention which applies to acts between individuals also holds true for the
conduct between governments. Therefore, intervention is allowed only in
cases of self-defense or restitution and may only be imposed upon those
persons responsible for the transgression. This latter requirement makes the
act of war in the modern world ethically problematical.
War, then, even a just defensive war, is only
proper when the exercise of violence is rigorously
limited to the individual criminals themselves ....
It has often been maintained . . . that the
development of the horrendous modern weapons
of mass murder .. .is only a difference of degree
rather than kind from the simpler weapons of an
earlier age... [A] particularly libertarian reply is that
while the bow and arrow, and even the rifle, can be
p inpointed, if the will be there, against actual
criminals, that modern nuclear weapons cannot.
Here is a crucial difference in kind. Nuclear
weapons ... are ipso facto engines of indiscriminate
mass destruction . . . . We must, therefore, conclude
that the use of nuclear or similar weapons, or the
threat thereof, is a crime against humanity for
which there can be no justification (Rothbard,
1982a, pp. 190-191).
.

The requirement that any military action must pinpoint the enemy is
perfectly consistent with libertarian ethics. However, the discussion of
nuclear weapons seems quite arbitrary, especially when it is related to
Rothbard's position on gun control. Humans act; lifeless objects do not.
Moreover, th e right of self-defense is only meaningful if one provides the
_
victim the instrumentation to successfully ward off the invader. He correctly
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argues that bearing arms and using them are entirely different ethical acts.
Yet, concerning nuclear weapons or other non-selective weapons, he
concludes that their ."disarmament becomes a good to be pursued for its own
sake," or the "highest political good" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 191). How Rothbard
can square these two positions is unexplainable. He confuses in the most
obvious ways the possession of potentially violent items with the actual use
of them. It is unclear how a weapon's selectivity establishes distinct moral
principles which are prevailing over human action. Such a principle denies
the possibility that these weapons might be used for beneficial non-violent
reasons. Before one dismisses this proposition as completely unfounded, it
might be useful to consider the relatively peaceful state of affairs in the
"nuclear age". If we may grant the deterrence argument any creedence, then it
would be premature to reject a priori the existence of this weaponry.
Rothbard contends that all State-sponsored wars are illegitimate
aggressions since they entail violence against the property owners within
their own territory (taxation) and usually involve the indiscriminate killing
of persons in or from the enemy territory. The consequences of these acts of
violence linger endlessly. Echoing the writings of Randolph Bourne,
Rothbard concludes:
. . . [W]e must allude to the domestic tyranny that is
the inevitable accompaniment of inter-State war, a
tryanny that usually lingers long after the war is
over ... .It is in war that the State really comes into its
own: swelling in power, in number, in pride, in
absolute dominion over the economy and the
society. The root myth that enables the State to wax
fat off war is the canard that war is a defense by the
State of its subjects. The facts are precisely the
opposite. In war... the State frantically mobilizes the
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people to fight for it against another State, under
the pretext that it is fighting for them. Society
becomes militarized and statized, it becomes a herd,
seeking to kill its alleged enemies, rooting out and
supressing all dissent from the official war effort,
happily betraying truth for the supposed public
interest.. .. (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 195-196).
Only in those occasions deemed "vertical violence" by Rothbard, when the
citizenry carries out revolution against the State, may there be ethical
justification for war. Unfortunately, the greater the success the State has at
creating the "herd" mentality among its citizens, the less likely revolution
opposing the government will occur.
What, then, should libertarians do in the support or opposition of a
government's foreign policy? According to Rothbard, one should, first of all,
support the least aggression possible by limiting coercion to within his own
borders. Essentially, this principle requires the "total avoidance of war"
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 193). Secondly, cases in defense of one's own citizen's
person or property ought not to extend beyond existing territorial borders.
Persons who move beyond their original "countries" must accept the new
rules of that territority. Thirdly, in situations in which war presently exists, it
would be the libertarian position to "reduce the scope of assault against
innocent civilians as much as possible" or, to "induce the warring States to
observe fully the rights of neutral citizens" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 194). The
military policy of any State would be especially limited. Similarly, foreign aid
would be eliminated.

Since the aid comes from the forced taxation of

person's property, it also represents aggression, as do other forms of political
or diplomatic involvement.
This idea of "peaceful coexistence" would entail free trade and
218

exchange on one hand, and military and political "isolation" on the other
hand. On the surface, it seems to be quite consistent with the overall domestic
program of libertarianism. Yet, as Rothbard willingly admits, individual
libertarian ethics lose much of their clarity in foreign policy because of the
monumental level of the effects of military and political acts at the inter-State
level (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 268) . A libertarian foreign policy would not entail
the mere "turning of the cheek". Nevertheless, the State may not ethically
expand beyond its borders in warlike fashion. The level of involuntary
involvement of persons in these scenarios makes the application of any
libertarian pr�nciples in relations between States extremely problematic.
To provide an example of this dilemma, let us explore one of the
fundamental tenets of libertarianism, namely, the support of free trade
between nations. On the surface, it would appear completely consistent to
argue that free trade is the only ethical route of economic activity. But
consider this issue as it might be applied on the individual level. If a person
stole from another individual to obtain the capital needed to produce his
product for trade, would this theft not be viewed as a criminal activity? Ought
not the resources be returned to the rightful owner, even at the expense of
whomever made the mistake of purchasing the item from the thief? This
conclusion is deeply embedded in libertarian ethics. Yet, how in principle
would this scenario be different from cases where certain countries subsidize
specific exports to increase their sales--at the expense of the country's
taxpayers?
Or, let us investigate a second example: Why would it necessarily be
illegimate for the State to become more involved in citizens' problems in
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other countries than within their own territorial boundaries? If one's rights
have been violated, why should the arbitrary boundaries of nation-states
dictate the responses of persons coming to the aid of these victims?
Therefore, because of the ethical "taint" in which States and their
political acts create, it would be quite feasible to argue that libertarianism
offers very little guidance for most foreign and military policy issues. Most
libertarians, including Rothbard, strongly promote both political and military
non-intervention. Yet, it is unclear exactly how useful these theories are in
providing general policy guidance, since there are no purely political nor
perfectly economic actions in existence in contemporary political economy.
There are obvious reasons to superficially argue that the non
interventionist perspective is consistent with the whole fabric of libertarian
ethics. Non-intervention in the protection of self-ownership might be in
theory as con.sistently applied to collectivities of persons as it may be to single
individuals. And Rothbard supports that conclusion, advocating the closing
of foreign bases, the removal of foreign troops, the end of espionage activities,
the shutting off of all foreign aid for all reasons, and consequently, the
significant reduction of military capabilities (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 291-294).
However, there is an additional libertarian principle that would seem
to be as pertinent in this situation, namely, the right of persons to defend
themselves from real aggressors. The determination of the circumstances
surrounding the rights of self-defense is purely historical, i.e., it emerges from
past acts which violates one's rights. For example, what does the notion of
principled isolationism imply for certain Middle East countries who have
been aggressing against each other for literally centuries? Do we define an
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military act by the Palestinians as an act of aggression or an act of self-defense?
If it is self-defense, it would be perfectly legitimate under the libertarian code
of ethics for the Palestinians to enter the territory of the Israelis and act
aggressively. How, then, may libertarians in the topsy-turvy world of nation
states and infinite historical aggression formulate any a priori principles in
support of isolationism?
Suppose Person A aggresses against Person B at Time-1. B then returns
to his own territory. To capture B, would not A be justified to transgress into
B's territory? Or, in his search to catch or protect himself from B, would it not
be perfectly legitimate for A to contract with C for the use of C's territory in
exchange for whatever C values ? Are these contracts on their face
illegitimate, and if they are (for the reason that they are established by the
State apparatuses), then is not the entire discussion of libertarian non
intervention moot? Hence, one may not conclude, for example, that the
participation of the United States in NATO, in the Phillipines, or elsewhere is
illegitimate without an extremely careful case-by-case analysis.
Rothbard may be correct in his stinging criticism of political and
military intervention by the United States and other governments. However,
this criticism is based on practical, not principled, argument? Libertarianism
may no more justify total non-intervention in the area of foreign policy than
it may in the realm of individual ethics. Persons have a right to self-defense.
One may not discern before the fact what sort of actual arrangements will be

7. Libertarian theory may begin with identical premises and reach
alternative conclusions in foreign policy issues due to complex historical
factors. See, for example, Cox (1990, pp. 15-19) and Richman (1990, pp. 32-37).
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produced between States. One may only define and justify the manners in
which forms of intervention may occur.

Public Welfare for the Rich and the Poor

It is rather simple to infer the role Rothbard surmises for what is
commonly called "public assistance" or "welfare". 8 Forced charity is
illegitimate. Only voluntary charity may be allowed in his libertarian society.
Since each person is absolute owner of himself and his property, he is free to
provide his labor and goods to persons as he sees fit.
Rather than repitiously proceeding through the ethical arguments, let
us examine what Rothbard anticipates from a world without governmentally
provided assistance. First, he does not expect massive suffering. As he
indicates, there was very little public assistance

in

America prior to the fateful

Great Depression; nevertheless, the world survived--and at a much lower
standard of living (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 148).

Religious organizations and

other private institutions filled what today would be viewed as a large void.
And these groups satisfied these needs without generating the horrible
disincentives. found in the contemporary policy structure which often locks
persons into a cycle of failure. 9 Rothbard accepts the generally conservative

8. For a critique of the Welfare State's "finest hour", i.e., the Great
Society, see Rothbard (1973b, pp. 88-94).
9. For an historical example of successful provision of private charity,
see Rothbard (1 978b, pp. 1 48-1 5 1 ) . On the unfortunate dynamic that
accompanies government aid, see particularly Murray (1984, pp. 205-218).
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critique that a major portion of the problem of poverty is due to
"irresponsible present-mindedness" and argues that the solution requires the
"inculcation of 'bourgeois' future-minded values" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 154) .
Yet, he also willingly endorses the popular left-wing criticism that public
assistance "demoralizes" the recipients. Both of these arguments seem to fit
neatly into Rothbard's conception of the individual creative human. Thus,
publicly coerced welfare is injurious to taxpayer and tax consumer alike.
But Rothbard's most damning criticism is that welfare does not even
achieve what the rhetoric purports to accomplish, namely, the redistribution
of wealth from rich to poor. In fact, many programs accomplish the exact
opposite result, benefitting the rich at the expense of the poor and politically
underrepresented (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 157-162).
What, then, according to Rothbard, should government do to
eliminate its involvement in welfare? First, eliminate (or at least "drastically
reduce") taxation and allow the consequent expansion of the economy to
truly assist the poor. Secondly, significantly reduce government programs,
especially those which create regressive tax transfers. Instead, one ought to
leave these resources with the private consumers who will allocate them
much more efficiently and equitably. Thirdly, eliminate government
"roadblocks from [the poor's] productive energies," such as minimum wage
and licensing laws (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 165).
Would government "getting out of the way" in the area of public
charity be the best solution? Perhaps the best responsive question is: For
whom? It is obviously not the best answer for certain powerful corporate
giants who since at least the Progressive Era have significantly benefitted
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from their under-the-table alliances with the State. Neither is it beneficial for
the corporate farmer who rakes in huge subsidies at the expense of the
taxpayers, the consumers, and the small farmers forced to compete on a very
unequal "playing field". Nor is it preferred by union leaders and members
who benefit from the security of the effects of minimum wage laws and State
enforced job protection. But these specific groups in no way represent "the
poor". If they are benefitting from these "assistance" programs, is it not
conceivable that, overall, the poor represent "taxpayers" in our political
process and not "tax consumers"? And, if this is the case, would not the
removal of these programs generally benefit the poor? Of course, when one
examines the problem of poverty, the general improvement in the lot of the
impoverished sectors likely will not be sufficient for the supporters of public
assistance. Will there not still be a set of poor persons who will suffer--even
die--without public aid? Must we tolerate the huge levels of usurpation of
these programs by middle and upper class citizens to prevent the potential of
dire consequences for a small number of extremely underpriviledged
individuals?
Both libertarians and welfare socialists provide less than satisfactory
responses to these questions because both perspectives are required to heavily
speculate as to the world that would exist devoid of government welfare.
Nevertheless, Rothbard's arguments are quite convincing. First, he is very
likely correct that without public assistance the standard of living in a given
economy would be substantially higher. Accordingly, either fewer people will
be poverty-stricken or the society will be able to maintain a larger number of
persons. (This is an important and usually overlooked point: "The poor" will
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always be with us. But this phenomenon is due to the fact that when the
economy enjoys real growth, it generates an influx of new marginally
survivable persons, either through immigration or heightened birth rates. It
is, then, mere rhetoric to speak of the ending of all poverty, unless there are
incredible and oppressive forces at work in the world.)
Secondly, the ability of the private sector to coordinate the provision of
charity is highly underrated. As Hayek has often argued in his criticisms of
centrally planned socialist systems, expanding social complexity demands
further division of both labor and information and, thus, an increasingly
decentralized social system. Some critics argue that without coercion persons
would not provide the resources required to fund the elimination of poverty.
But this argument is mere speculation, since both the heavy burden of
taxation and, more importantly, the creation of a morally irresponsible
attitude among individuals would be removed from the formula of the
debate if public assistance suddenly evaporated. It is just as likely that a
complex network of charity would arise, tailored to meet more diverse needs
and assist those persons that donators deem deserving.
Thirdly, Rothbard is correct in pointing out the regressive nature of
many of the present welfare programs. This argument ought to be even more
cogent for egalitarians, who support progressive taxation and the
redistibution of wealth. Of course, they might still support only reform rather
than complete elimination of public aid. But does not the existence of these
programs for the politically and economically weak depend upon the political
support of the very powerful interests in society? Is it, then, possible to
discuss a truly egalitarian-centered redistributive State? In any case, a large
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portion of these resources never make their way to the lowest economic
classes in the system.
Finally, there remains for Rothbard, at least, the ethical illegitimacy of
public assistance. These programs are a clear violation of one's rights of
person and property. Moreover, they are a demoralizing process for both the
"giver" and the "receiver". The former is denied the satisfaction of a freely
chosen moral choice. The latter is denied control of his own will, forced to
subsist in an inhuman way off the dictates of an impersonal State.

Environmental Policy in Anarchy

Environmental policy represents one of the most hotly debated issues
on the contemporary political agenda. The heavy involvement of the media
and special interest groups, as well as several real environmental concerns,
places conservation at the top of the public debate. Environmentalism is also
an area in which libertarian scholarship may offer a great deal of assistance.
Rothbard is extremely critical of the political establishment's overall
treatment of the issue of economic growth and its ecological consequences.
He contends that the American liberal intellegentsia has waffled to and fro on
these controversies, passing through at least seven "stages" of contradictory
and confusing changes of perspective in post-war America (Rothbard, 1978b,
pp. 242-244). · First, there was the notion around the time of World War II that
capitalism faced "secular stagnation" which required the institution of certain
forms of central planning. In the 1950's, though, despite record expansion,
liberals joined a "cult of economic growth" which demanded government

226

intervention or planning to "force-feed" the economy. Then enters the
quintessential liberal J. K. Galbraith who argued that we have grown too
much and, thus, were "suffering" from too much affluence. Again, the
solution to this pressing problem was government i ntervention.
Nevertheless, only four years later affluence gave way to the suddenly
discovered vast poverty of Michael Harrington's America. The solution was,
again, increased government intervention. However, the next great
expansion generated the great fear that growth was becoming so rapid that all
employment would be ultimately automated out of existence. Once the
economic problems of the late 1960's occurred, this fear was quickly replaced
by the return of a philosophy of "gloom and doom". By the mid 1970's,
however, liberals had returned to a "super-Galbraithian position" as
spaceship-earth sped out of control without the able leadership that could be
provi ded through, again, government involvement. All of these rapid
intellectual posturings ultimately left the establishment's position in a
contradictory bundle of several positions drawn from particular stages in the
evolution. For example, Rothbard concludes that these interpretations place
us in a world of post-scarcity yet, for some reason, our resources are being
rapidly depleted by the greed of the market system.
This confusing journey through recent liberal intellectual history
concerning the environment and the economy provides an excellent means
to establish perhaps the two most important planks of Rothbard's discussion
of environmental policy. First, the debate over the environment is soaked in
unfounded rhetoric and cloaked with an anti-free market ideology. Secondly,
it is the market with its thoroughly developed system of property rights, and
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not socialism and central planning which best provides for conservation of
the ecology and stable unintrusive economic growth.
The common attacks on materialism and technology in modern
environmental debates, Rothbard contends, are based largely on economic
naivete. These market forces generate the contemporary standard of living;
they provide those wishing to kill the goose that lays the golden egg with
their subsistence. lO Therefore, the removal of these economic activities, he
concludes, cannot be the solution to environmental problems.
What we need is more economic growth, not less;
more and better technology, and not the impossible
and absurd attempt to scrap technology and return
to the primitive tribe. Improved technology and
greater capital investment will lead to higher living
standards for all and provide greater material
comforts, as well as the leisure to pursue and enjoy
the 'spiritual' side of life. There is precious little
culture or civilization available for people who
must work long hours to eke out a subsistence
living....What we need is for government to get out
of the way, remove its incubus of taxation and
expenditures from the economy, and allow
productive and technical resources once again to
devote themselves fully to increasing the well
being of the mass of consumers .... (Rothbard, 1978b,
pp. 246-247).
But are there not limits to this economic growth? Economic resources
exist in a world of scarcity. If we place such emphasis on growth, will not
these resources "run out" because of wreckless and indulgent use of them? A

1 0. Of course, subsistence is a definite misnomer; it is unlikely the
environmental movement will ever be heavily populated by the lower
classes!
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popular point of humor among modern libertarians concerns the practically
infinite number of "doomsday" reports which reappear year after year which
warn of the world's diminishing resources. Each period seems to have its
own resource of concern. In the 1970's it was crude oil. Today a favorite is
timber (although oil seems to be returning to these discussions). Each of these
fears has at least one thing in common: They ignore the price mechanism in a
market economy. Prices, by sending the signals of the existing supplies and
demands for any given product, conserve the product and prevent rapid
depletion if the market is allowed to function.
For exc:tmple, let us assume that we own a tree farm. As owners of the
trees and not some other resource, we may first conclude that we view the
production of trees to be in our comparative advantage. Otherwise, we would
sell the property or use it for other more profitable activities. However, the
environmentalist might argue that this private tree industry allows the
owner to deplete important natural resources purely for the sake of profits.
But how do profits arise in a free economy except through the satisfaction of
the consumers who, evidently, in this particular case do not value as much as
the environmentalist the maintenance the present level of trees? l l If these
critics truly view the protection of our trees as crucial, they are free to "put

1 1 . These actions would be preferable to spending large amounts of
funds in rent-seeking and / or rent-avoiding through the "lobby-regulate"
network of politics. Environmentalists might be served investing in the
purchase of "set-aside" conservatories rather than focusing so many resources
upon government assistance. There is little doubt society would be better
served.
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their money where their mouths are", purchase the property from us, and
conserve the lands as a tree sanctuary.
Would we not go on a wild spree of cutting and selling the timber as
private owners? Not unless there is an incredible demand for the resource
and the prices for the product skyrocketed. If that occurred, one would
literally see the "asphalt jungles" being returned to nature, since huge profits
would follow from these transformations. More likely, though, we would
consider present and future income requirements and withhold part of our
resources, accordingly--as would other tree owners. Otherwise, the price of
trees would plummet because of the sudden influx of the goods on the
market.
Suppose, on the other hand, we actually believe some of the doomsday
reports and feel that there will be a substantial shortage of the resource. We
would withhold our product until the future. The price would increase, as
demand remained constant while supply diminished. We, in turn, would
garner greater profits and, at the same time, we would provide a "social" good
by withholding the timber until a period when it will be in greater demand.
Finally, as the owners of the land where the trees grow, it would be
rather irrational for us to cut the trees and flee the property. Instead, knowing
that unless we die we will require subsistence in the future, it is quite likely
that we would refurbish our resources by planting more trees.
But certain items cannot be replaced--at least not at our current levels
of technology. Still, for Rothbard, the same principles would apply equally for
non-reusable products such as oil. Conservation is best protected through an
undistorted price system which drives up prices in times of relative shortage
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of the good and creates incentives for more thorough conservation of the
good, a search for adequate less expensive (more plentiful) substitutes, and
the discovery of new technologies to respond to these existing demands.
Are there, however, in a market economy adequate incentives to
prevent the long-term depletion of resources? In other words, why would we
as owners desire to conserve resources across generations? Is there not instead
incentives for each generation to deplete as many resources as possible before
their deaths? This enticement for rapid consumption and short time
horizons is potentially a serious concern. However, what often gets lost in the
debate over resource depletion is whether any known alternatives to the
market economy would be any more successful in alleviating this problem.
As Rothbard argues, the public ownership of resources tends to guarantee that
the resources will be exhausted (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 250-251). Without
private ownership, the property is left to the "tragedy of the commons".
Collectization of property generates incentives for individuals to compete for
a set of resources without regard to the long term consequences of their
present usuage. One is required to consume the resource as quickly as possible
or surrender it permanently to other actors facing the same constraints. Take
for example the common "cut and run" practice which occurs with forests on
government-leased public lands. Without any future connection to the
property, the cutters are induced to strip the property of all valuable resources.
Leasing strips away the constraints or expectations of future returns from the
lands.
There are no convincing arguments which would provide for the
allocation and control of these resources which are more persuasive than
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those in support of a market price system. Moreover, if resource allocation
were left to the political process, it would be logical to presume that the
corporatists would have substantial advantages in the competition over these
rent-seeking activities. Of course, this conclusion is unacceptable to the
environmentalists who are convinced that they understand these issues
more clearly than the consumer. Again, nothing prevents these individuals-
if, in fact, they truly are representative of a substantial portion of the
population--from pooling their resources and purchasing the land to be set
aside from any form of development. Furthermore, when a resource reaches
a truly limited supply, it will be "conserved" by high prices. It is doubtful that
environmental experts have a better grasp of the supply of a given resource
than the billions of decisions that go into the composition of a given price.
Solving the concerns of cross-generational depletion of resources,
however, depends on extra-economic matters which, perhaps, neither private
nor public ownership may guarantee, such as cultivating family structures
which might lengthen human time horizons. If an argument might be made
for either system of allocation's ability to generate these kinds of sociological
needs, evidence would seem to be on the side of private enterprise in the
fostering of the family. The dynamics of human self-interest dictate that
under political constraints, individuals exhibit extremely short time
horizons. Present powerful political coalitions will not surrender the
advantages they have gained from the obvious lack of political clout retained
by future generations in the contemporary situation. This unwillingness to
give up these "entitlements" is well demonstrated in the hapless struggle
against government budget deficits. Therefore, the heightened scope of
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government activity in environmental issues only increases the rent-seeking
opportunities and acts to shorten human time horizons, which causes
resources to be exploited in increasingly rapid ways.1 2
On the other hand, public ownership of resources on some occasions
acts to prevent development rather than overuse resources (Rothbard, 1 978b,
p. 252 ). As Rothbard points out, the classic example of this "problem" is the
dormant state of the world's oceans. Instead of being subjected to the "cut and
run" philosophies of government leasing, the sea suffers from the State's
uniform application of rules in the opposite manner, as it is made almost
completely "off-limits" . Rather than establishing property rights for
homesteaded ocean areas, which would provide a stable development of
numerous aquacultural opportunities, these waters remain in their
"primitive, unproductive hunting and gathering s tage" (Rothbard, 1978b, p.
252) . Yet, modern technology provides exceptional opportunities to take
advantage of these forms of property. Unfortunately, political knowledge
oftens fails to keep abreast with technological advances.
While the privatization of property solves many of what are
considered today as serious environmental problems, there remains the
potentially more difficult problem of negative externalities.l3 What would
the libertarian system do to prevent the imposition of spillover costs upon

1 2. For a similar and equally pessimistic Public Choice argument, see
Barry (1986, pp. 1 94-195). For a discussion of the importance of time horizons
in public policy, examine Smith (1988).
1 3. For an excellent discussion of the problems of externalities, see
Dahlmann (1988, pp. 209-234).
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innocent third parties? The same solution applies to these costs in the
environmental arena as in all other areas of policy, namely, the continual
clarification of individual property rights. Rothbard, for instance, applies this
principle to the most difficult forms of externalities, water and air pollution.
By leaving the "ownership" of these resources in the hands of the
government, he argues, individuals have incentives to impose spillover costs
onto persons through these resources, e.g., dirty water. But if the rivers were
owned privately, then persons would noticeably suffer the costs of these
spillovers. If the resources are not owned, however, other private individuals
and government controllers of other goods have an additional incentive to
heighten pollution-causing activities. Public ownership, in other words,
encourages water pollution! The technology of industries evolve around the
notion that the industry is sanctioned by the State and is a legitimate polluter,
since it does not have to consider these costs

in

the operation of its business.

May we apply these same principles to the ownership of air, though?
According to Rothbard, there are no reasons not to adequately define property
rights with this good, also .
.... But in the case of air pollution we are dealing not
so much with private property in the air as with
protecting private property in one's lungs, fields,
and orchards. The vital fact about air pollution is
that the polluter sends unwanted and unbidden
pollutants-from smoke to nuclear fallout to sulfer
oxides-through the air and into the lungs of
innocent victims, as well as onto their material
property. All such emanations which injure person
or property constitute aggression against the private
property of the victims. Air pollution, after all, is as
much aggression as committing arson against
another's property or injuring him physically. Air
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pollution that injures others is aggression pure and
simple.... (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 256).
Pollution controls, then, would follow the same principles of liability
which any other spillover problem would face. Though Rothbard rejects the
ad coelum rule that property owners

possess airspace indefinitely above

them, he accepts the view that persons own "zones" dependent on the
definitions of the owner's homesteading activities. Hence, ownership would
be defined by historical understanding of the owner's level of use of the
property (Rothbard, 1982b, pp. 84-91). If aggression occurs there would be
liability. Of course, the plaintiff must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
has suffered actual harm, that the pollutants caused the harm, and that the
other party was directly responsible for the production of the pollutants. 14
Injuries from environmental hazards would be handled just as any
other impairments. Persons who believe they have been injured by, say, an
industrial pollutant would be free to bring a suit against the alleged aggressor.
If the court finds the industrialist guilty, then he is liable in proportion to the
crime. This would not open the courts to infinite numbers of frivolous cases,
since the burden of proof would still rest with the accuser, and the loser may
be liable to pay the court costs. However, if, by clarifying property rights, these
costs were n o longer allowed to be passed on to third parties indiscriminately,
the number of cases which exist under the present failed regulatory model

14. Rothbard (1978b, pp. 74-76) rejects the often applied principle of
"vicarious liability" which originated in medieval law and is occasionally
applied to contemporary employer-employee relationships, so as to hold a
third party employer liable for torts commited by an employee.
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would diminish immensely. This point is particularly true if common law
class action suits are allowed.
These principles may be applied to any externality. There seems to be
no reason to conclude that a court, operating on a case by case basis with the
proper rules of property, would be unable to determine criminal activity. If
public ownership exists this clarification is less than ideal, though. Rothbard's
proposals concerning environmental issues appear to have the greatest
potential for correcting current policy problems. By choosing a "middle
ground" between a position which contends that economic growth
supersedes all concerns of the environment or that environmental concerns
are not real on the one hand and the misguided and exaggerated arguments
of "no-growth" and ecological hysteria on the other hand, libertarianism
offers a viable and ethically sound theory of environmentalism which seems
best able to balance the concerns of the environmental debate.
Yet, there are many remaining concerns that are not so easily solved by
the Rothbardian property rights framework. 15 One such problem which has
received little attention in libertarian theory concerns the issue of humans'
relationships to the animal kingdom. Rothbard is extremely brusque with
animal rights. Unlike humans, he concludes, animals do not have the ability
to reason and consequently do not have natural rights. Animals should have
rights "whenever they petition for them;" that they obviously cannot file
such a petition demonstrates to him that they do not possess rights

15. For an excellent trilogy of articles on the concerns of libertarians
regarding environmental and animal rights issues, see Hospers (1988, pp. 2331); (1989b, pp. 46-49); and (1990, pp. 26-36).
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(Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 155-1 56) . Yet, this radically anthropocentric ethical
perspective seems arbitrary. First, it is unclear how these conclusions so
obviously follow from his political philosophy.

As

we argued in Chapter IV, a

political theory may outline relations between rights-bearers; more discussion
is required to determine who shall be these rights-bearers. Secondly, it is also
unclear how a system founded on a teleological notion of natural rights may
so abruptly dismiss the possibility of an evolving and expanding community
of morally sanctioned entities.
Furthermore, there exists several potentially huge problems at the
international ecological level such as the "greenhouse effect" which, if real,
pose a dilemma for Rothbard's individualist model. His responses to these
issues--that animals have been going extinct since the beginning of time and
that scientists cannot agree what ecological catastrophe is going to actually
occur--are less than satisfactory arguments, to say the least (Rothbard, 1 989a,
pp. 13-14) . Faith in the market process may at some point become a blinding
force which obscures serious short run problems from the theorist which
might make the long run obsolete. While market arrangements and property
rights clarification may be able to solve these serious problems, one may not
presume that these concerns will magically disappear or that they do not
exist.

Transportation in Anarcho-Capitalism

If privatization of the oceans and rivers is achievable in Rothbard's
anarcho-capitalist system, then surely private ownership of the highways and
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thoroughfares is also possible. These businesses might range from a merchant
association's ownership of the city streets around their shops to the corporate
ownership of super-highways. There is a distinct possibility that police
protection and street ownership might well be combined in urban areas. In
some cases, street ownership might be a separate business in itself, similar to
a corner grocery store. The street owners might charge the involved store
owners and I or their customers for the benefits of the street. They would be
required as any industry to maintain their product or face the loss of
customers.
Rothbard argues that the rules of the roads would be established by the
owners. Would this privatization not create chaotic circumstances in which
each new street (with different ownership) would have its own set of rules
and, hence, make travel hectic or even impossible? Rothbard considers such a
concern as "absurd" .
.... Obviously, it would be to the interest of all road
owners to have uniform rules in these matters, so
that road traffic could mesh smoothly and without
difficulty. Any maverick road owner who insisted
on a left-hand drive or green for 'stop' instead of
'go' would soon find himself with numerous
accidents, and the disappearance of customers and
users .... (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 207-208).
Therefore, the realities of the market would demand the consolidation and
cooperation of the diverse owners of the properties. There is no reason to
believe that these characteristics would be any more difficult to achieve than
with any other market activity that requires a common set of rules and
similar language. The notion that these rules would not exist comes from the
limitations that arise currently from the non-existence of a developed set of
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real world examples. When one examines numerous other products which
are provided by the free market, he does not find the high degrees of chaos.
For instance, there is an "order" in the manner shoes receive their sizes,
despite the fact that no one actually planned this conformity across industries.
And, there are particular examples of roads or comparable items which are
privately maintained (ferries, for instance) that have relatively no significant
problems. If one were to speculate what would occur if the world of
transportation went private, it would be more likely that there would not be
widespread chaos in regard to the nature and enforcement of traffic rules.
A more challenging criticism of private roads concerns the potential
inefficiencies of toll collection. It might be argued that the present ownership
of the roads by the State relieves the users of the troublesome problem of the
toll road. However, Rothbard argues, a toll would not likely be the means of
collection except in a very limited number of cases. In the congestion of urban
traffic, for instance, licenses or stickers may be required. Or, there is the
possibility in the near future of the technology of electronic equipment which
would not only register one's travel on specific streets and roads, but also
could record the time of the road's usuage, allowing the owners to price
discriminate to stabilize periods of congestion. In fact, perhaps the most
promising aspect of highway privatization concerns a private owner's ability
to distinguish rush hours from slow times in road usuage. Present means of
financing highway use do not rationally allocate the use of roads. A gas tax is
collected based on the number of miles one travels and his vehicle's fuel
efficiency, with no knowledge of when the travel occurs. Roads become
congested, then, because the costs of travel at peak times are held far below
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true market rates. If road owners were allowed to price-discriminate based on
the periods of highest congestion, then traffic would flow more smoothly and
safely on probably less highway. 1 6 One might witness an increase in
commuter pools or even the change of the normal business workday if the
true costs of the present structure were uncovered.
There is one additional issue concerning privatized roads which
Rothbard does not address. Under the present system the government enjoys
the "benefit" of eminent domain, which allows the taking of property for
"public" use. Of course, in Rothbard's system of ethics, this activity is
immoral. Yet, how would private road-builders handle the single property
owner who is unwilling to sell his land which rests in the center of a
proposed highway construction? Suppose Person A decides to build this
super highway across the country. He is able to purchase all the property
except Farmer B's large farm which substantially blocks the building of the
road. From a utilitarian perspective, eminent domain would likely be
justified; one may not allow one person to defeat the demands of so many
people. However, under Rothbard's ethics, one either meets the farmer's
demand or, if that option is unavailable, he builds around the farm. Are not
the consequences of this stalemate highly "inefficient"?
The problem in this scenario is more than likely overrated. Such a
highway would surely generate substantial increases in the value of the land
the farmer retains. In fact, if one is concerned with the economic potential of

16. A similar type of program might be applied to the airline industry.
Through price-discrimination private airports could eliminate congestion
and improve airline safety. See Rothbard (1987b, p. 1).
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one's property, he would quite rationally beg the highway-builders to
construct through the farm. One might even pay the road builder for the
rights to be included in the route. But let us assume the farmer places a
greater value on privacy. If he would not sell, the costs to go around him are
minimal in most cases, especially if the purchase and planning of the
highway properties precede any actual development. Finally, why would it be
so detrimental for the whole project to fall through? Why would a trans
continental highway necessarily be preferred to a network of shorter roads?
One may easily imagine a system of private roads servicing parcels of
landed property or businesses, providing each person with adequate
easements to prevent property blockade. Part of the world would proceed as it
always has, only minus the failures of a congested and rather dangerous
public highway system. It is quite likely market accountability would be
preferable to government control. The reform however, might drastically
change the modes of transportation, since persons would be required to pay
for the total cost of their "product". 1 7

1 7. See Rothbard (1978b, pp. 212-21 3). For example, if the "subsidies"
were removed, one might even witness a revitalization of more "collective"
forms of transportation, e.g., buses, trains, etc. Of course, these industries
would also be required to surrender their current government assistance.
There is one additional criticism which is occasionally brought against
private highways. Initially, part of the rationale behind the interstate system
concerned national defense matters. What would happen to defense
capabilities without an integrated transportation system? Rothbard is
apparently silent on this question, although based on similar issues, we may
assume this lack of government networks would not be a serious concern.
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Conclusion: Anarcho-Capitalisrn in Perspective

Excluding the criticisms we have noted, Rothbard's anarcho-capitalist
system represents a consistent, ethical, and even a potentially workable social
model. Several important critiques do stand in the way of its ideal existence,
though. First; Rothbard's presentation of private national defense is less than
convincing. Security against groups of persons who do not share one's
common language or culture is probably the only good which approaches the
definition of a pure public good. Even it is not "pure", but the circumstances
surrounding the provision of the good do not allow any community the
luxury of developing the necessary private processes or institutions which
would overcome the initial dilemma of non-excludibility. Thus, the
provision of private defense faces a classic case of the prisoner's dilemma, in
which no single group has the incentive to end State coercion and privatize
defense unless all other "players" do the same. Since the potential for
unanimous consent occurring approaches zero, it would probably be more
fruitful for Rothbard and anarchist libertarians to focus on the limitations of
government coercion within a limited State which provides national
defense.
Secondly, while one may be able to conceive of an actual anarcho
capitalist system, Rothbard never is able to inescapably unite libertarian ethics
and the Stateless society. There are no assurances that libertarian ethics would
be retained in anarchy, although the legitimacy of the anarchist society
requires their maintanence. Whereas there are reasons to believe that
libertarian rights would have a better opportunity for survival in a common
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law system which is devoid of the strong monopolistic forces of a State and
the "social" components of the legislative process, there still remains the
possibility of a reemergence of the State (in form and/or in name) through
the denial of libertarian ethics by the more powerful forces in the
community.
Thirdly, Rothbard never addresses the transitional consequences
imposed upon persons if the system actually transformed into anarcho
capitalism. He would support an immediate transformation from existing
statism if given the alternative. But these radical reforms generate results
which are themselves a separate ethical concern. How does one sort out the
incredible costs to individuals in the dismantling of State programs and
processes and the consequent reformation of plans (Barry, 1 986, pp. 189-190)?
From Rothbard 's absolutist position this problem would surely be
outweighed by the primacy of libertarian ethics. Nevertheless, it might be
convincingly argued from an overtly conservative stance that these reforms
would be too "expensive".
Finally, there is a very practical concern which remains: The radical
nature of Rothbard's libertarianism far removes his theories from the
mainstream of both policy debate and philosophical discussions. As he
recognizes, the overcoming of these differences in perspectives poses perhaps
the greatest hurdle in the achievement of the libertarian society.
People tend to fall into h abits and into
unquestioned ruts, especially in the field of
government. On the market, in society in general,
we expect and accomod fte rapidly to change, to the
unending marvels and improvements of our
civilizations . . . . But in the area of government we
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follow blindly in the path of centuries, content to
believe that whatever has been must be right. In
particular, government, in the United States and
elsewhere, for centuries and seemingly from time
immemorial has been supplying us with certain
essential and necessary services, services which
nearly everyone concedes are important . . . . So
identified has the State become in the public mind
with the provision of these services that an attack
on State financing appears to many people as an
attack on the service itself.. .. (Rothbard, 1978b, p.
194).
Furthermore, a libertarian, immersed in the tradition of free markets and the
spontaneous order, faces an additional problem when trying to convince the
heavily "constructivist" and rationalistic modern individual to make this
potential "leap of faith". The libertarian cannot outline the "nuts and bolts"
of each and every privately provided service .
.... The point is that the advocate of a free market in
anything cannot provide a 'constructive' blueprint
of such a market in advance. The essence and the
glory of the free market is that individual firms and
businesses, competing on the market, provide an
ever-changing orchestration of efficient and
p rogressive goods and services: continually
improving products and markets, advancing
technology, cutting costs, and meeting changing
consumer demand as swiftly and efficiently as
possible. The libertarian economist can try to offer a
few guidelines on how markets might develop
where they are now prevented or restricted from
developing .... (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 195).
The failure to provide exact formulas, frameworks, or facts seriously
threatens reform and, hence, fails to convince the twentieth century human's
constructivis� mentality. The modern citizen demands a "plan"--the kind of
details provided by the socialist modeL But the evidence seems to challenge a
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polity's ability to control or manipulate these complex policy issues. Rothbard
(and libertarians in general) face a perplexing dilemma: The sorts of policy
positions he supports by their nature leave many individuals unimpressed or
unconvinced because of their lack of detail and/ or control. Unfortunately,
simplicity is . seldom a virtue in structuring a complex society. Thus, we
continue to face failed policies.
As Rothbard clearly understands, the success of the libertarian
movement ultimately rests on its ability to educate and persuade persons of
its validity and value. For that reason, he focuses substantial attention on the
more practical concerns of strategy. In Chapter VI, we examine these
perspectives.
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CHAPTER VI
STRATEGIES FOR ATTAINING THE LIBERTARIAN SOCIETY

It is obvious that the kind of society which Rothbard argues is ethically
imperative is vastly dissimilar to the present world. These differences require
him to provide guidelines for a system of political ethics and also to produce
a theory of strategy for the accomplishment of these principles.
Libertarianism is "a philosophy seeking a policy" (Rothbard, 1982a, p.
253) . The non-aggression axiom is applied to any given situation to judge the
morals of that particular circumstance. This employment of a universal rule
is especially pertinent to Rothbard's non-consequentialist version of
libertarian principles. By grounding ethics in natural law, he formulates a
theory which provides "an iron benchmark with which to judge . . . any
existing brand of statism" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 253). As we noted in Chapter
IV, Rothbard's anarcho-capitalist theories are radical in nature and demand
massive changes from the status quo. In fact, the factor that poses the most
serious challenge to the success of libertarianism is probably the huge gulf
between its ideal society and the current world. If his system of thought is
both a feasible alternative and preferable to the existing political realities,
then the only remaining problem is the practical concern of achieving these
outcomes.
This issue is a critical problem in the contemporary libertarian
movement. As Rothbard notes, tongue in cheek, at times it has been apparent
that liberty is not always the "highest political end" for a number of the
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movement's proponents; some advocates find "the desire for self-expression,
or the bearing witness to the truth of the excellence of liberty" as the more
important political principle (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 254). There is within the
movement a definite propensity toward intellectual scholasticism at the
expense of the potentially more difficult tasks of political activism and
reform.
What must this libertarian strategy entail? Rothbard argues that it first
must be thoroughly grounded in a sense of justice that is essentially
unbending i n all situations.
.... Hence, to be grounded and pursued adequately,
the libertarian goal must be sought in the spirit of
an overriding devotion to justice. But to possess
such devotion on what may well be a long and
rocky road, the libertarian must be possessed of a
passion for justice, an emotion derived from and
channelled by his rational insight into what natural
justice requires. Justice, not the weak reed of mere
utility, must be the motivating force if liberty is to
be attained (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 254).
These principles of action are not without controversy. An ongoing
and often heated struggle among libertarian strategists concerns one's
approach to seeking reform. Some tacticians within the movement argue in
support of a more practical strategy which may "bend" to the current political
realities and is more open to short-term compromise in the hope of
achieving more substantial long-run objectives. Advocates of this position
are openly more political, attempting to "live in the world" they seek to
change. Political success requires one to be a viable alternative in the process
of debate and reform. To affect policy requires both a technically workable
solution and the ability to get on the "agenda". To focus upon notions such as
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the privatization of national defense, for example, leaves one open to serious
accusations of being utopian. As a consequence, there is the distinct possibility
that all the libertarian's perspectives may be dismissed or ignored. In other
words, the pragmatic libertarian strategy "comes down" to the less than
perfect real worl d and, by maintaining realistic goal s in a give-and-take
environment, directs the world toward more libertarian-oriented solutions.
Not only does this pragmatism allow libertarian alternatives into the policy
dialogue, it also forces the movement to recognize the complexity of the
social order. While liberty may well be the greatest good in the long term, its
achievement requires a framework in which persons accept and respect it.
One simply cannot radically transform society, a la the French Revolution,
and expect to. be able to maintain a stable system. Change of any kind mus t be
gradual, for there

are too many established institutional

norms and

expectations among individuals to allow immediate and drastic reform.l
Rothbard rejects these pragmatic perspectives to the degree that they
are not consistently and unidirectionally aimed at the fulfillment of absolute
ethics. If liberty is the highes t good, then the strategy must be to achieve it by
" the most efficacious means" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 254) .

One must be "an

abolitionist" who would, if able, "abolish instantaneously all invasions of
liberty" (Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 254). To deny this perspective, he concludes, is to
give some other political ideal priority and, thus, to ultimately defeat the
strategy. For example, the fear of upsetting present social institutional

1 . Hospers ( 1 989a, pp. 29-36) draws a similar dichotomy within the
movement between "open" and " closed" libertarianism.
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connections demonstrates that one may value order, rather than liberty, as
the highest political good.
The demand for such extreme results, according to Rothbard, is not
utopian. To consider the absolute support of the libertarian model as utopian
is to misuse the concept.
While it is vital for the libertarian to hold his
ultimate and 'extreme' idea aloft, this does
not...make him a 'utopian'. The true utopian is one
who advocates a system that is contrary to the
natural law of human beings and of the real world.
A utopian system is one that could not work even if
everyone were persuaded to try to put it into
practice....
In short, the term 'utopian' in popular
parlance confuses two kinds of obstacles in the path
of a program radically different from the status quo.
One is that it violates the nature of man and of the
world and therefore could not work once it was put
into practice. This i s the utopianism of
communism. The second is the difficulty in
convincing enough people that the program should
be adopted. The former is a bad theory because it
violates the nature of man; the latter is simply a
problem of human will, of convincing enough
people of the rightness of the doctrine .... (Rothbard,
1 978b, p. 303).
Of course, the immediate support of complete abolition will not likely
produce these results in the real political world. But the problem with
gradualism, in Rothbard's view, is that it undercuts principled action prior to
the political confrontation it will surely face in the social arena. It is the
libertarian's function in the compromising state of real politics to "keep
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upping the ante" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 301). 2 If one enters the political debate
with a less than absolutist attitude, he is destined to fall short of his goals.
Moreover, Rothbard's libertarianism is founded on a procedural
notion of justice, i.e., it rejects the common view of consequentialism that
"ends may justify means". Unfortunately, the "means" applied in each of the
gradualist's compromises are ends in themselves--further aggressions against
specific members of the community--that surrender additional portions of
the only legitimate position (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 2.1:)6). For example, there are
many utilitarian-libertarians who, in effect, argue that the provision of
individual liberty maximizes total individual satisfaction. But "social"
welfare and not liberty become the highest goal in this perspective. As a
advocate of an "end-state" notion of justice, there is really no reason why a
utilitarian might not be quite willing to accept rather brutal "compromises"
upon some persons so as to achieve higher satisfaction in the long-run for
other individuals who, of course, are not the ones suffering the sacrifice. For
Rothbard, these principles necessarily contradict the theory of liberty. His
position does not demand "all or nothing" immediately. It merely requires
that the tactics for achieving a libertarian society do not contradict themselves

2 . One might argue this strategy was used quite successfully by
American socialists in the twentieth century. While socialism has never
appeared attractive to the American ethos, it has over time chipped away at
the country's value structure. For example, one may compare The Socialist
Party of America's early twentieth century platforms to the policy agenda
today. There are practically no parts of the document that are not commonly
accepted policy in the contemporary setting. This circumstance lends
creedence to the view that more often than not one may expect an especially
gradual transformation of a successful ideological movement.
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by either setting some other principle above liberty for certain purposes or by
taking actions that redirect even for apparently temporary parcels of time the
achievement of these ultimate principles. In other words, transitional steps
are welcomed and, obviously, if any success occurs, expected. But an
unqualified strategy that results in transitionalism and a predetermined tactic
of moral give-and-take are quite different, ethically speaking.
In the process of reform it is difficult to imagine libertarian principles
not becoming intermingled with the State. It is virtually impossible to
separate the effects of the government from any "private" act. Furthermore,
social reform itself has increasingly fallen within the domain of State activity.
If the State is, as Rothbard concludes, the "permanent enemy of mankind"
(Rothbard, 1 982a, p. 257), then libertarian strategists face an apparently
unsolvable paradox: How can one bring about political change without the
use of political action? This dilemma seriously threatens libertarian political
aspirations (or, if one prefers, it has kept the levels of libertarian coercion to
minute levels). Is not the Libertarian Political Party, for instance, at root an
ethical oxymoron? If the use of politics is tantamount to aggression in
Rothbard's ethics, in what direction may the movement turn to achieve its
goals?
Consider a recent argument of libertarian George Smith which
demonstrates the kinds of tensions that emerge when an absolutist systems of
ethics meets the impure world. He challenges the "disturbing trend" of
libertarian i ntellectuals entering careers in State-funded universities and
colleges. These "welfare intellectuals", he concludes, are selling out to statist
interests (Smith, 1990, p. 37). This view held by some libertarians denies any
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bending from the straight and narrow path. However, it would seem that in
the real world the path is wide and full of crooks (no pun intended); if
libertarians are going to have any real policy success, this attitude must
subside.
Can Rothbard's principle of unidirectionalness avoid this dilemma?
Perhaps. If the party were to gain political power and use it only to reduce
their function of power on every occasion, then there would appear to be no
necessary contradiction. But with each reduction of their own control comes a
decreasing ability to achieve the next reduction. Such efforts face the dilemma
of diminishing abilities to achieve these ends. The simple abdication of
control does not solve the libertarian agenda. Even an anti-government
policy plan requires positive actions by the State to cultivate and enforce these
changes. Freedom is not attained merely by the creation of a political
vacuum.
Moreover, to expect any political leadership to relinquish power goes
against historical realities and practically all the wisdom of libertarianism's
own principles! Are there not, for example, the uncontrollable temptations of
power once control of the State is attained? Why are we to assume that
h umans with libertarian proclivities are different from any other
individuals? This perspective comes perilously close to making the same
unfounded class distinctions that Marxists made years ago. As Rothbard and
many others, including the nation's founders, have eloquently demonstrated
time and time again, humans (of which libertarians are a subset) are not
angels, and if they are given the monopoly powers that accompany political
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control, they will likely use them for the satisfaction of their own interests
and not the maintenance of any moral imperative.
To be true to his principles, the libertarian must deny the existing
world--at least the part called politics. Does this leave him with any tactics
that might be successful? There is at least one possibility, and Rothbard gives
it high priority. He concludes that ideas ultimately rule the world. For this
reason, libertarianism's success hinges on the development, dissemination,
and persuasion of these ideas . These activities require a libertarian
"movement"--an "active group of dedicated libertarians" willing to spread
the gospel (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 259).
Education, then, is obviously the most important component.
Rothbard argues for a two-front assault. First, there must be "hard thinking
and scholarship" among the more intellectual members of the movement to
develop, refine, and reinforce the theory of libertarianism. But, secondly,
there must also be activism to allow the dissemination of these ideas in ways
that may be appreciated by the population-at-large. This interaction is crucial
both to spread the word to the "unwashed" and to provide for the inner
health of the movement itself. As Rothbard readily understands from years
of scholarly seclusion, one of the most difficult parts of emerging alternative
movements is that, at least in the beginning, it is "a lonely creed" subject to
the pitfalls of intellectual isolationism (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 299).
While it may seem self-evident that any successful political movement
requires an influential cadre of leaders, the more pressing and unique
concern for the libertarian movement relates to the general nature of
movement politics. If one lives by the ethical proposition that non-
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intervention or pnvacy

m

person and place is the highest ideal, it is

extremely difficult to be convinced to cooperate in collective activities.
Whereas collectivist-thinking persons might be much more inclined to
participate in group action, the libertarian culture tends to look upon such
activity with suspicion or even disdain. Part of this problem apparently
results from an important difference among certain groups within the
libertarian circles as to how they view the notion of "individualism". For
some (particularly the followers of the philosopher Ayn Rand) individualism
•

represents a philosophical form of egoism and subsequently contains definite
threads of atomism. These individuals in particular are not likely to be
joiners. To differing degrees, these same attitudes permeate the greater bulk
of the libertarian political culture.
Yet, there is nothing in the body of mainstream libertarian thought
that denies the importance of cultivating community or acting collectively, as
long as these actions are voluntary. Humans are social animals. In fact, one
might argue that the reason liberty is the highest ideal is due to the fact that
only in a free society may humans discover the communities or "utopias", to
borrow Nozick's terminology, which provide for their individual happiness.
Still, the paradox remains for Rothbard's libertarianism. If we assume
that these concerns may be overcome, how does he envision the activities of
these intellectual cadres? The fundamental goal would be to work to "raise
people's consciousness" toward a higher acceptance of the principles of
liberty.
. . . . [W]e might conceive of the adoption of
libertarianism as a ladder or pyramid, with various
individuals and groups on different rungs of the
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ladder, ranging upward from total collectivism or
statism to pure liberty. If the libertarian cannot
'raise people's consciousness' fully to the top rung
of pure liberty, then he can achieve the lesser but
still important goal of helping them advance up a
few rungs up the ladder (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 260).
In this consciousness-raising, Rothbard provides a role for some
pragmatic coalition-building with alternative ideological perspectives. On
issues concerning freedom of markets and property rights, he suggests the
potential of "united front activities" with sympathetic conservatives.
Similarly, the same possibilities exist to ally with modern liberals on rights of
expression and other "personal" rights. These alliances, he concludes, serve
two distinctive functions:
By engaging in such united fronts on ad hoc issues,
the libertarian can accomplish a two-fold purpose:
(a) greatly multiplying his own leverage or
influence in working toward a specific libertarian
goal--since many non-libertarians are mobilized to
cooperate in such actions; and (b) to 'raise the
consciousness' of his coalition colleagues, to show
them that libertarianism is a single interconnected
system, and that the full pursuit of their particular
goal requires the adoption of the entire libertarian
schema. Thus, the libertarian can point out to the
conservative that property rights or the free market
can only be maximized and truly safeguarded if
civil liberties are defended or restored; and he can
show the opposite to the civil libertarian.
Hopefully, this demonstration will raise some of
these ad hoc allies s ignificantly up the libertarian
ladder (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 260).
Both of these functions have critical importance in the advancement
of the libertarian movement. First, there are substantial gains presently being
made by libertarianism because of its rather unique position between liberals
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and conservatives on many policy issues today. While self-identifying
libertarians are extremely outnumbered by both liberals and conservatives
(Maddox and Lilie, 1 984), they have infiltrated the policy arenas to the degree
that they can have substantial (although, perhaps, indirect) influence within
both political institutions and interest group movements. In the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, for example, there is evidence of how this
dynamic unfolds: As liberal and conservative judges continue to split over
issues as they have done historically, a small number of libertarian-leaning
justices often become critical "swing votes" . For example, while liberal and
conservative commentators angonize over how the same Court could hand
down anti-Affirmative Action decisions and uphold rights to burn the
American flag, libertarians hail both as well-reasoned decisions. 3 The same
apparent inconsistency involving public support of the right to abortion and
public opposition to tax increases is also explained by the existence of a
significant libertarian culture. While liberalism and conservatism are
established and are generally defined and understood in the political process,
libertarianism faces the identity crisis which always accompanies new
political movements. However, because of its unique policy prescriptions of
"fiscal conservativism" and "social liberalism", libertarian theory has the
distinctive advantage of being able to infiltrate the ideological status quo.
The second purpose of this infiltrating strategy is even more
significant. Libertarianism's ultimate success may rest upon its ability to

3. As of yet, it is unclear how the appointment of David Souter will

affect this dynamic. Likely, we may expect either a more conservative and
restrained Court or a more libertarian activism.
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demonstrate the super-ethical n ature of its theory. In other words,
libertarianism's political ethic does not rest on the same ideological plane as
simple conservatism, liberalism, socialism, etc. These ideologies postulate a
universal ethic of the good society too narrowly and then require all persons,
by force if necessary, to live by these principles. Libertarianism, on the other
hand, is distinctive in that it imposes no limiting set of political guidelines
upon individuals beyond the idea that every person is free to choose his own
"good society" and obligated to allow the same freedom for others. Or, as
Robert Nozick argues, persons are left to find their own utopias (Nozick,
1974). Libertarian theory seeks to escape the confines of an overly limited
notion of political philosophy . By highlighting a philosophy of human
individual rights and a toleration for divergent views of the good society, this
perspective expresses a set of ethics which may be superimposed over
common ideologies and ways of life.
It would seem apparent that a political ethic which seeks to expand
individual control /choice over one's decisions as a general rule would be
well-received. Despite these advantages, libertarianism has not been able to
mobilize the kind of consensus it potentially could amass. On one hand, one
might argue that these ideas are extremely "elitist"-·-a criticism that seems to
deserve some creedence if one merely investigates the common demographic
features of libertarians. On the other hand, there are persons in the present
"illegitimate" system who would not accept change and view libertarian
theory as a radical threat to the status quo. Due to this problem, Rothbard
argues that there are particular groups more assessible to education efforts
(Rothbard, 1 978b, p. 308). Convincing defense contractors, politicians, and

257

bureaucrats of the evils of statism, for instance, is unlikely. Instead, one ought
to focus on attempting to "convert the mass of the people who are victimized
by State power, not those who are gaining by it" (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 308). But
to succeed in these arenas, the movement must be able to overcome the
elitist stigma. Being "elite radicals" obviously creates some rather peculiar
problems.
Where, then, may the libertarian movement turn for support? Will
not the achievement of political success necessitate the forging together of
coalitions

of

the

exis ting

power

structure?

Again,

Rothbard's

uncompromisingly radical nature leaves him in a dire dilemma: How may
an ethical system based on overt anti-statism be successful in a world where
the State and the interests it represents are by definition the dominant force?
What prevents the State from using numerous means, including cooptation,
censorship, or even outright violence to suppress ideas that are increasing in
popularity and that are threatening the foundations of its power base? By
being ethically confined from playing the political game, Rothbard's
libertarianism leaves him with very few or no alternatives for achieving his
objectives, since he is morally confined from using political instruments to
realize reform. While he recognizes this dilemma, he is rather ambiguous as
to how it may be overcome. The unfortunate fact is that, as the monopoly
force in a given society, the government and the forces it represents retain
huge advantages over any set of upstart ideas.
How may Rothbard expect ethics to transcend interests among those
very potent individuals or groups whose demands are being exceedingly
well-served in the existing interest-founded polity? He argues that "other
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means than education, means of pressure, will have to be used," including
voting, the use of other non-public institutions, and massive boycotts.
Unfortunately, it would seem each of these actions face serious problems.
First, is not voting illegimate in the libertarian society--an act of political
criminality? And given the environment, is voting any more than a myth
perpetuating mechanism? Secondly, if non-public institutions could actually
attain significant power, it is quite likely that the government would employ
either collusion, cooptation, or premature destruction to prevent these
alternatives from ever arising. Thirdly, boycotts are not likely to be any more
successful than the other alternatives, since the victims of continual "theft"
are not prepared to compete with the beneficiaries of plunder. Therefore, it is
extremely difficult to envision any sort of fair struggle between the power
impotent and Rothbard's "Corporate Welfare-Warfare State" (Rothbard,
1978b, pp. 308-309).
In developing tactics, Rothbard borrows a number of ideas from the
historically successful Marxist theories of political strategy. One example of
this similarity concerns the theory of ideological deviation from the "correct"
path. Movements may deviate from the ideal goals either by what Marxists
term "right opportunism" or "left sectarianism" (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 260-261 ;
1978b, pp. 299-300) . Rothbard argues that libertarianism faces dilemmas
similar (though over very different issues) to those that challenged Marxist
strategy. Right opportunism threatens the libertarian movement by allowing
it to "immerse itself in minor and short-run gains, sometimes in actual
contradiction to the ultimate goal itself" (Rothbard, 1982a, p. 261 ). Conversely,
left sectarianism leans to the other extreme, always prepared to purge the

259

movement of any individual who supports anything but the immediate and
complete transformation of the world to libertarian ideas. Furthermore, there
is a tendency for some persons in these kinds of movements to leap from one
end of the continuum to the other edge. Thus, in a rather strange way, the
two extremes may in reality "feed on and reinforce each other" (Rothbard,
1 982a, p. 261). Once this phenomenon begins, it is likely that the movement
will

tum

on itself and disintegrate into petty internal squabbling.

There is some evidence of this sort of struggle occurring within a part
of the libertarian movement. During the last four Presidential elections, for
example, the Libertarian Party has ridden a tactical "roller-coaster", rotating
between pragmatism and ideological purity in alternate elections from 1976 to
1988. While the Party is by no means the bulk of the libertarian movement, it
seems fair to conclude that it represents a fairly reliable subset of
libertarianism. If this behavior can lead us to make predictions about the
candidate and strategy for 1 992, we may expect an ideological purge after the
more pragmatic candidacy of Ron Paul in the 1 988 election. 4
Rothbard also accepts the Marxist notion that a radical program's
success requires both "objective" and "subjective" pre-conditions (Rothbard,
1 982a, pp. 261-262). In other words, the success of a movement depends upon
the self-conscious support of its principles as well as the existence of crises
that severely fault the existing system and often weaken the support of the

4. Despite the political squabbling, the body of libertarian sholarship
continues to grow--perhaps far out of balance in relation to the successes of
libertarian political activism. Unfortunately, the popular press tends to focus
upon the Party activities.
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ruling groups. The radical cadre must be in place to exploit the crisis when it
occurs, filling the intellectual vacuum that results from the loss of faith in
the status quo. Those systems of thought that have a history of predicting the
actual problems which eventually occur obviously have the advantage in
filling the arising void.
Like the Marxists, Rothbard is optimistic that such a crisis must occur
in contemporary society, due to the system's inherent inner contradictions.
Obviously, these contradictions are not the same for Rothbard as for the
Marxists. Rather than the market order disappearing, it is discovered in the
libertarian ideal world. But like Marxism, libertarianism is a "highly
optimistic creed" because of the perceived inevitability of the failure of
statism.
. . . [F]ortunately for the cause of liberty, economic
science has shown that a modern economy ca nnot
s urvive i ndefinitely under s uch draconian
conditions [ as despotism, stagn ation, and
totalitarianism] . A modern industrial economy
requires a vast network of free-market exchanges
and a division of labor, a network that can only
flourish under freedom. Given the commitment of
the mass of men to an industrial economy and the
modern standard of living that requires such
industry, then the triumph of a free-market and an
end to statism becomes inevitable in the long run
(Rothbard, 1982a, p. 263).
Libertarianism, then, will "win" because only it is compatiable with the
nature of humans and the realities of nature. According to Rothbard, history
made a "great leap, a sea-change" with the Industrial Revolution that cannot
be undone without causing massive death (Rothbard, 1982a, pp. 314-315). He
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comes exceedingly close to guaranteeing, at least in the long run, the
inevitability of libertarian society.
Yet, these contentions seem built more upon faith than either logic or
historical evidence. Outside a relatively small temporal span of world history,
humans have existed primitively and often in virtual slavery. As we noted
in the preceding chapter, it is difficult to imagine how the triumph of liberty
is inescapable. There is little reason to believe that the world is indeed
commited to the modern market economy and the standard of living that
free trade (of all contemporary known alternatives) allows. S Furthermore,
there is no guarantee that even if humankind is commited to these living
standards it will be able to intelligently link prosperity to certain economic
and political ideas.
Still, there are many reasons to at least be hopeful if one, like Rothbard,
supports the principles of libertarianism. Much of the socialist world is facing
the inner contradictions of central planning, for example. After having
drifted toward state capitalism and the Welfare State for decades, much of the
"free" world also faces the tough problems of no longer being able to provide
programs without serious political and /or economic repercussions. As a
result, we are witnessing world-wide privatization and deregulatory
movements. Perhaps the natural fact that one cannot live beyond one's
means indefinitely has come to be realized in the contemporary world.
Rothbard's contention that economic laws ultimately demand the

5. For example, there is very little reason to anticipate that substantial
portions of the current ecological movement will ever endorse libertarian
policy prescriptions.
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recognition of the role of markets and subsequently facilitate the advent of
libertarian principles seem especially persuasive.
Yet, on other fronts, the world seems to be heading in the opposite
direction. The United States is a particularly good example of these trends.
Today, we face the real potential for a new age of neo-prohibitionism aimed
at eradicating many of the "vices" that diverse religious, medical, racial,
ethnic, gender, and other assorted ideological groups find offensive. As a
consequence, large numbers of activities are defined as negative externalities;
hence, toleration for these actions evaporates.

Rather than becoming less

politicized, society becomes a pit of open public conflict where all decisions
fall within the jurisdiction of the State.
Therefore, it is quite possible that we are we only witnessing the
changing of the "ideological guard". What we define in the modern
American context as conservativism may merely be replacing contemporary
liberalism. This political realignment brings with it minor changes when
examined from a libertarian perspective. While State-sponsored aggression
may appear in different garb, there is no substantial weakening of statism.
Needless to say, the signals for the future of the libertarian movement
are, at best, mixed. While libertarianism has made inroads in academia,
journalism, and even politics, it would be overly optimistic to argue that it
will inevitably score a victory over its intellectual rivals. However, political
philosophy is. presently in one of those periods of void which arises following
the destruction of the previously dominating world-view. If we may argue
that Marxism-socialism was, in fact, the ideological paradigm of the twentieth
century, then we do seemingly face an intellectual vacuum. The perspectives
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which most convincingly provide the best explanations for socialism's
apparent failures and the most attractive guide for future political action
have the advantages in filling this void. While libertarianism is not alone in
this intellectual struggle, it does hold distinctive advantages, since it has been
one of the most consistent and thorough alternatives challenging socialist
Marxist ideology. 6 And, of course, all of these speculations presume that
ideas ultimately shape and direct the world order.
However, is Rothbard's rather absolutist approach the optimal strategy
for winning over libertarian converts and, subsequently, bringing on the
advent of libertarian society? Unfortunately, his approach faces extreme
dilemmas which all too often leaves one with little or no course of effective
action. While it may be ethically true that the ends do not justify the means,
if libertarians are not willing to play political hard-ball and / or involve
themselves in the compromising and negogiating atmosphere of power
politics, they may be destined to faiL This possibility is unfortunate since the
body of libertarian scholarly writings represents a substantial and convincing
alternative to the less than successful ideological status quo. There may be

an

imbalance in the libertarian movement toward intellectual pursuits that all

6. In fact, Peterson (1987, pp. 237-245) explores the common complaints
that anarchism is impractical and concludes that such perspectives result
from low levels of moral development! Using modern cognitive
development theory, he argues that persons who are at higher levels of
moral development are much more often able to envision society without
the coercion of the State apparartus. Moreover, as higher order organizations
evolve, one may anticip ate less government in this emerging
"postconventional" stage.
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too often leaves these ideas on the "drawing board", deficient of the
willingness to slice through the soiled activities of a political process.
Moreover, the absolutism prevalent in a substantial portion of the
movement handicaps the open dialogue which must emerge for these ideas
to receive a fair hearing. Unfortunately, neither Rothbard's monistic
foundations nor his propensity to use the instrument of shock in his rhetoric
are conducive to that kind of interaction. Therefore, while the anarcho
capitalist model may have important points to add to the debates in political
ethics and public policy, it faces the dilemma of finding itself increasingly
preached to the previously converted.
In a recent article, libertarian theorist Loren Lomasky argues for a
"partial compliance theory" within both libertarian strategy and its code of
morals (Lomasky, 1990, pp. 39-40). Lomasky recognizes that success may only
come in gradual intervals. A useful libertarian strategy, then, demands 1 .) the
existence of legitimate expectations in light of present political realities and
the subsequent human expectations derived from these realities; 2.) the
realization of the transaction costs in reform and the subsequent recognition
that one might not prefer immediate reform even when the ultimate
morality demands it; and 3.) the recognition that in many circumstances the
best case may be the avoidance of the worst case, or at least the one true way
may not be attainable.
Of course, this argument surely leaves Lomasky susceptiable to charges
of impurity from those in the inner circles. And, to follow the "low road" of
ethics poses some very serious concerns. One always faces the "slippery slope"
of compromising the movement into an untimely death. But if libertarian
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supporters are not careful, they will miss a glorious opportunity to fill the
void created by the demise of world socialism. Whereas it may not be
necessary to relegate ethics to the Hobbesian world of fantasy, it is probably no
more preferable to rest uncompromisingly upon absolutist ethics. If
libertarianism takes this route, its program is destined to fail--similar to all
other brands of utopianism--as it will become unachievable in reality and
unfamiliar to anyone outside the small circle of ardent believers.
With these issues taken into consideration, our discussion of
Rothbard's social theory is completed. Chapter VII concludes our discussion
by examining the importance and place of Rothbard, in particular, and
libertarianism, in general, in the evolution of American political thought.

266

CHAPTER VII
ROTHBARD, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THEIR PLACE IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduction

We conclude our discussion of Rothbard's work by attempting to bring
his writings into an historical focus. This effort requires that we examine four
interrelated subjects in Chapter VII: 1 .) Rothbard's (and libertarianism's)
historical heritage; 2.) libertarianism's relationship to the modern American
ideological se tting; 3.) Rothbard's status in the evolution of libertarianism
and his influence in the present revival of these ideas; and 4.) the future of
libertarian thought in regard to the theoretical and historical advantages or
disadvantages it possesses within contemporary American political thought.

America and the Libertarian Heritage

Although libertarianism has in recent years spread in influence
worldwide, it is at root an American phenomenon. It is clearly a child of this
country's experience with the ideas of classical liberalism. And Rothbard's
anarcho-capitalist writings are as pure a statement of American radicalism
that has ever been penned. By extending the logic of the philosophy of
individualism and individual rights, he carries classical liberalism into the
realms of anti-authoritarian anarchism. It is unlikely his thought would be
understood outside this context.
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In a recent work on modern American ideology, William Maddox and
Stuart Lilie correctly articulate the fundamentally classical liberal character of
the United States (Maddox and Lilie, 1984, pp. 7-1 2) . They identify six
important tenets within this political perspective. First, and most
importantly, classical liberals maintain the idea of individualism. Humans
are autonomous; they precede society and/ or the State and create these
institutions to match their own personal interests. Hence, individuals are
viewed as "ends" and not "means" in the social order. Secondly, classical
liberals accept an instrumental or mechanical notion of government. Political
obligation is usually a function of individual self-interest, based on the idea of
the contract or constitution. Thirdly, through the "social contract", the State is
limited to the protection of the rights and/ or interests of the members of the
community. These limitation generate the "nightwatchman" State
politically /legally and support an economic system founded on the principles
of laissez-faire. Fourthly, classical liberalism endorses the notion of
individual rights which create separate spheres of action within the society
for particular individuals. These rights specifically include the rights to life,
liberty, and property. Fifthly, the rule of law is preferred--particularly the idea
of legal equality. Through this tenet, the classical liberal seeks to dissolve
existing priviledges and guarantee equal protection of individual rights
through the requirements of generally applied rules. The final, and least
important, tenet for classical liberalism is the existence of representative
government. While democracy was a central part of government for most
early American liberals, its significance was as an instrumental force in the
checking of political power, not as a primary factor in the benefits of actual
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participation in the political community. Since the goal of the classical liberal
theorist is to limit the State, participation is not an important item of concern.
Libertarianism is quite clearly a reawakening of these tenets in modern
political debate. The only factors which separate the two sets of ideas are time
and the degree of "purity". Libertarians face a different agenda in the
contemporary world. Moreover, writers such as Rothbard are much more
sophisicated ideologically than past orthodox liberals.
Nevertheless, the similarities are quite strong. Rothbard, for instance,
draws an extremely dose connection between the two schools of thought.
Accordingly, libertarian theory has been a significant component in the
history of American thought. The initial foundations of the movement are
found in the English writings of the Levelers and, of course, John Locke. In
America, the more radical Lockean writings of John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon, in Cato's Letters, laid the framework for an American libertarian
ethos. These principles are exemplified in both the revolutionary war debate
and in the Articles of Confederation, the United States' first government.
These ideas enjoyed the advantages generated by the unique nature of the
American situation which provided a cultivating atmosphere for classical
liberalism. These views began unimpaired in the United States, minus the
feudalistic and aristocratic priviledges and institutional constraints which
impeded European classical liberalism. Moreover, they possessed the popular
support of overwhelming numbers of the citizenry. Finally, our geographical
isolation provided a nurturing atmosphere for these ideas, exemplified in
both our early domestic and foreign policies. America, Rothbard concludes,
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was "born in an explicitly libertarian revolution" (Rothbard, 1978, p. 6). 1
These foundational principles have never completely disappeared.
In Rothbard's view, early libertarian America was the nation of the
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the principles
of the Anti-Federalists, and not the America of the pragmatic and ordered
liberty of the Constitutional Framers. While Federalist theory maintained
great influence in the early years of post-Constitutional America, he
concludes that libertarian values began to dominate thought in the early
nineteenth century. He particularly links modern libertarian thought to the
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements which, he argues, "explicitly strived
for the virtual elimination of government from American life" (Rothbard,
1978, pp. 6-7).2
Despite the "grave antilibertarian flaw in the libertarianism of the
Democratic program" of slavery in Jacksonianism, Rothbard refuses to accept
the notion that the new emerging Republican coalition had any libertarian
i nfluences (Rothbard, 1 9 78b, p. 8) . He views the nineteenth century
Republican Party as statist, nationalist, anti-secessionist, and corporatist.
Eventually, however, the Democratic Party also surrendered these classical
liberal principles, domestically in 1896, and internationally in the 1 9 1 0's.

1. For a more extended discussion, examine Rothbard (1978b, pp. 1-19).
For a divergent perspective which views libertarianism as "gravely flawed,"
see Newman (1984, pp. 50-75).
2. Rothbard's discussions of history often unfortunately tend toward
hyperbole. For example, it is unlikely that Native Americans viewed the
"Trail of Tears" as an example of the United States striving for the
elimination of the State.
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Therefore, in Rothbard's view, by the twentieth century both major political
parties in America, and the ideas they represented, had surrendered the
traditional libertarian ethos which had been so significant to the nation's
early experience.
It is in what Bernard Bailyn calls the "permanent legacy" (Bailyn, 1967,
pp. 1-21) of the Revolution and the grassroots classical liberalism of
Jeffersoniani sm

and

Jacksonianism

that

Rothbard

roots

modern

libertarianism. He defines the evolution of ideas in America political thought
in a rather unique manner, viewing them as a struggle between the liberatory
ideas of classical liberalism versus a series of conservative traditions in
different "clothing" which sought to prevent the dynamic extension of
individual freedom. These conservative propensities began to reshape
American thought in the late nineteenth century, he contends. Radical ideas
faced extreme reaction from what he terms the "Old Order", which sought to
return to a society of priviledge, hierarchy, mercantilism, militarism, and
absolutism through the usurpation of the opportunities in which the
Industrial Revolution and its consequences provided.

Rothbard heaps the

greatest blame for the diminishing of libertarian values in the Western world
upon this "conservative" tradition. As a "dressed-up version of the a n cien
regime," the conservative forces reconnected old priviledged alliances within

the new institutional arrangements of the modern industrial world of the
late nineteenth century (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 1 0). In Rothbard's view, then, the
Progressive movement was anything but forward-looking. Its fusion of labor,
corporation, and State contrived to reestablish a new conservative ruling
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class. 3 Ultimately, the final collaboration with intellectuals (see Chapters IV
and VI) gave this New Order the ability and opportunity to reshape public
opinion in Western democracies.

Hence, the ethos of classical liberalism

passed away--or, at least, went into hibernation.
Rothbard realizes that one of the most effective means in achieving
this transformation was through the expropriation of political labels. The
twentieth century's "New Order", fundamentally reactionary in nature, was
able to capture the "progressive", "radical", and even "liberal" labels.
Conversely, classical liberalism, particularly in America, was stuck with the
"conservative" stigma (Rothbard, 1978b, p. 12) . Even today, classical liberals
are incorrectly positioned in the same ideological camp as traditional or
communitarian conservatives. (See the proceeding section for additional
discussion.) A central thesis in his historical analysis is that these
classifications are fundamentally incorrect.
There was, according to Rothbard, a second reason for the
disintegration of classical liberalism in the nineteenth century, namely, the
advent of socialism. Socialism represented a "confused, hybrid movement"
which combined parts of both classical liberalism and conservatism. It

3. Note the similarities of Rothbard's interpretations of American
political and economic history and those of Neo-Marxism. Both views, for
example, highlight the emerging collusion between State and Business which
arose rapidly in the Progressive Era. Obviously, however, these
interpretations use similar evidence to reach wholly different conclusions.
Whereas Marxists view collusion as a demonstration of the inherent
inevitability of capitalism's failure, libertarians conclude that this evidence
shows the necessity for limiting or (in Rothbard's case) removing the
temptations of government and the political process.
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coupled liberal ends (liberation) with conservative means (centralized
authority) and, in the process, silenced the radical purpose which once
defined liberalism (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 12-13). The camouflaged Old Order-
veiled in the radical rhetoric of Marxism--was able to "outflank" liberalism in
the arenas of hope and reform. Whereas liberalism once represented radical
change, it settled into a moderate and, subsequently, stagnant gradualist
position with the advent of socialism. Rothbard, thus, interprets modern
liberalism's efforts to reform and / or reject the classical tenets as a
surrendering of its initial purpose to a series of collectivist and / or
conservative ideologies.
Hence, from Rothbard's perspective, it was not the competition with
superior ideas, but the "inner rot within the vitals of Liberalism" that
ultimately defeated it (Rothbard, 1979d, p.4). First, it surrendered its devotion
to abolitionism for adherence to a conservative gradualism as the proper
ethical position. Secondly, it abandoned natural rights philosophy for
utilitarian ethics. Accordingly, expediency and the acceptance of the status quo
replaced militancy and change (Rothbard, 1978b, pp. 1 5-1 6). Consequently,
without these specific ethical imperatives, liberalism suffered a gradual
devolution toward statism. Thirdly, a substantial portion of liberalism came
to accept social Darwinism, which a priori rejected the path of radicalness.
Theorists such as Herbert Spen cer, Rothbard concludes, "abandoned
liberalism as a fighting, radical creed and confined [ their] liberalism in practice
to a weary, conservative, rearguard action against the growing collectivism
and statism of [ their] day" (Rothbard, 1979d, pp. 4-5). Finally, liberalism's
historical co:r:nmitment against imperialism and militarism, exemplified in
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the writings of the English Manchester School, passed away as the world
entered the twentieth century. As a result, the guiding principles of neutrality
and non-intervention were replaced by foreign involvement and power
driven nation-states which, Rothbard contends, led to the devastation caused
by this century's wars. Modern liberalism, then, lost sight of the values of
non-interventionism and classical rights, turning instead to an economically
and militarily intervening State that redefined its rights framework to
include overtly egalitarian overtones.
And for the substantial part of this century the ideas of classical
liberalism have been in deep hiatus in America. The "isms" of the twentieth
century which arose from the turbulence in Europe dominated political
debate and practice. The scattered remnants of what was termed liberalism
gradually became co-opted by these similarly collectivist ideologies. Only
muffled criticisms from a few remaining critics of this evolution toward
statism remained.
However, as Friedman and McDowell note, at the close of World War
II,

there were arising concerns which were to foreshadow the reemergence of

classical liberalism in America and elsewhere (Friedman and McDowell, 1 983,
p. 48).

Beginning with the trenchant arguments found in Hayek's Road to

Serfdom, a reappraisal of the directions that liberalism was taking began
(Hayek, 1944). While one of the "isms" seemed buried, namely, fascism, a
substantial threat to liberal values remained after World War

II,

evidenced by

the spread of socialist influence. Hayek's criticisms of the popular modes of
central planning joined a set of historical enemies by demonstrating the
economic and political shortcomings of both fascism and socialism. His work
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laid the groundwork for the critiques of socialism and the milder social
liberalism which was to follow.
Initially, the criticisms of expanding collectivist thought arose under
the larger umbrella of what was called in America, at least, conservatism.
However, the movement itsel f possessed fundamentally divergent
perspectives. The tensions which existed in the "right-wing" of American
ideology between traditional conservatism and libertarianism rested dormant
when focused upon the critique of the modern social liberal agenda. It was
not until the crisis of Vietnam and the turbulence of the 1 960's that these
fundamental differences overwhelmed the possibility of a permanent
alliance. The core value of individualism which most assists in
distinguishing the libertarian movement from traditional conservatism was
bound to become elucidated in times of political and intellectual crisis.
The contemporary period has produced crises that have further
distinguished libertarianism from either American conservatism or modern
liberalism. In the past thirty years events have redefined the political
spectrum, threatening the Keynesian policy paradigm, the militaristic and
anti-communistic policies of foreign intervention, and the entire socialist and
central planning mentality. Libertarianism's uniquely individualistic
message continues to separate it from the traditional views of the American
ideological mainstream.
Yet, in a difference sense, the definition of these ideas are merely the
rediscovery of a heritage. No serious political perspective in America may
expect to achieve popularity without retaining some degree of this libertarian
inclination; there still remains a fundamental reverence in American to the
275

tenets of individualism; although classical liberalism may be deep below the
apparent contemporary political debate, it is still present. Of course, at times,
these impulses demonstrate themselves in unprincipled and illogical ways
and stray substantially from the founding principles of America. But they
ultimately provide the most rudimentary drive in American public policy.
Contemporary libertarianism may be understood as a concerted effort to
rediscover these first principles through a thoughtful and principled
development of these tenets.
It is not difficult to understand why libertarian ideas have flourished
the longest and most thoroughly in their American contexts. Criticisms
which arose against the expanding statism in this century were often the
works of American critics (Nock, 1983; Chodorov, 1980). Likewise, it is not
surprising that the libertarian revival first reemerged on the American
political scene.

In fact, David DeLeon argues that there is

an

"anarcholibertarian sensibility" in the American political tradition (DeLeon,
1978, p.6). He identifies this sensibility in three distinctive strands: 1 .) the
radically Protestant and individualistic nature of American religion; 2.) a
sense of economy that highlights the singular spirit rather than the collective
spirit, in which community is often defined through market processes; and,
3.) a feeling of openness and opportunity and all that is derived from these
sensations in the historical boundlessness of America physically. All of these
factors combine to create radical, liberatory, and even utopian core values.
American liberalism, which is arguably more of a way of life than a set of
ideas, is the moderate expression of these values. Libertarianism, when
viewed in this light, is simply the more radical and consistent expression of
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the first principles of classical liberalism and the American way of life. And
surely Rothbard represents the purest modern statement of this "sensibility".
However, radicalism has historically been characterized by violence,
inconsistent writings, and utopianism. To the degree in which libertarianism
represents American radicalism, it seems to be different. First, its focus is
upon ideas and not action. Different from both the active but intellectually
devoid "New Left" and the fatalistic but intellectual sophisicated traditional
conservative movement, the libertarian movement seeks to synthesize
activism with the intellectual forces that shaped the American experience.
Secondly, these ideas are attractive to individuals who are not normally
found in radical political movements . Libertarianism has in many ways an
ironic middle class, or even upper class, attraction (Maddox and Lilie, 1 984).
As DeLeon argues, anarcho-capitalism allows "college kids [to] find the
transition from Republican to anarchist much less difficult than may be
imagined" (DeLeon, 1978, p. 1 23). It is, then, an anarchism for middle
America which is both intellectually sophisicated and American to the core.
The libertarian heritage represents the subtle foundations for much of
everyday pragmatic American politics. In unusual ways it transcends
common contemporary ideological labels and provides
understanding of our intellectual heritage.

a deeper

It is able, for example, to

simultaneously accept Paine and Jefferson, Thoreau and Emerson, the
abolitionists, Henry George, anarchists like Lysander Spooner and Benjamin
Tucker, Randolph Bourne, and Albert Jay Nock while also being able to claim
the writings of John C. Calhoun, William Graham Sumner, Ludwig von
Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Frank Chodorov, Henry Hazlitt, Ayn Rand,
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Milton Friedman, and even a substantial portion of Barry Goldwater.
Radicalize any of these writers and discover a piece of Rothbardian thought.

Libertarianism's Position in the Modem I deological Spectrum

As we noted in the preceding section, it has been common to classify
libertarianism as a subset of the larger conservative movement which grew
in influence in America after World War

II.

Yet, this classification has never

really done justice to either libertarians or traditional conservatives because
of their fundamental differences. For example, traditional conservative
Russell Kirk assesses libertarianism.4
It is of high importance, indeed, that American
conservatives dissociate themselves altogether
from the sour remnant called libertarians. In a time
requiring long views and self-denial, alliance with
a faction founded upon doctrinaire selfishness
would be absurd-and practically damaging. It is not
merely that cooperation with a tiny chirping sect
would be valueless politically; more, such an
association would tend to discredit the
conservatives, giving aid and comfort to the
collectivist adversaries of ordered freedom. When
heaven and earth have passed away, perhaps the
conservative mind may be joined in synthesis-but
not until then. Meanwhile, I venture to predict, the
�ore intelligent and conscientious persons within
the libertarian remnant will tend to settle for

4. For a thorough discussion of the libertarian-conservative "fusionist"
debate, by a number of respected scholars, examine the works collected in
Carey {1984).
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politics as the art of the possible, so shifting into the
conservative c a m p . A t L a s t J u d g m e n t,
libertarianism may find itself reduced to a minority
of one, and its name will be not Legion, but
Rothbard (Kirk, 1984, pp. 123-124).
Kirk argues that a number of fundamental distinctions separate
libertarians and conservatives (Kirk, 1984, pp. 120-122). First, libertarians deny
the existence of a "transcendent moral order" for humans, and thus are
"converts to Marx's dialectical materialism." Secondly, libertarians grant
primacy to liberty, whereas conservatives are concerned first with social
order. Thirdly, libertarians view the cement of society as self-interest bonded
through the "nexus of cash payment. " Conservatives, on the other hand,
accept society as a "community of souls" linked by friendship and love.
Fourthly, libertarians believe in the goodness of human nature;
conservatives argue that it is "irremediably flawed". Fifthly, the libertarian
views the State as the "great oppressor." Conservatives see it as "ordained of
God," as the instrument toward which virtue may be achieved. Sixthly, Kirk
concludes, libertarians see the world as "a stage for the swaggering ego."
Conversely, conservatives respect tradition and the ancient customs.
These comments are significant not because of their validity--on most
points Kirk woefully misunderstands the libertarian perspective--but because
they demonstrate the grand chasm between traditional conservative and
libertarian perspectives. In a more balanced argument, Rothbard points out
five potential issues which separate the two systems of ideas (Rothbard, 1 981 a,
pp. 355-362).
The fir?t difference concerns the relationship of freedom and virtue. As
Kirk notes, conservatives view the State as the instrument by which humans
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may become virtuous. Libertarians, on the other hand, see the State as the
worst possible institution for this purpose; since it rests on the initiation of
force, the government guarantees that virtue will not be achieved. Secondly,
whereas libertarians see individuals as the only "life-stuff" in the social
world, conservatives grant a reality to collective entities such as the State or
society. For libertarians these institutions are abstractions. However, the
traditional conservative often comes quite close to giving these items ethical
priority. The libertarian would generally argue that efforts to achieve State
enforced community ultimately disintegrates true community which evolves
through voluntarism. Thirdly, a conservative is at root "an empiricist,
distrusting rational abstraction and principle, and wrapping himself in the
custom of his particular society." A libertarian, on the other hand, (quoting
Lord Acton) "wishes for what ought to be, irrespective of what is" (Rothbard,
198la, p. 357). 5 There is, then, according to Rothbard, a role for rational
thought which may supersede tradition and habit. Fourthly, as Kirk argues,
conservatives grant priority to order. Libertarians, on the other hand, contend
that order may only emerge through the provision of individual liberty. They
view State-imposed order as "artificial and destructive of the harmony
provided by following the natural order" (Rothbard, 1 98la, p. 360). Thus,
libertarians would thoroughly agree with Proudhon's famous dictum that
liberty represents the mother, and not the daughter, of order. Finally, there

5. While this distinction surely applies in Rothbard's case, there
appears to be no reason why a libertarian must accept these rationalist
constraints. For example, Hayek clearly would not; nevertheless, he claims he
is not a conservative.
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has been a traditional disagreement between the two groups over who should
rule, namely, the "populist" versus "elitist" debate. But, as Rothbard points
out, this distinction has become muddled in recent years because of the
contemporary conservative's attraction to "ultra-populism", a rather clear
break from the traditional elitist notion of rule in historical conservatism
(Rothbard, 198 1 a, p. 361). He argues that libertarians have consistently
maintained a "commonsensical" perspective which neither grants the masses
eternal wisdom nor the elites complete confidence, yet still holds to a long
run optimistic view of society.
Although there have been sporadic efforts to achieve a "fusion" of
libertarian and conservative theory, there is little reason to believe this
synthesis is, in reality, possible. Might, then, libertarianism find a home
within modern liberalism? There are definite reasons to en vision an
ideological unification. As we noted in the previous section, both modern
liberalism and libertarianism emerge from the same classical liberal genes.
Many libertarians share with modern liberals common Enlightenment
principles such as the rationalistic and science-focused approaches to
structuring society, for instance. Nevertheless, each would view the other as a
gross mutation in contemporary policy debates. Modern liberalism in many
ways resembles a "garbage barge" of ideas scarred by the years of intellectual
battles with alternative perspectives. Consequently, it has co-opted a vast
array of conflicting and moderating perspectives. It is a hybrid mix of
democratic

so cialism,

theoretical

egalitarianism,

and

pragmatic

utilitarianism, with remnants of old liberalism and individualism. Rothbard
is completely correct when he argues that modern liberalism has lost its
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"fire". It represents in the modern political struggle the force for the status
quo. Modern liberalism is devoid of vision and, like a boxer who has fought
one too many rounds, does not seem to have the fortitude to rediscover a
new one. The chances of libertarianism realigning with its historical name
are, therefore, unlikely. The differences from the many years of separation are
much too significant to overcome to allow a chance for a new fusion.
Hence, it appears that libertarianism fits into no pre-existing notions of
ideology in contemporary American society. It would be more fruitful to
define the movement as a separate and viable alternative to the common
ideological systems available in the modern American context. In fact, one
might procee d even further and speculate that the present set of ideological
.
alternatives are no longer applicable in our present policy context. This point
assists in explaining the success of modern libertarianism. Novel technology,
new political and economic realites, and transforming cultures make the
older definitions and classifications of ideologies obsolete in the new world.
The instability of internationalism, for example, makes the questions which
loom in the future larger and more significant and, in turn, causes the
answers which traditional ideologies provide to be insufficient and small.
The world is passing through a set of events that may define a new
millennium, and its emergence transforms the existing set of questions
which define political debate while enlivening the opportunities and dangers
these ideas produce. It is a period which cannot rely on humdrum politics-as
usual. A more comprehensive world order requires a more extensive
intellectual perspective than either traditional American liberalism or
conservatism may provide.
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One of these transformed and fundamental questions goes to the root
issues concerning the role and even the existence of the State. On one hand,
we may be entering a world which demands high levels of authority and
·
hierarchy to diminish the dangers of international economic and political
disorder. On the other hand, we might be engaging a new age of individual
and industrial mobility and technology which makes old definitions of the
State or perhaps even the nation-state itself obsolete. We are entering an age
that will first, judge the consequences of the past sixty years of American
politics and, secondly, provide a new guide for the next era. Of course, it is
still too soon to know exactly what this guide will entail, but it seems that
libertarianism is an especially useful model for meeting these new challenges.

Rothbard and Modern Libertarianism

Where· does Rothbard's writings fit in this libertarian renaissance? He
represents in many ways the "Marx" of the modern libertarian movement.
First, he developed many of his ideas in a period when libertarianism did not
have the substantial intellectual following it boasts today. Secondly, in his
work is the ideological and rhetorical fire which sparks an intellectual
movement. Many of the ideas that Rothbard's radical arguments first
(re)developed are found in the practical and more acceptable writings of
numerous contemporary minimalists and laissez-faire proponents today.
Although he is extremely critical of Rothbard's system of thought,
Stephen Newman calls him "the founder of the modern libertarian
movement" (Newman, 1984, p. 27) . He concludes that Rothbard represents a
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"model of the secular intellectual who has discovered a new faith" (Newman,
1 984, p . 27). While Newman provides these comments in a derogatory
manner, there is an important function to be served by these attitudes,
especially in the embryotic stages of a movement.
Furthermore, more than perhaps any other libertarian theorist,
Rothbard has actively worked to diminish the gulf between the American
Left and Right. Libertarianism possesses the advantage of being able to
dialogue with both liberals and conservatives. Depending upon the specific
issue, Rothbard has been over his career equally at home with both ends of
the tradi tiona! spectrum. As a revisionist historian and a severe critic of
American foreign policy, he finds allies on the Left (Radosh and Rothbard,
1 9 72; Rothbard, 1972c, pp. 66- 1 1 0) . As a dogmatic free market Austrian
economist, he is equally at ease with numerous conservative groups. He is
definitely a unique mixture of American political thought.
Norman Barry correctly identifies a number of philosophical roots or
sources of Rothbard's unique substance and style (Barry, 1986, p. 173). Three of
these influences stand out as most important. First, there is the influence of
the political philosophy of John Locke, especially his notions of property
rights and his theories of ownership. Rothbard formulates his natural rights
theory which rests upon the principle of self-ownership.

It

is quite clear that

he identifies himself as a part of both of the natural rights tradition and that
he understands his mission as one that is focused upon correcting the
contradictions which remain in Lockean political theory (Rothbard, 1982a, pp.
21-22). The second influence, the Austrian School of Economics, entails the
largest portion of Rothbard's scholarly work. Accepting his mentor Mises'
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scientific method and style, Rothbard carries forward the Austrian paradigm
in substantial ways. Praxeology and the use of apriorism--in economics and
ethics--serve as the foundation for the entire bulk of his work. He is
consistently able to merge these "value-free" perspectives with the ethics
found in his theory of liberty to provide a double front in his ongoing
intellectual struggle against statism (Barry, 1986, p. 1 73) . Rothbard's third
significant influence, Barry concludes, is distinctly American. There are clear
similarities between Rothbard's writings and earlier native American
anarchism. This inborn critique of the American State differs from
"imported" syndicalism and communistic anarchism in the same ways
America its e lf differs from the Old World. His writings resemble the
"peculiar kind of moral fervour" that is found in the individualistic
anarchism of writers such as Spooner, Tucker, and Stephen Pearl Andrews.
And i t also differs in substance from collectivist anarchism, as it attempts to
remove the "ch ains of authority" in uniquely American ways, namely,
through homesteading, the marketplace, and the destruction of politics.
The unusual combination of influences allows Rothbard to borrow
from diverse traditions, often filling apparent voids in each set of ideas. He
brings to Locke's theory the rigorous logic of an a priori axiomatic method,
leading him to recognize the contradictions that Locke, trapped between two
epochs of human history, could not realize. Rothbard rescues political
philosophy from the error of the classical theorists who sought to establish
ethics in collective society rather than upon the individual moral actor. He
provides the Austrian program the ethical foundations for the free market
that praxeology alone cannot generate. Conversely, to the moral fervor of
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native individualistic anarchism he brings the insights of post-marginalist
economics, correcting the weakest portion of American anarchist theory
(Rothbard, 19.74d). 6 Barry concludes of Rothbard's writings:
Rothbard's social thought, quite unjustifiably
neglected in the contemporary teaching of social
science, represents a remarkable synthesis of
economics, politics, jurisprudence and the
philosophy of social science, directed entirely at the
problems, and indeed prospects, of a free society.
His work constitutes perhaps the most powerful
and sophisicated form of individualistic anarchism
this century, if not in the entire history of this
particular social philosophy (Barry, 1986, p. 1 73).
How, then, does one explain the almost complete scholarly ignorance
of the substantial body of Rothbard's writings? One might argue that his
views are too far outside the mainstream of American political thought. Yet,
a cursory investigation of any major university library will uncover
numerous works on other anarchists. Most (if not all) of these writings entail
analyses of either communists or syndicalists. Perhaps radicalism is more in
style on the Left or, maybe anarcho-capitalism does not have a significant
scholarly following.
However, Rothbard's approach to theory does not facilitate a
propensity for scholarly dialogue, either. For example, he continues to write
in a style more appropriate of a movement in its embryoic stages. His
absolutist and monistic foundations also limit analytical discourse. Mutual

6. Rothbard correctly interprets Benjamin Tucker's theory of interest as
flawed, for example. He includes Lysander Spooner's views in that critique,
although there are seemingly important differences. See Hall (1986, pp. 226229).
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exchange of ideas with other systems or perspectives seems to be fruitless
when one feels he possesses the absolute truth. Nor is there much to be
gained in continued investigation by critics of Rothbard who reject the initial
premises in his thoroughly logical chain of axioms. While these criticisms
provide no evidence in favor or against the truth-claims of his ideas, they do
raise the equally important issue concerning the necessity of having an
intellectual audience. Due to the nature of his work, Rothbard may be
destined to be ignored in American political thought.
Rothbard's often brusque style further hinders the generation or
maintenance of an audience. For example, he is presently working toward the
completion of a comprehensive history of economic thought. But the small
examples of that research which are proceeding the text seem unnecessarily
controversial and devoid of a comprehensive understanding of historical
circumstances. Consider his assessment of Adam Smith:
.... [Smith's] devotion to laissez-faire was dubious at
best, and his 'contributions' to economics were
retrograde and disastrous. It took a century for
thinkers outside of Britain, especially in Austria, to
revive and develop the French utility and
subjective value tradition.... (Rothbard, 1987a, p. 8).
Smith was off the mark on value theory. Furthermore, most of the ideas of
The Wealth of Nations may now be pieced together from earlier sources to
demonstrate that Smith was also not all that original when we investigate his
theories from our modern perspectives. Moreover, Smith had numerous
exceptions to his principle of a laissez-faire economy. Finally, Smith, as
Rothbard is prone to note, may well have been sympathetic to the State
Church and he may have been a diligent customs officer. Nevertheless, from
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a strategic standpoint, what purpose do these criticisms serve in the
development of modern libertarian theory? Furthermore, the assessment
itself suffers from the dogmatic application of an unbending universal code
that is apparently oblivious to historical factors. Are we in 200 years, for
example, to ignore or condemn the contributions of Rothbard and focus
instead on the fact that he was employed by a State-supported University?
Having developed the "gospel" of anarcho-capitalism, Rothbard may now
ignore his intellectual opponents and chastise his comrades in the
advancement of the free society--although the first group surely outnumbers
the second set. This attitude might best explain why his works may never
receive the attention they deserve from even fellow libertarians. His radical
style and reproachful rhetoric served a younger movement well; his ideas
provided the foundation for much of the libertarian paradigm today. But
libertarian theory has matured intellectually from the questions of
foundations and first principles. Today, it faces the equally difficult issues of
concrete policy and application of libertarian ethics. Rothbard served a crucial
role in the advancement of these ideas, but as a founder and historical figure
rather than a contemporary and continuing influence.

The Future of Libertarianism

Nevertheless, that libertarianism has been able to reach a "mature"
stage speaks optimistically about the possible intellectual and political
successes of these ideas. In our final section, we explore both reasons for this
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optimism and also some remaining problems for libertarianism, in general,
and Rothbard, in particular, concerning this system of thought.
If the program were given the opportunity, what kind of world would
the ideas of Rothbard and libertarianism create? During the course of our
previous discussions, we attempted to critique Rothbard's arguments from
within the libertarian mentality, setting aside other distant criticisms which
might arise. However, one who does not accept the premises of this model
may provide a number of additional criticisms against the system. Some of
these complaints result solely from critiquing portions of these ideas too
narrowly or from pulling items out of context. A second set of critiques arises
from the realist set of assumptions, which contend that human society
cannot exist under the (lack of) constraints imposed by libertarianism. In this
critique, libertarian theory is guilty of failing to recognize the additional value
and role of order in society. Thus, these ideas represent not the heritage of
American politics, but what Friedman and McDowell call "a brilliant
caricature" of it: Through the exaggeration of individualism and the
apolitical portions of human existence, libertarianism "disfigures" political
life by ignoring or at least underestimating the institutional and political
power necessary to secure a balanced liberty (Friedman and McDowell, 1983,
pp. 62-63). By overemphasizing individual liberty, this movement ironically
increases disorder and the demands for authoritarianism.
Stephen Newman, in one of the few mainstream critiques of modern
libertarianism, carries this criticism further. He concludes that libertarianism,
rather than being a response to the modern crisis of public authority,
represents a· "symptom" of the disease itself (Newman, 1984, p. 49) .
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Following the well-known writings of Theodore Lowi, Newman argues that
the combination of limited public resources and weak governments created
circumstances which ignored the crucial issue of the "public interest".
Libertarianism's unfortunate response is to deny the existence of the concept
of an overarching public purpose and, subsequently, reject a role for political
power. Its solution to the crisis of authority is to abolish politics and to
replace it with the market (Newman, 1984, p. 42). But, in Newman's view,
this solution begs the question, for it merely replaces poli tical power with
economic power. Unfortunately, he concludes, libertarianism tends to ignore
the potentially oppressive consequences of private power and creates a world
in which persons "may be formally free but have little or no control over
their own lives" (Newman, 1984, p. 48).
Rothbard's system seems to be quite susceptible to these criticisms. If
freedom is defined completely in regard to one's property rights, i.e.,
limitations on movement are dictated by the space one is in control of, then it
is possible that persons who own no property could be completely free and
unable to do anything (Barry, 1986, p. 1 73)! Rothbard might respond to this
criticism in one of three ways: 1 .) So what? The dictates of ethics demand this
conclusion and, thus, it is imperative that property rights take precedence
over any other values; 2.) There must be additional components in the
definition of freedom and rights; it may not be solely the result of property
ownership; or, 3.) It is morally imperative that this definition of freedom
remain inseparably linked to a self-ownership and homesteading framework;
however, the consequences of this imperative are such that the concerns
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raised by these criticisms are unfounded. In other words, these complaints fail
to investigate the entire anarcho-capitalist "package".
Rothbard obviously may not accept the second choice without
surrendering his entire system of ethics. Yet, if the implicit assumption of the
first alternative is correct, i.e., that one may anticipate inequality of outcome
in the libertarian system, then these ethics may create severe hardships for
numerous persons (and, at times, he comes very close to supporting this
untenable position). Even if absolute property rights are ethically necessary, it
would be an unacceptable consequence for the persons who suffer the fate of
impoverishment; therefore, there are serious concerns involving the degree
of social order which would be retained in such a system. But is not third
possibility empirically unattainable? Will not the "play" of market forces
guarantee an emerging inequality of property and, subsequently, eliminate
the effective use of one's rights? May rights of any kind be protected within a
system which generates inordinate differences in the levels of resources each
individual possesses and, consequently, the amount of economic power one
retains?
There is a long-standing and implicit assumption in the vast majority
of liberal thought which concludes that unhampered markets create unequal
material outcomes. Even Rothbard seems to accept this conclusion in his
criticisms o ( egalitarianism. However, if inequality is the rule, his entire
system is threatened by the critique leveled above. These outcomes likely
erode a community's respect for ethical principles, creating more of a
Hobbesian condition than a Lockean one in a state of anarchy. If this
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inequality reached substantial portions, the entire order itself would be
severely threatened.
Is, then, the maintenance of social order (which presumedly would be
threatened by vast difference in wealth among persons) a "public good"
beyond private provision in an anarchist system? There appears to be no
reasons to assume that free riding would not be overcome by cooperation in
this area as in almost all the arenas we discussed in Chapter V. The extreme
transitional costs which apply to external defense are surely not applicable in
this case; social disorder brought about by wealth inequities would evolve in a
very gradual manner. There are no theoretical reasons to presume private
charity would not prevent social turmoil. But the need for these actions on
the part of wealthy individuals is itself built upon an assumption as to
consequences of a market process. The outcomes of an unbridled free market
is an empirical question and, as of yet, we have had no perfect laboratory to
test this proposition. Neo-Marxists and libertarians alike have indicated the
tendencies of alliances to arise between businesses and the State. From
p o l i t i ca l collusion follows monopoly a n d inequality. Without the
monopolistic instrumentations of political power, might the concern over
inequality largely disappear? Might it be more likely that economic inequality
is the result of allowing the use of governmental institutions? And, if this
argument is correct, would it not be best to eliminate or at least severely
restrict these institutions? Rather than define libertarianism as a means of
protecting existing priviledge through the language of human rights and
markets, why not view its market process as an essential ingredient in
accomplishing the exact opposite results of breaking priviledge and dispersing
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wealth in increasingly equal increments? From this perspective, the most
effective way to prevent undue social power is to avoid the formation of any
forms of State-maintained monopoly power.
But the main criticism in which Newman levels against libertarianism
is that it destroys the notion of the public life. In opposition to this "vision",
Newman supports a "classical" view of participatory politics which he argues
will foster a strong sense of collectivity and community. Unfortunately, this
critique seems to arise from a misconception of libertarianism. Newman
argues, for example:
Libertarianism aims at nothing short of the
privatization of social existence. True to its liberal
origins, libertarianism rejects the public life in
favor of the private life cultivated by self-interested
bourgeois individualists .... [T]his position overlooks
the broader conception of politics that derives from
the classical republican tradition and the ancient
Greek polis. It denies the element of collective
purpose essential to their understanding of political
life. Libertarianism carries liberal privatism to an
extreme by redefining the state (in terms of its
functions) as a kind of private enterprise and
moving to replace politics by the market.
In the world projected by libertarian theory
the individual stands in relation to the whole not
as a citizen but as a consumer ..... (Newman, 1984, p.
162).
This familiar complaint misunderstands the depth of libertarian social
theory. First, Newman misconceives and underestimates the breadth of the
libertarian "marketplace" . A libertarian market (in the Austrian tradition, at
least) encompasses all exchanges, not merely those within the "cash nexus"; it
remains neutral on the issue of the value of the action except to protect the
principle of non-interference. The difficult burden of demonstrating how a
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political structure better facilitates the plans of individuals than the actual
individual falls upon the proponents of the doctrine of a specific "public
interest". Secondly, he substitutes for the liberal instrumental conception of
the State a naive and utopian view of the polity. Somehow, "citizenship
expands the power of the individual to shape the social environment in
collaboration with others. " On the other hand, "consumership requires that
the individual confront the world as given." For reasons he leaves unknown,
the market order must be "accepted as a fact of social life" waiting for
entrepreneurs and powerful corporations to move the world (Newman, 1984,
p. 163). Yet these same "isolated" individuals are able to discover the warmth
and community of the State. In the polity, the individual is significant and
enjoys a sense of belonging. In a marketplace, he is weak and isolated.
Newman falls prey to the same dogmatic dualism that he accuses
libertarianism of. 7 It is not clear, for example, why the State is going to be any
more responsive than the market to the needs of the "public life". If one
compares the notion of the single individual against the force of the market
with the idea of citizens who able to generate strong collective identity within
the State, then, of course, the latter alternative will appear more attractive.
But, obviously, this comparsion is a false dichotomy. More often it is
the single citizen against the Big State. At times, it is large collectivities
against the Big Corporation. The same human nature which helps to dictate
actions in one of these realms remains unchanged when one moves into the

7. On the critique of "libertarian dualism" examine Sciabarra (1987, pp.
93-95).
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other arena. · Newman, for example, argues that envy is not a pol i tical
emotion, since it "promotes the egoistic war of all against all" and will not
"generate bonds of allegiance that transcend economic self-interest"
(Newman, 1984, p. 164). But his notions of both envy and politics represent
utopian, or at least highly unlikely, visions of human reality. Whether envy
is "political" in Newman's idealized perspective is unimportant; it surely
occurs in the political process in the real world. Theory must take humans as
given. Newman's criticisms of libertarianism come full circle and defeat his
own vision: The consumer and the citizen are the same individual.
Yet, there is an even more misguided criticism in Newman' s
argument, one that is commonly found in attacks on libertarianism.
Politics, understood in terms of collective
purpose, invites us to consider the public good
before our private desires. Libertarians cannot
contemplate this notion of politics without
perceiving the threat of totalitarianism. They fear
the destruction of individuality in the name of a
higher good. Ultimately, their case rests on the
claim that freedom and privacy are inseparable.
Whatever its character, whether totalitarian or not,
politics is always an invasion of privacy. It burdens
private men and women with public obligations
(Newman, 1984, p. 164).
He unfortunately makes a common error in politics of creating an overly
limited notion of what is entailed by the term "public" . Why must the
"public good" receive its meaning through the dictates of a government, for
example? M�reover, why must there always be one singular purpose? For
libertarians, politics by definition is the use of force by certain persons who
agree with the implementation of an action against others who are not
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willing to voluntarily go along with the decision . By definition, when it is
possible, we ought to avoid these sorts of activities. The intent of the former
group might well be to place the good of the public (assuming such a thing
exists) over the selfish interests of the particular individuals. But i t may
(perhaps more likely) be merely the former coalition's imposition of their
brand of interests upon all the rest of society. The articulation of the "good
society" through monopolistic political actions quite often becomes either
naive rhetoric or clever camouflauge for the execution of special interests.
There is absolutely no reason why self-interest may not be transcended
as easily in the anarchist system as within the polity. Newman's argument
fails unless he is willing to contend that the market itself creates selfishness,
whereas politics somehow creates the desire for an altruistic and/ or collective
purpose. But this assumption is riddled with problems. First, it faces the
inner contradiction that arises when one uses force through the State
apparatus to achieve "moral" ends.

A libertarian would argue that to

conclude that an immoral action may be used to achieve a moral conclusion
faces a severe dilemma. As Rothbard points out, freedom is a necessary,
although not a sufficient, condition for virtue. Moreover, why would one
turn to the State for assistance in "imposing" morality; it is arguably the worst
form of institutional arrangement for achieving these goals, for it embodies
the monopoly of violence (Rothbard, 1981a, p. 353; Hayek, 1944, pp. 134-152).
While the market process cannot guarantee virtuous actions, there appears to
be no reason to anticipate that the political process will be any more
successful at this endeavor.
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But Newman's additional criticism is even less appropriate in regard
to libertarian theory. Critics perceive the market process as an atomistic,
estranged, and alienated system devoid of any sense of community. But from
the libertarian perspective, the only true communities which exist are those
that emerge through the free interaction of individuals. These critiques
unfortunately possess a limited idea of the Stateless society. For example,
there is no reason why libertarians must support "privacy" as the primary
value or live isolated and segregated lives. These are merely values which
individuals may chose or reject freely. They are not, in fact, the values that
most libertarians would expect to be dominant in a free society. Persons will
create their own communities, their o w n higher values, and their o w n
obligations in the State-less society. These values will arise without the
(generally misdirected) intervention of the government. More importantly,
there is no reason to assume that these community values must be imposed
uniformly upon all individuals. Humans are free to seek their privacy, but
this same principle provides them the freedom to create their own
communities. Privacy, atomism, and isolation are the consequences of the
market only if persons freely choose those values. And the extension of the
State--the alternative in this case--surely does not eliminate these problems.
Therefore, Newman's ( mainstream) critique of libertarianism fails
because it applies an unfortunately incorrect and overly limiting notion of
virtue on human interaction. The libertarian principle of value neutrality
may offend writers such as Newman who believe that a more narrowly
defined notion of the good society ought to be imposed on their fellow
citizens. All that libertarian theory postulates is that liberty is the highest
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political end and not necessarily the highest human end (Rothbard, 1981a, p.
354). Still, these perceptions remain in the academy: These ideas supposedly
lead to societies of "isolated, hermetically sealed atom[s]," operating in a
vacuum; they generate libertines and hedonists who "worship the Sears
Roebuck catalogue"; or, they are atheistic and materialistic with absolutely no
connection to spiritual matters (Rothbard, 1980c, pp. 9-1 3). Sometimes in life
persons may exhibit each of these qualities; at other times, they may be able to
transcend these characteristics. But these qualities will exist or will not exist
regardless of whether the State is present or absent. To conclude that within
the market, these activities will somehow mystically increase is an empirical
question and, as of yet, there is no reason to believe it has any foundation in
reality. In fact, it would be perhaps easier to demonstrate a correlation
between the growth of the public sector and the kind of materialism and
greed that so troubles Newman. It is this type of naive perspective which
blindly ignored the consequences of statism and gave rise to the libertarian
renaissance in the first place.
Hence, despite these substantial criticisms there is strong evidence that
libertarianism is enjoying expanding influence in both political and
intellectual circles . One may speculate that these ideas will continue to
increase in influence into at least the near future. There are at least three
reasons for this optimism.
First, there is a substantial amount of evidence that there is significant
support for libertarian policy among mass opinion, although the number of
self-identifying libertarians remains low. Maddox and Lilie argue that the old
liberal-conservative spectrum of post-World War II is no longer applicable in

298

the contemporary American political scene (Maddox and Lilie, 1 984, pp. 1-4).
By further dividing ideological classifications from two into four
components, they are able to successfully place a substantially larger number
of persons under fairly consistent ideological quadrants.
Maddox and Lilie define the new category of libertarianism as
supportive of both economic freedom and social freedom. Individuals
exemplifying these qualities, they conclude, tend to support minimal
government, property rights, social freedoms, and a non-interventist foreign
policy. They also found that (by 1980) approximately one/fifth of Americans
could be classified as libertarians. More importantly, perhaps, these numbers
increased significantly during the period of post-Watergate/ Vietnam
America. At the beginning of the 1 970's, for instance, conservatives
outnumbered libertarians by a margin of two to one; by 1980, libertarians had
surpassed conservatives in total numbers. Maddox and Lilie also explored
these ideologies based on their demographic components. While populism
(persons taking policy stances that are generally opposite those of libertarians)
remained the largest overall category, with slightly more than one/ fourth of
the total, libertarianism may hold substantial future advantages. The populist
ideology is found heavily among older individuals, particularly those
persons who came of maturity before or during the New Deal (Maddox and
Lilie, 1984, p. 76) . Libertarianism, on the other hand, is strongest with groups
maturing in the period of 1950-1970--individuals who in 1990 are coming into
positions of influence and power. Moreover, libertarians tended to be of
middle to upper class backgrounds, with higher incomes and greater levels of
education (Maddox and Lilie, 1984, p. 96) . All this evidence would seem to
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indicate that the libertarian movement may find an influential and willing
audience for their ideas in the 1990's.
Secondly, there is an expanding network of libertarian think tanks,
institutes, presses, journals, and educational programs and seminars to satisfy
the demands generated by the growing mass appeaL S Furthermore, there
seems to be an extensive crusade to attract young scholars to these ideas. In
short, there is clear evidence that at least the intellectual portion of
libertarianism has its house in order. Whereas the gradual influx of young
libertarians into the academy does not compare to the rapid penetration of
American universities by Neo-Marxists in the 1960's, the eventual effect may
be quite similar.
Thirdly, the "objective" criteria that Rothbard discusses seems to be in
place i nternationally for the s ubstitution of a new dominant ethic. The
changes in the American political system in the last twenty years, for
instance, ought not to be underestimated. The language of the Welfare State's
Great Society and the anti-communist rhetoric of the Vietnam conflict has
been replaced by austere budgetary constraints and military disengagement
from the Cold War. On a grander international scale, we may be witnessing
the demise of socialism. But while the practical political battles seem to have
been won for Eastern Europe (at least the impediments have been removed),
the more important intellectual battle remains. Both liberals and

8. Friedman and McDowell (1983) include a partial and now outdated list of
libertarian organizations. Our own unofficial count netted over thirty
libertarian or libertarian-leaning foundations, institutes, presses, or other
forms of organizations aimed at the dissemination and/ or development of
these ideas in the United States.
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conservatives in America are scrambling to respond to recent world-changing
events. Conservativi sm is now required to reconsider its overt anti
communist perspectives which won control of the movement over the
traditional isolationist segments in the 1950's. It can no longer rely on the
successes of the "we-them" mentality which directed its international
"vision" in recent political debate. Today, with the possibility of their
ultimate enemy disintegrating, this strongly negatively-oriented ideology
faces a severe identity crisis.
Liberals face a more subtle and potentially more damaging problem,
though. Lost in the hoopla of the emerging "democracy" in Eastern Europe
are the economic realities which are probably more important in the
production of these changes. Concerning the viabili ty of centralized
socialism, Ludwig von Mises has been vindicated. But Mises' critique was
equally aimed at the "third way" of economic allocation, namely, the mixed
economies of the West. While modern liberalism stresses the divergent
political attributes of socialism and liberalism, i t tends to ignore the economic
arena. But there are ominous parallels between politi cal and economic
authoritarianism. Liberation is not achieved through acceptance of only half
of this formula. On this issue, American liberalism may face its ultimate
challenge.
It will be these sorts of issues which potentially may provide the kind
of crisis that leads to fundamental intellectual change. Perhaps it will emerge
so slowly as to be undetected until its effects have clearly restructured the
contemporary world. As we have continually demonstrated in our
discussions, there are numerous reasons to anticipate that the libertarian
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movement will be a significant participant in the reforms that emerge. And
Murray Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism has surely been a vital component in
the advancement of these ideas.
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